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THESIS

THE 'CHINA FACTOR' IN JAPANESE MILITARY
MODERNIZATION FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

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June 1997

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**THE 'CHINA FACTOR' IN JAPANESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION FOR
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
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


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
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ABSTRACT

Japan's reevaluation of its security position and the role it wishes to play in regional and international matters has been influenced by the reemergence of China and continue to affect Japan as it moves to its newly described role. Japan's ongoing modernization of its forces, which are directed under its National Defense Program Outline and Midterm Defense Program, do not, however, seem to be in reaction to any overt perception of a Chinese threat or Chinese influence. These programs reflect Japan's decision to take a "balanced approach" to security, an approach based on the United States-Japan security arrangements, supported by a self-reliant defense force and in conjunction with regional and international approaches to security.

The Japanese, with their balanced approach to security, are carefully preparing for the 21st Century. By addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international perspectives, Japan is putting itself on a more even keel. It is no longer relying exclusively on the United States-Japan security arrangements nor is it waiting for the United States to lead the way in its foreign policy. The "China factor," in its small way, has enabled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with the United States, its neighbors, as well as the rest of the world, as it prepares for the 21st Century. Areas of tension remain, however, that could stress, strain or break its security structure. Such an event could cause Japan to reassess the system it has chosen. What is clear, however, is that Sino-Japanese relations will play a critical role on which ever path it goes.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ACSA	Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
APEC	Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASDF	Air Self-Defense Force (Japan)
ASEAN	Association of South-East Asian Nations
ASEAN-PMC	ASEAN-Post Ministerial Conference
ASW	Anti-Submarine Warfare
AWACS	Airborne Warning And Control System
BMD	Ballistic Missile Defense
C³	Command, Control, and Communications
C³I	Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence
CBM	Confidence Building Measures
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command (U.S.)
CMC	Central Military Commission (PRC)
CSBM	Confidence and Security Building Measures
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
DIH	Defense Intelligence Headquarters (Japan)
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party (Taiwan)
DPRK	Democratic People's Republic of Korea
EASR	East Asia Strategy Report
EU	European Union
FBIS	Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FSX	Future Support Fighter (now know as the F-2)
GSDF	Ground Self-Defense Force (Japan)
HNS	Host Nation Support
HTTP	HyperText Transport Protocol
IDDN	Integrated Defense Digital Network
IMF	International Monetary Fund
JDA	Japan Defense Agency
JETRO	Japan External Trade Relations Organization
JSP	Japan Socialist Party
KEDO	Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization
LDP	Liberal Democratic Party (Japan)
LEGCO	Legislative Council (Hong Kong)
LST	Landing Ship-Tank
MITI	Ministry of International Trade and Industry (Japan)
MSDF	Maritime Self-Defense Force (Japan)
MTDP	Mid-Term Defense Program
NDPO	National Defense Program Outline
NSC	National Security Council (United States)

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
PARC	Policy Affairs Research Council of the LDP
PEP	Personnel Exchange Program
PKO	Peace Keeping Operations
PLA	People's Liberation Army (China)
PLAN	PLA Navy (China)
PLAAF	PLA Air Force (China)
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PRC	People's Republic of China
QDR	Quadrennial Defense Review (United States)
RIMPAC	Rim of the Pacific (United States Joint Training Exercise)
RMB	Renminbi (Currency of PRC)
ROC	Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
SACO	Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa
SC	Security Council (Japan)
SCAP	Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
SCC	Security Consultative Committee
SDF	Self-Defense Forces
SDPJ	Socialist Democratic Party of Japan
SIPRI	Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SSBN	Ballistic Missile Submarine, Nuclear-Powered
SSN	Attack Submarine, Nuclear-Powered
START	Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
TIAS	Treaties and Other International Acts Series (United States)
TMD	Theater Missile Defense
UN	United Nations
UNSC	UN Security Council
UNSCOM	UN Special Committee
USFJ	United States Forces in Japan
UST	United States Treaty Series

NOTE ON PERSONAL NAMES

Japanese, Chinese and Korean personal names appearing in this work are normally given with the family name first, as is the custom in these countries. Whenever possible this format has been followed. Some publications, however, do reverse the personal names, following the western custom with the family name last. The list of references and the bibliography, which are in family name order, will clarify any questions or problems with the proper listing of the name.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This thesis examines the "China factor" in Japan's modernization for the 21st Century of its security structure and military. More specifically, it looks at Japan's reaction to the reemergence of China as a powerful player in East Asia security affairs. This reaction has led to a reevaluation of its security position and the role it wishes to play in regional and international matters. It has required a reevaluation of the security environment in East Asia, the security arrangements based on the United States-Japan security relations and a thorough review of the missions, doctrine, training, manning and equipment of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces. Despite the dramatic changes that have occurred in the last seven to ten years, Japan has taken an approach which has been incremental and has taken action only after extensive planning.

I begin with a review of the relationship between Japan and China, in which a number of characteristic trends are identified and examined. The Sino-Japanese relationship has struggled through a history of aggression, animosity and misperceptions that continue to color their dealing with one another today. Some of the emblematic factors in this relationship, such as nationalism, racism, and the fear of a "new Japanese militarism," can be traced from these historical relations and continue to influence their modernization efforts. Despite the growing "friendship," economic aid and increasing trade between the two countries, the negative images and animosity lingers on and continue to have an important impact on the way in which these two countries interact.

Japan clearly sees China as a growing competitor in the East Asian security arena and one that must be watched. In its annual (1996) white paper on defense, Japan for the

first time has identified China as a country which needs to be given more attention by its defense establishment. A brief examination of the important factors behind China's military modernization provides a background and the basis from which to measure the degree to which Japan is responding in its modernizations to China.

Japan Self-Defense Force's modernization programs, as outlined in the 1995 revision of the National Defense Program Outline, the Mid-Term Defense Program (1996-2000), and the 1996 white paper on defense are examined. I then turn to look at the structure of the Self-Defense Forces and the impact of its current "drawdown," restructuring and new missions on the capabilities of each branch. This examination makes clear that the modernization of Japan's Self-Defense Force reflect Japan's appreciation of its new security environment and are closely associated with the security arrangements with the United States. The 'China Factor' has not had a great deal of direct influence on Japan's military modernization, but indirectly it has been a strong factor in the security approaches which Japan now embraces.

Given that Japan's defense policies and arrangements are intricately linked to the United States, no analysis of Japan's modernization programs would be complete without an examination of the United States-Japan security relations. Specifically, I examine the changes or redirection of effort agreed announced in the United States-Japan Security Declaration in April 1996, the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and the ongoing revisions to the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. It is obvious that this security relationship has a great impact on Japan's actions and influences its response to China's reemergence and its growing strength in the region.

Japan's approach to security outlined in the reinvigorated U.S.-Japan security arrangements and in its modernization and restructuring of the Self-Defense Force do not signify a major change of direction or immediate fear of some new threat. What they do represent is a subtle shift of emphasis from its previous exclusive reliance on the security arrangements and self-reliant capabilities of its Self-Defense Forces, to a "balanced approach," which better emphasizes the importance of regional and international security structures as well. It is this triad of security approaches that will be used to take Japan into the 21st Century.

In the end, the future prospects and the ultimate success of this security posture is dependent on Japan's ability to deal with the tensions and disputes in its immediate geostrategic environment. Tensions that could lead to future problems include the Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku Islands/East China Sea and Japan's concerns in the South China Sea. Depending on how tensions here are dealt with, the results could weaken or destroy the security environment and Japan's new security system. China plays a critical role in each area of tension and will only grow more important over time. By addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international perspectives, Japan is putting its security relationship on a more even keel. The 'China factor,' in its small way, has enabled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with the United States, its neighbors, as well as the rest of the world, as it prepares for the 21st Century.

I. INTRODUCTION

The history of relations between Japan and China are steeped in animosity, aggression, and misperceptions. Despite the troubled past they are moving steadily toward economic interdependence. This dichotomy of enmity and economic reciprocity make the examination of this relationship complex and intriguing. It is necessary to begin with an understanding of the history behind the relations of these two countries and how they view each other to understand their importance to one another and the importance of stability and peaceful relations in the region. The significance of this relationship in East Asian security matters can not be understated. The United States, Russia, and other smaller powers in the region have roles to play, but it is on the relations between Japan and China that stability, prosperity and peace rest. Japanese Foreign Minister Yukihiko Ikeda clearly identified its importance to Japan; "Basically, bilateral relations with China are as important as those with the United States."¹ China's Foreign Minister Qian Qichen has acknowledged publicly the importance of their relationship, their geographic, historic and economic closeness and believes improvements in the relationship are important, not only for the two countries, but also for the region.² Despite the stated importance of the relationship, a number of historical problems still continue to influence and challenge the relationship and therefore stability in the region.

¹ Ikeda quoted by Kajita Takehiko in "Ikeda: Ties With PRC 'As Important' As Those With U.S." Translated in FBIS-EAS-96-218. 8 Nov 1996.

² Press Conference for the APEC 1996 Philippines Meetings, available HTTP. <http://infomofa.nttts.co.jp/infomofa/apecinfor/1996/j-china.html>.

This thesis will examine ways in which Japan is modernizing its security arrangements and particularly its military in preparations for the 21st Century. Japan's modernization reflects many influences, both domestic and foreign, and there are numerous explanations as to why Japan has decided to move on the course that it has chosen. These range from various internal and external factors such as Japan's "Peace Constitution," the ideals of pacifism that the people of Japan have embraced following the disasters of World War II, and domestic political considerations. External factors such as the U.S. security arrangements with Japan, the growing regional and international structures for security, and the reemergence of China in regional and international affairs also have had a great deal of influence. No one factor alone can explain Japan's direction, but it is a question of combination and degree. This thesis will focus on an examination that will try to determine the extent to which the last factor, the reemergence of China, has influenced Japan's approach to security for the future.

In this thesis I will look at Japan's reaction to the reemergence of China as a powerful player in East Asia security affairs, particularly as manifest in the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. I will answer the question, "To what degree has Japan's reevaluation of its security position has been influenced by the reemergence of China and how will this 'China factor' continue to affect Japan as it inches toward its newly described role?" This thesis will focus on the Japanese perspective and attempts to identify, describe and analyze the "China factor" in Japanese military modernization and security.

Before one can begin to examine the particulars of the current modernization of Japan's defense forces, it is important to review the history of the relationship between Japan and China. Therefore in Chapter II, I will examine this relationship, some of the emblematic factors in this relationship, and a brief examination of the important factors behind China's military modernization. The Sino-Japanese relationship, which dates back longer than most countries have been in existence, has struggled through a history of aggression, animosity and misperceptions that continue to color their dealing with one another today. Couple China's military modernization and its reemergence as a powerful player in East Asian security matters with the emblematic factors of this relationship, such as nationalism, racism, and the fear of a "new Japanese militarism," and it is clear that the two countries continue to have direct and significant influence on one another. To what degree these factors drive Japan's security concerns for the future are important. Despite the growing "friendship," increasing economic aid and flourishing trade between the two countries, the negative images and animosity linger on and could undercut their relations in the future.

Japan clearly sees China as its most important competitor in the East Asian security arena and one that must be carefully observed. In its annual white paper on defense, Japan for the first time identified China as a country which needs to be given more attention by its defense establishment. "The situation must be watched with caution in terms of promotion of nuclear weapons and modernization of the navy and air forces, expansion of naval activity and heightened tension in the Taiwan Strait as seen in the

military drills near Taiwan.”³ In order to determine the extent to which Japan is responding to China’s modernization, I will briefly examine China’s modernization of the PLA, looking specifically for the sources for change and reasons for modernization. With this as background and a basis for comparison, I will in Chapter III examine the Japan Defense Agency’s modernization program, looking at the recently revised National Defense Program Outline, the Mid-Term Defense Program (1996-2000), and the 1996 white paper on defense. From these broad program outlines I will then turn to examine the force itself; the structure of the Self-Defense Forces and the impact of its current “drawdown,” restructuring and new missions on the capabilities of each branch. The idea is to derive the sources for change in Japan’s modernization program and to evaluate the degree to which it reflects Japan’s concerns with China.

Given that the Japanese defense arrangements are intricately linked to the United States, no analysis of the Japanese modernization program would be complete without an examination of the United States-Japan security relations. In Chapter IV I will look at this and specifically the changes or redirection of effort agreed upon in the updating and signing of the United States-Japan Security Declaration in April 1996 by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, the recommendations of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa, and revisions to the Guidelines for Defense Cooperation. It seems apparent that this security relationship has a great impact on Japan’s current

3 Quote from *Defense of Japan 1996, Response to a New Era*, cited by Kajimoto Tetsushi in “Defense Report Voices China Concerns.” Japan Times Weekly International Edition, Vol. 36, No. 30, July 29-August 4, 1996. pp. 1, 6.

modernization programs and the direction of its future security arrangements, but it also not so obviously reflects the influences of China's reemergence and its growing strength in the region.

Finally in Chapter V, I conclude with an examination of the future prospects for Japan's security arrangements. Tensions and disputes surround Japan, including the Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes, such as the Senkaku Islands and the East/South China Seas. Any one of these hot spots, depending on how it is dealt with, could hurt or even destroy the new security environment and the system Japan is developing to deal with it. China plays a critical role in each one of these areas and will only grow more important over time.

II. MODERN RELATIONS BETWEEN JAPAN AND CHINA

The relationship that exists between Japan and China has grown and developed over more than 1500 years. It has continued through good times and bad, and remains today as one of the most important to both countries. In this chapter, I will review a number of the critical aspects of this relationship over the more recent past 150 years. From this review I will then examine some of the characteristic trends or patterns of this relationship, looking specifically for characteristics that will continue to impact it in the future. Finally, I will look at China's recent military modernization (1985 to present) focusing on the basis and sources for this modernization. The combination of these historical characteristics and trends for the future, with China's military modernization will give us a basis for examining the changes in Japan's security arrangements and military modernization.

Japan and China have had relations stretching back well before 593 AD, though this date was the first time in which Japan and the Japanese empress Suiko received "official recognition" from China. It was a pivotal period in which Buddhism was to take firm root and Japanese culture was to be Sinified.¹ The principal method that the Chinese used and have used historically in their foreign relations has been suzerainty. This was an attempt at the conquest of mind and pocketbook through the exportation and imposition of Confucian values and the Chinese tributary system, a method that has been called "Imperial Confucianism" by the noted historian and China scholar John K.

¹ Taken from Trager, James. *The People's Chronology*. CD-ROM. Henry Holt and Company, Inc. 1994.

Fairbank.² During this period Japan accepted this tributary status, gaining from it trading advantages as well as the opportunity to identify and gather techniques and ideas that could be assimilated.³

The Japanese, as they accepted into their society the Confucian ideals, have adapted, refined and “Japanized” them into a different form of Confucianism, one that had a more aggressive, imperialistic characteristic to it. In the modern history of these two countries,⁴ control of the relationship has been decidedly one-sided, with Japan as the aggressive, dominant partner. The negative images and perceptions resultant from Japan’s imperialistic actions of modern times have left a lasting impression on the Chinese. When it is in China’s best interest – such as when there is a perceived injustice or when there is a problem between China and Japan – the negative image is brought out as a weapon to be used against Japan. Despite the outward appearance of normality in the current political and economic interaction and “friendship,” these negative images built on historical animosity continue to color the foreign relations between the two in a pessimistic and negative way.

An attempt even at a brief recapitulation of the entire history of these two countries’ relations is well beyond the scope of this paper and therefore I will begin from the period when Japan “entered the modern world,” from the Meiji Restoration of 1868

2 John King Fairbank. *China: A New History*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1992) pp. 62-63.

3 Christopher Howe, ed. *China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects*. (Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1996) p.4.

4 For this work, I consider modern history to begin with the opening of Japan and the Meiji Restoration 1854-68 to the present.

onward. I will review chronologically the major events and conflicts between the two countries, 1868 - 1945, focusing on those aspects that have most directly affected the underlying relationship and created this sense of distrust, negative images and destructive perceptions. I will then look at the Cold War and Post-Cold War period, examining the growing relations and "friendship" between the two to see how the negative images and animosity from the previous period continue to pervade and flow like a dark undercurrent through the modern relationship, disrupting and undercutting it.

A. FROM THE MEIJI RESTORATION TO THE NANKING MASSACRE

Japan, as it observed the world just prior to its forced opening by Commodore Perry's Black Fleet in 1853, could see the impact of European colonial expansion, especially the military disasters and national humiliation the British had inflicted on China in 1839 - 1842 and again, with the French and British, in 1856-1858.⁵ When forced to open itself, Japan decided, after great turmoil, to turn to modernization and westernization and to seek an international status that would ensure what happened in China did not happen to them. The necessary principles were outlined in the Emperor's Charter Oath of 1868, which established deliberative assemblies, did away with the feudal class system, and most importantly, stated the desire to seek knowledge throughout the world to strengthen the foundations of imperial rule.⁶

⁵ Edwin O. Reischauer. *Japan: The Story of a Nation*. (New York: McGraw-Hill Publishing. 1990) p. 94.

⁶ Milton W. Meyer. *Japan: A Concise History*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 1993) p. 128.

As Japan became more confident in the region and began to assert itself, it did so by looking to China as an area into which it could expand. In 1874, Japan sent an expedition to Taiwan, to punish the aborigines on the east coast of the island for killing fifty-four of sixty-six shipwrecked Ryukyuans. The Ryukyu Islands were claimed by Japan and had been part of Satsuma Daimyo since 1604. However, they also paid tribute to China through their own ruler, who, moreover, had entered on his own into independent treaty relations with Western representatives, including Perry. As a result of this incident, China was forced to pay an indemnity to Japan, which established in Western law that the Ryukyu Islands were legally part of Japan and not a tributary state of China. With the legal standing of the islands clarified (in Japan's eyes) they were fully incorporated into Japan and were made the prefecture of Okinawa in 1879.⁷

1. Japan Knocks China Out of Korea

In the early 19th Century, Japan also looked to Korea, the object of a number of past attacks and invasions, as an outlet for the energies of its disestablished samurai. It did so with the economic motive of acquiring a captive market for Japanese consumer goods, the strategic consideration of preempting Russian encroachment into the Korean Peninsula, and the impulse of the Meiji leaders to spread Japan's "imperial glory" abroad.⁸ In that China had long considered Korea to be a tributary state, rivalry for control of the peninsula began to grow. Japan, using a sort of "gunboat diplomacy"

⁷ Reischauer, p. 127 and Meyer, pp. 159-161.

⁸ Carter J. Eckert et al. *Korea Old and New: A History*. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1990) p. 198.

reminiscent of Perry's opening of Japan, frightened Korea into signing the Treaty of Kanghwa in 1876. This was the first modern treaty for Korea, which was very similar to the unequal treaties Japan had been forced to sign upon its opening. This treaty asserted Korea's independence (and therefore denied Chinese suzerainty), opened trade ports to Japan and provided the Japanese in Korea with extraterritorial privileges.

Reformists within Korea and the Korean King favored Japan, though conservative factions wanted China to assist it in throwing off Japanese control. When mob demonstrations got out of hand and the Korean palace was attacked, both countries sent troops to assist. In 1885, after a number of heated disputes, a Sino-Japanese convention was signed in which both countries pledged to remove their troops, and, if either side found it necessary to return troops to quell further disturbances, each agreed to notify the other first. In the following years sporadic uprisings continued to occur. In 1894 a large Korean peasant uprising occurred, giving both Japan and China reason to send in their troops. Both did so, however, without prior notification of the other. Though the Koreans suppressed the uprising before the foreign troops arrived, Japanese ships fired on Chinese gunboats and a British ship transporting Chinese troops to Korea. Soon thereafter, Japan formally declared war on China.

2. Sino-Japanese War

China's view of the Japanese and their ambitions in Korea did not seem to take into account the military modernization that the Japanese had undertaken or the importance of their drive into Korea. In fact, China did not consider Japan to be an

important nation or of any great concern for two reasons. First of all, throughout the 19th century, and for many centuries prior, the Chinese had always regarded only domestic events as truly important.⁹ Thus the actions occurring in Korea were important to only a very small percentage of Chinese. Secondly, those who did concern themselves with the foreign relations of China, invariably thought of England, Russia, and France, and then only remotely of the United States. The next grouping of states were tributary states such as Korea, Annam, and the Ryukyus. Japan did not fit into either of these groups and because it did not have even an irregular tributary relationship with China, it did not rate even that ceremonial importance.¹⁰

This disregard for Japan left the Chinese poorly prepared for war with the modernizing Japanese Army and Navy. The Japanese were able to quickly defeat the Chinese Navy, thoroughly rout the Chinese Army and conclude the war within nine months. During the war, Japan expelled all Chinese forces from Korea, attacked into and captured the Liaodong peninsula and the naval base of Lushun (Port Arthur), and occupied the naval base at Weihaiwei on the Shandong peninsula, thereby commanding the sea approaches to northern China.

In the Treaty of Shimonoseki (signed April 17, 1895), China was forced to give up Korea as a tributary state, as well as suffer its first loss of territory in modern times

9 There are complex arguments made as to what is 'Chinese' and what are 'domestic events.' For this argument, Chinese is defined as the governing Han Chinese and domestic events to be events occurring with the borders of China itself. For the sake of this argument, Manchuria lies within these borders.

10 Samuel C. Chu. "China's Attitudes Toward Japan at the Time of the Sino-Japanese War" in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980) p.77.

with Japan's annexation of Taiwan and the Pescadores islands as well as the Liaodong peninsula. Additionally, China was forced to pay an indemnity, open four new treaty ports, extend the most-favored-nation clause, and promise a new treaty of commerce. However, within six days of signing the treaty, intervention by France, Germany and Russia (the Triple Intervention) forced Japan to return the Liaodong peninsula and withdraw from the Chinese mainland. This experience constituted the most humiliating diplomatic defeat for Japan prior to World War II and left a lingering sense of distrust for these powers and a desire to make sure this type of event could not happen again.¹¹

3. Chinese Revolution

The Chinese Revolution that broke out on October 10, 1911, was initially seen in Japan as beneficial because it was believed that by providing timely assistance to the old regime in China, the latter would be obligated to Japan. Additionally, the emergence of Yuan Shikai as the primary leader in China, at least initially, was considered to be in Japan's favor because he would provide stability in the country and was a personal friend of the Japanese minister in Peking and so would look favorably on relations with Japan.¹² At the same time, Japan also felt constrained by the enormous popularity of the Chinese revolutionaries in Japan. Sun Yatsen, in order to prevent civil war and prevent foreign intervention, had agreed to unite China under Yuan. Sun also believed that Japan would help China and worked on bringing the relationship closer through economic ties.

¹¹ Meyer, p. 162.

¹² Marius B. Jansen. *Japan and China: From War to Peace, 1894-1972*. (Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Company. 1975) p. 203.

Sun looked to Japan as a friend and benefactor. "The patriots of your country have led and taught me, and I deem Japan my second fatherland and your statesmen my mentors. China awaits your saving help."¹³ However, when Yuan Shikai began to revise the constitution at will and became a dictator, the Nationalist Party or Kuomintang began to oppose him. When Yuan suspended parliament and the provincial assemblies and forced the promulgation of a new constitution that made him President for life, widespread rebellions ensued which threatened the survival of the new republic. Japan felt that actions must be taken to stabilize the Chinese Republic or other powers might intervene.

World War I provided Japan the opportunity and the excuse to settle the score against the Triple Intervention and continue its expansion into China. The British request for Japan to help destroy German men-of-war in Chinese waters under the terms of the Anglo-Japanese alliance (1905) led to the Japanese decision to seize the Shantung port base of Tsingtao. Japan declared war on Germany, and in conjunction with the British, attacked and seized Tsingtao by November 1914. With this completed and despite British objections, Japan continued to strike German shipping and attacked and seized all the German holdings in the South Pacific, including the Marshalls, Marianas, Palau, the Carolines and Yap.¹⁴

¹³ Sun Yatsen quoted in Jansen, p. 207.

¹⁴ Jansen, pp. 197-198.

4. Twenty-One Demands

The deterioration of central, political and administrative control in China and the pressures for resolve in dealing with China from the military, businessmen and from within the Japanese government, led Japan to issue of its infamous "Twenty-One Demands" to Yuan in 1915. Initially kept secret by both Japan and China, these demands included the transfer of all Imperial Germany's rights in China to Japan, the extension of the leases and privileges in south Manchuria and east Inner Mongolia, the confirmation of the control of the joint Sino-Japanese administration of the Hanyehp'ing Company, the extraction of China's promise not to lease any port or island along the coast to any other country (to protect China's territorial integrity), and finally the insistence on a group of terms that would have literally made China a Japanese protectorate.¹⁵ Though some of the demands were rejected, China yielded to the Japanese insistence on keeping Shandong, southern Manchuria and eastern Inner Mongolia and later signed a secret deal to confirm these arrangements.

5. May Fourth Movement

The end of World War I and the Paris peace conference affirmed the Japanese claims on Shandong and brought the underhanded dealings of the Chinese government into public view. On May 4, 1919, Beijing University students swept through urban centers, holding demonstrations, boycotts, and issuing demands for the return of the

¹⁵ Robert L. Worden, et al., Eds. *China: A Country Study*. (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1988) p. 30-32.

Shandong concessions. The May Fourth Movement and the "political fervor, student activism, and iconoclastic and reformist intellectual currents" have been associated with a rekindling of the then-fading republican revolution and the growth of Chinese nationalism.¹⁶ Though directly tied to and a result of unscrupulous Japanese actions and secret treaties, the movement, according to noted Japan scholar Marius Jansen, was nationalistic and anti-imperialistic but was not anti-Western nor anti-Japanese.¹⁷ In my opinion, however, it seems that though there may be other important reasons and aspect of these demonstrations, it cannot be denied that this action began as a pattern of anti-Japanese demonstrations that raised the issues far above the level at which it would have normally been treated. Jansen's own example was a statement by Ch'en Tu-hsiu, "the most important figure among the intellectual leaders of the day," which criticized "selfish nationalism and patriotism" as shoddy Japanese products that should be boycotted together with other Japanese imports." As seen in his words, which seem to give as much credence to the argument that, Ch'en, as much as the students, at least was partially consumed by animosity towards the Japanese.

China's progress under the Republic and the various warlord governments that controlled parts of China during this period reinforced the conviction of many Japanese that unless Japan stepped in, China would never develop a stable government and into a profitable trading partner. However Japan's power and influence in China had been

¹⁶ Worden, p. 32.

¹⁷ Jansen, p. 248.

severely undermined by the rising nationalism, resultant of the May Fourth Movement. For the most part, the Japanese were satisfied, for the time being, with their control of Shandong and their relationship with Chang Tso-lin in Manchuria. Sun Yatsen, in his attempts to unify China, had tried to get Japanese, European, especially British, and American support, but none were willing to provide what he wanted. The Japanese had little confidence in Sun's ability to organize the rest of China. Therefore the only remaining source of support and the one to which he turned was the Soviet Union.¹⁸

China struggled to consolidate under the Guomindang with the support of the Soviets, who also supported the newly formed Chinese Communist Party, which eventually led to problems. By 1925, the Nationalists were strong enough to begin the long delayed Northern Expedition against the northern warlords. Within nine months, half of China was under the Nationalists' control. However, the Nationalists were becoming more divided between left-wing and right-wing factions, such that in early 1927, the left-wing and the CCP moved to establish a separate Chinese government. The Nationalists, under Chiang Kai-shek, continued the Northern Expedition while attempting to wipe out the Communists. By mid-1927 all of China was nominally under Nationalist control and the remaining Communists turned to the peasantry to survive. The Nationalists used this period to consolidate control and modernize China's government and infrastructure.¹⁹

¹⁸ Jansen, pp. 285-287.

¹⁹ Worden, pp. 32-34.

Japan was not satisfied with the direction in which China was moving, or with its current position in China. Prior to the Sino-Japanese War, a number of Japanese writers discussed the requirements needed to modernize and develop China. One such argument, put forth by Naitô Konan, is often referred to for championing Japanese "imperialism." He believed that indigenous reforms were impossible in China and to facilitate its development, China must go through a phase where foreigners would be employed to manage the affairs of state in place of the Chinese.²⁰ This type of thinking was behind the rise in the belief that Japan must intercede in China and was also a contributing factor in the Manchurian Incident.

6. Manchurian Incident

On September 18, 1931, Japanese troops blew up a section of the South Manchurian railroad north of Mukden, blaming "Chinese Communists" for the act. Japanese troops, using the "attack" as an excuse, seized the rest of the city, and continued to thrust into Manchuria, taking all of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia. They established the independent state of Manchukuo in March 1932. The Manchurian incident had a number of consequences, mostly in Japan, but also in China. The loss of Manchuria reduced revenues of customs and tariffs by 15% for the Kuomintang government and the loss of its vast potential for industrial development and war industries were a serious blow to the economy. It was another incident that brought out anti-Japanese

20 Tam Yue-Him. "An Intellectual's Response to Western Intrusion: Naitô Konan's View of Republican China" in Akira Iriye, ed., *The Chinese and the Japanese*. (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1980) pp. 161-183.

demonstrations and boycotts in major cities around China. If there were any Chinese with illusions about Japanese designs on China, this event clarified and focused them.

The Manchurian incident had a major impact on the Japanese populace. As a result of the successes of its military in Manchuria and the Japanese civilian's reaction to the international opprobrium, there was a marked rise in support for this type of action; a "war mentality" seemed to have overtaken the Japanese people.²¹ Additionally the incident left the military in a far stronger and more independent position that allowed it more flexibility and greater support in its actions, both in Manchuria and in Tokyo.²²

The loss of Manchuria had another, more important effect on China, in that it led to the refocusing of the Guomindang government from one focused on the anti-Communist extermination campaigns to one that would allow for the unification of the competing governments against a foreign threat. In December 1935, students in Beijing took to the streets, with the demand of "stopping the civil war and uniting as one against foreign invaders."²³ In December 1936, Nationalist forces that had been pushed out of Manchuria by the Japanese, mutinied in Xi'an, forcibly detained Chiang Kai-shek until he stopped the anti-Communist fight, and allowed Communist forces to fight in designated

²¹ Some have argued this "war mentality" was something unique to the Japanese, developed by the militaristic movements of its last 200 years of cultural evolution. Hendrix expands on this statement, looking at these cultural influences on Japan's peace constitution. He argues that a combination of Japan's culture, internal domestic organizations and pressure from foreign interests caused it. Henry J. Hendrix II. "The Roots of Japanese Militarism." (MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. December, 1994) pp. 63-92.

²² Jansen, pp. 383-384.

²³ Wu Jingsheng. "Reassessing the War in China." *Beijing Review*. August 12, 1985. p. 13.

anti-Japanese front areas.²⁴ These events had far-reaching consequences, both for the Nationalists and the Communists, in that they allowed the consolidation and refocusing of the government against the Japanese that would eventually lead to the virtual destruction of the Nationalists by the Japanese during the coming war. This left the field clear for the Communists.

7. The China Incident (Marco Polo Bridge Incident)

Japan continued to push into northern China in an attempt to protect its forces in Manchuria and to prepare itself for the expected war against the Soviet Union. After the Manchurian Incident, China had decided to retreat in the face of Japanese advances. With the unification between the Nationalists and the Communists, China was then able to stiffen its defenses against the Japanese. The situation by 1937 was fairly calm, with little movement along the border and neither country really expecting a full-scale war.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident of July 7, 1937, really was nothing more than a few shots fired, and in fact, it is still unclear which side did the actual firing.²⁵ Some have argued that a conspiracy by the Japanese China Garrison Army caused the incident, trying to draw Japan into a war against China; the *Beijing Review* in its reassessment of the war on its 40th anniversary seem to support this position.²⁶ Hata and others argue,

²⁴ Worden, pp. 36-37.

²⁵ Hata Ikuhiko. "The Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937" in James William Morley. ed. *The China Quagmire: Japan's Expansion on the Asian Continent 1933-1941*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1983) pp. 243-261.

²⁶ Wu, p. 14.

however, that no such conspiracy existed and the Japanese, from the staff officers of the Garrison Army to the Army General Staff in Tokyo, moderated their stance and attempted to bring the incident to a quick local settlement.²⁷ However, the incident did quickly escalate, again bringing Japan into full-scale war against China.

Japan issued demands calling for an official apology, withdrawal of Chinese troops, dismissal of the commander of the Chinese forces, and acceptance of these demands by 11 July. In its response, China stated it would accept the minimum conditions of preservation of China's sovereignty and territorial integrity, noninterference in its government and the right to appoint whom it chose to, and the removal of any restrictions on where it positions its forces. In short, the government rejected the demands.²⁸ Therefore Japan began to mobilize its forces and developed a "Strategy towards China" that would continue Japan's push into China.

8. The Rape of Nanking

Japan's war against China spread from northern China to Shanghai as the Chinese Supreme War Council in Nanking decided to engage in a full-scale war of resistance against the Japanese. Japan launched attacks into northern China, Inner Mongolia and most of China's major coastal cities. The brutal way in which the Japanese conducted the war led to charges of atrocities and other war crimes. One of the largest and most disturbing of these incidents was the sacking and rape of Nanking in December 1937.

27 David Lu. "Introduction: Marco Polo Bridge Incident, 1937" in Morley. ed. *The China Quagmire*. p. 233.

28 Hata, pp. 238-260.

Nanking, which had become the capital in 1928, had seen its population soar to nearly 1 million in 1937. From its capture on December 17, 1937, over the next six weeks, an estimated 300,000 Chinese soldiers and civilians were killed, and 20,000 women were raped.²⁹

The war had a devastating impact on Chinese-Japanese relations with Chinese estimates of the results of the eight-year struggle against Japanese militarism leaving 21.8 million Chinese soldiers and civilians dead and wounded and much of the country's industry destroyed or damaged. Japan also suffered losses, with more than 1.33 million troops killed, wounded or captured in China.³⁰ The Tokyo War Crimes trials in 1946-47 did little to placate the Chinese sense of loss and abuse. Only 28 individuals actually were brought to face the International Tribunal and all that were alive by the end of the trial were found guilty. However, some of the areas of greatest contention, such as the Nanking Massacre, narcotic trafficking, the use of bacterial warfare and human scientific experimentation, were not even used as counts against them or thoroughly investigated.³¹

B. POSTWAR RELATIONS AND CONTINUING PROBLEMS

With its defeat at the end of World War II and its subsequent reinvention under the direction of the United States, Japan was firmly on the capitalist-side of the growing

29 New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available HTTP. <http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html>. 12 November 1996.

30 Wu, p. 22.

31 Robert Gray. "Japanese Imperialism and the Massacre at Nanjing". New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available HTTP. <http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj-trans.html>. 13 November 1996.

bipolar power struggle. China, after its successful unification under the ideology of Communism, was clearly on the other side of the proverbial fence. This ensured the separation of Japan and China in almost every aspect for over twenty-five years. It did not mean, however, that China could not react to changes, actions and statements made by the Japanese. The Cold War may have separated and kept the two from direct official relations but the Chinese and the Japanese both continued to react to each other's actions and were affected by the years of hostility and the animosity that had developed since 1868.

One of the first moves that drew Chinese (PRC) criticism was the 1950 "re-militarization" of Japan under the reinterpretation of Article IX of the new Japanese constitution. In response to the need for troops in Korea, the United States sent most of its forces stationed in Japan and urged Japan to reexamine its self-defense requirements to fill the hole. The Japanese government authorized the National Police Reserve of 75,000 persons in 1950 to replace the U.S. occupation forces sent to Korea. These were then reorganized and expanded into National Safety Force in 1952, and finally into a Self-Defense Force consisting of a land, sea and air branch under the control of the Japanese Defense Agency in 1954.³²

During this same period, China also protested and refused to attend the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which reestablished Japanese sovereignty. Japan, by its acquiescence to U.S. foreign policy, chose to forgo relations with the PRC and concluded

³² Reischauer, p. 219-220.

a separate peace treaty with Taiwan. Japan was thoroughly tied to the U.S. policy of containment of communism and its non-recognition of the People's Republic of China. Economic embargoes against China imposed by the United States during the Korean War further prevented direct relations between the PRC and Japan. However, by 1953 an informal pact on trade between PRC and private groups in Japan was created and by 1956, the PRC was Japan's number one East Asian trading partner accounting for nearly 30% of Japan's total trade in the region.³³

1. The Normalization of Relations with the PRC

Even with the non-governmental, private economic ties, the opening of relations between the United States and China produced what was called the "Nixon Shock" in Japan. Shocking, because it was done without prior notification or consultation with the Japanese, it was a move in the direction many Japanese wanted to go. It was difficult because the PRC would not stand for both Chinas to be recognized and Japan, with its strong economic trade with Taiwan and growing trade with the PRC, needed to react quickly. In September 1972 Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei's official visit with Mao Zedong in Beijing reestablished diplomatic ties and transferred formal recognition from Taiwan to PRC.³⁴ But the lingering economic policy with the Republic of China was criticized by the PRC. Additionally, the Japanese "model" of economic policies between the two Chinas set a precedent for the United States.

33 Allen S. Whiting. *China Eyes Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press. 1989) p. 39.

34 Meyer, p. 260.

2. Amnesia of History

The predicament that has continued to stir considerable controversy in Japan and reaction from China, much of Asia and the world, and has yet to be fully resolved by the Japanese is their inability to acknowledge in a manner acceptable to China their war responsibility and guilt and their refusal to accept blame for their actions taken during the war. Additionally, there are a number of examples of an "amnesia of history," most notably in the Japanese denial of the Nanking Massacre and other brutalities that occurred in Asia. This position has taken three broad forms; either complete denial that the event occurred, arguing or downplaying the numbers involved, or the distortion or rewriting the history of the event.³⁵ Prior to 1970, there was no open denial by the Japanese regarding the Nanking Massacre. In fact, there were a number of Japanese articles and books such as Katsuichi Honda's series of articles, "The Journey to China," published in Asahi Shinbun (Nov. 1971), which were based on interviews with the survivors of the Massacre. However, the Nanking Massacre was never emphasized in the Japanese history textbooks. By the end of 1971, the historical accounts and confessions of the Nanking Massacre began to meet with strong resistance from the right-wing conservatives in Japan. Two articles, one by Shichihei Yamamoto, "Reply to Katsuichi Honda," and another by Akira Suzuki, "The Phantom of The Nanking Massacre," were published in April 1972. A book by Massaki Tanaka, *Fabrication of Nanking Massacre*,

³⁵ This section on war guilt is mainly taken from the New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available HTTP. <http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html>. 12 November 1996.

claimed that not only had the Nanking Massacre not occurred, but that the Chinese Government was responsible for the occurrence of the Sino-Japanese War.

The denial of the Nanking Massacre again was put forward in an interview in 1990 by Shintaro Ishihara, a popular contemporary writer in Japan (co-author of "The Japan that Can Say No") and former member of the Diet, who declared that the Nanking Massacre never occurred, and that "it is a story made up by the Chinese, . . . it is a lie." Later on November 10, 1990, during a protest by Chinese Americans against the Japanese action in the Diaoyu Islands (called the Senkaku Islands by the Japanese), the Deputy Japanese Consul in Houston maintained that according to Japanese sources, "the Nanking Massacre never occurred."³⁶

Besides total denial, a slightly less outrageous line of Japanese thought insisted that the total number of casualties of the Nanking Massacre was exaggerated by the Chinese. This view is best elaborated in a book written by Hata Ikuhiko, *Nanking Incident*, in which it was argued that the number of victims in the Massacre was between 38,000-42,000. It was also argued that the killing of surrendered or captured soldiers should not be considered as "massacre." Despite these revisions of history, this book is now the official history text on the issue by the Japan Ministry of Education.

36 New Jersey Hong Kong Network. Online. Available HTTP. <http://cnd.cnd.org/njmassacre/nj.html>. 12 November 1996.

3. Japanese Textbook Issue

The third form the Japanese have attempted to use to rewrite the history of the war is through the revision of school textbooks. In 1982 the Japanese Ministry of Education proposed the revision of history textbooks, changing Japanese "aggression" in China to "advancing in and out" of China during the Sino-Japanese War. The Nanking Massacre was described as a minor incident that occurred because the Japanese soldiers were too frustrated by the strong resistance from the Chinese Army. Although the substitution of the words finally was stopped because of the strong protest by the surrounding Asian countries and various Japanese educational groups, the rewriting of the Nanking Massacre remained. Moreover, the Ministry of Education has never admitted that the distortion of history is a mistake. The textbook issue caused a media uproar in China with an enormous number of articles and pictures on the massacre again published, that continued until the Japanese government promised to review the terminology being used.³⁷

The controversy over textbooks died down but was reignited in the 1986 with a new round of textbook reviews by Japan's Ministry of Education. Without the same "media circus" atmosphere associated with the 1982 incident, the 1986 revisions were protested by the Chinese government and the Ministry of Education, as prodded by the

³⁷ Whiting, pp. 46-51.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, made some corrections to the drafts but stood by the final version without apology.³⁸

4. The Question of an Apology

The example of the Nanking Massacre shows the difficulty the Japanese have had in adequately acknowledging their role in and remorse for World War II or the Pacific War. The sense of reservations or qualifications in any apology, from both the private and government realm, continues to dampen international acceptance and the ability to move beyond the issue of war guilt and responsibility. The “apology” adopted on the 50th anniversary of the war by the Japanese House of Representatives,³⁹ continued this debate. Though this statement originally was meant as a formal apology, by the time it was passed in the lower House, it had been watered down, made practically neutral in content and ambiguous as to what it was saying.⁴⁰ Additionally, almost half of the members of the House abstained from voting, either in opposition to it because they felt it went too far or not far enough.⁴¹ Norma Field, professor of Japanese literature at the

³⁸ Whiting, pp. 55-60.

³⁹ “Resolution to Renew the Determination for Peace on the basis of Lessons Learned from History.” June 9, 1995. Available HTTP: <http://www.nmjc.org/jpri/projects/document1.html>.

⁴⁰ Fukatsu Masumi. “The Eclipse of Showa Taboos and the Apology Resolution” in *Japan Quarterly*. Asahi Shimbun. October-December 1995. pp. 419-425.

⁴¹ Of 502 representatives, 251 voted, 230 in support of it. 14 who voted against it were from the Japanese Communist party, wanted a stronger statement of apology. Of the 241 abstaining members, 70 were from the ruling coalition parties; of which over 50 were from the LDP, who felt the resolution went too far, and 14 were from the JSP, who felt it didn’t go far enough. 141 of the abstaining members were from the Shinshinto (New Frontier Party) of who at least some felt it didn’t go far enough. These statistics were put together by John W. Dower, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. “Japan Addresses Its War Responsibility.” Available at HTTP: <http://www.nmjc.org/jpri/projects/dower.html>.

University of Chicago, examines some of the problems associated with war guilt, responsibility and apologies in her book *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor*⁴² and outlines very clearly the requirements for such an apology in the article, "The Stakes of Apology."⁴³ She addresses the enormous societal pressures felt by any Japanese who believe they must dissent or act contrary to social norms. The article lays out three requirements of an apology: the acknowledgment of wrongdoing, the expression of regret or pain, and the "reparation" or request for forgiveness – of which "taking responsibility" is a part. She highlights, however, that though Japan has attempted to apologize, it has done so with reservations and has not allowed the Showa Emperor to accept responsibility for the war.⁴⁴

5. Anti-Japanese Student Demonstrations

Another example of negative Chinese reactions in excess of what could logically be expected from the action can be seen in the anti-Japanese student demonstrations that occurred in September 1985. Chinese students in Beijing and elsewhere, ostensibly to commemorate the 1931 Mukden Incident, were provoked by Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's tribute to Japan's fallen soldiers. The students demonstrated against Japan's present role in China's economic modernization, using wall posters and shouting "Down with Japanese militarism!," "Down with Nakasone!" and "Down with the second

42 Norma Field. *In the Realm of a Dying Emperor*. (New York: Vintage Books. 1993) pp. 3-4.

43 Norma Field. "The Stakes of Apology" in *Japan Quarterly*. Asahi Shimbun. October-December 1995. pp. 405-418.

44 Ibid. p. 418.

occupation.” Whiting argues that on one hand, this was a legitimate way to protest against the current broader policies of the Communist regime under the guise of anti-Japanese rhetoric.⁴⁵ In the context of demonstration, however, it was a reaction to the anniversary of not only the Mukden Incident, but of the whole Japanese aggression against China. It triggered calls for boycotts against Japanese goods, stoning of Japanese cars, and other demonstrations against Japan.

One final example of how the subliminal fear and animosity China holds about Japan was seen in China’s acceptance of the U.S.-Japanese Security Agreement as proper and necessary to provide stability and security in the region, and though not specifically stated in the declarations, to hold down Japanese aggression and not allow them to remilitarize. Another aspect of this can be seen in Beijing’s critical comments when Tokyo lifted the ceiling of one percent on its defense expenditures in 1987 (fixed at one percent since 1976), even though the Japanese Self-Defense Forces were clearly inadequate to defend themselves, much less project force in the region. This will be explored in greater detail in Chapter III and IV.

C. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE JAPAN-CHINA RELATIONSHIP

From this review of Japan-China relations, there seems to be three trends or characteristics that group these events together and which continue to play a role in modern Japan-China relationships:

⁴⁵ Whiting, p. 66-79.

1. A historically-based animosity which includes the questions of war guilt and apology.
2. Racism and the "unique" character of the Japanese.
3. The rise of and fear that a "new" Japanese nationalism, most often viewed as inseparable from remilitarization, is emerging.

These characteristics are closely related, intertwined and difficult to differentiate which force is the primary actor or which is the most important. Despite this, it is clear they are active in Japanese thought and influence Japanese-Chinese relations.

Historical animosity is the most obvious and easily identified problem that continues to influence modern Japan-China relations. It is this deep seated distrust for the Japanese, based on their past actions reviewed above. It is also, however, the one trend that the Japanese could mitigate by their own actions. This again brings us back to the question of war guilt and apology. With their inability to apologize, to accept the blame and move on, the Japanese, allow this issue to continue to flare up and disrupt their relations. There are any number of reasons for this to continue. Takeo Doi, in her work *The Anatomy of Dependence*, argues that this inability to apologize is tied to "amae," a term that has special importance and emotion in Japanese, and is nurtured and flourishes there, but is excluded and suppressed in the West.⁴⁶ Amae is a sense of dependence that allows the Japanese to readily identify with the group, encourages the lack of individualism and places the basis of guilt and shame as a response to betrayal of the group. This identifies cultural factors as one of the things that makes it difficult for the Japanese to apologize.

⁴⁶ Takeo Doi. Translated by John Bester, *The Anatomy of Dependence*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, Ltd. 1981) pp. 166-170.

This historical guilt and problems with apologizing has given China a weapon that is often used in its dealings with Japan. As noted by one Japanese scholar, "China has frequently raised the issue of Japan's historical guilt as a card to be played in bilateral negotiations, and will doubtless continue to do so."⁴⁷ Journalists Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro argue China's use of historical guilt about these wartime atrocities are a major part of China's effort "to keep Japan in a state of... 'permanent strategic subordination,'" or more specifically:

to prevent Japan from ever being a 'normal' nation, such as the United States or China itself, a nation that has the sovereign right to determine its security needs and to build the armed forces required to meet those needs.⁴⁸

This is evident in China's tendency to raise these issues at times one would normally expect only pleasantries, such as the historic first visitation of a Japanese emperor to China in October 1992. Despite the apology made by the emperor, China was quick to remind Japan of its actions during the war and its responsibility to fully acknowledge these actions.

The second trend that entangles and influences Japanese actions in subtle ways is a sense of racism. In Japan it is not uncommon to hear of the many benefits of "racial homogeneity" as well as prejudicial comments about minorities from other Asian countries, the Ainu people of Hokkaido, or the presumed inherent weaknesses of those

⁴⁷ Shinkichi Eto. "China and Sino-Japanese Relations in the Coming Decades." *Japan Review of International Affairs*. Winter 1996. p. 33.

⁴⁸ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro. *The Coming Conflict With China*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1997) pp. 171-173.

nations in the world with mixed or "mongrelized" racial compositions.⁴⁹ Ian Buruma further describes some examples, such as former Prime Minister Nakasone's speeches extolling the virtues of the "monoracial state," the notion of Japanese "uniqueness" shown in a neurologist who wrote a bestseller about the uniqueness of the Japanese brain, or the uniqueness of Japanese snow which makes European-made skis unsuitable for Japan.⁵⁰ Though not a politically correct way of talking, these types of examples show up frequently in Japan, particularly in connection with ultranationalism and the right-wing.

The final trend, and one that often encompasses the other two, is the rise of the so-called new Japanese nationalism. Unlike nationalism in their own countries, much of the world views Japanese nationalism as something bad, tied closely to a remilitarization of Japan. Bruce Stronach, Dean of the Graduate School of International Relations, International University of Japan in Niigata, describes this new nationalism as the combination of a way of describing the increasing nationalism of Japanese youth; unfettered by war guilt and ignorant of prewar militarism and the hardship at the end of the war, as well as a way of describing the rebirth of nationalism in the postwar world.⁵¹ Stronach goes further and defines four types of Japanese nationalism; sociocultural, self-determined, state-oriented and state-centric. He believes all four currently are in place in

49 Paul Gordon Lauren. *Power and Prejudice: The Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination. Second Edition.* (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1996) p. 312.

50 Ian Buruma. "A New Japanese Nationalism." *The New York Times Magazine*. April 12, 1987. p. 23.

51 Bruce Stronach. *Beyond The Rising Sun: Nationalism In Contemporary Japan.* (Westport: Praeger. 1995) p. xvi.

Japan, with the populace generally favoring the sociocultural, and the governmental elites, the state-centric. The other two are relegated to the sidelines as the fanatic fringe. He clearly believes popular sociocultural nationalism in Japan is the controlling force, limiting the state-centric government, and almost ignoring the remaining fringe elements.⁵² The implication is that if this type of nationalism is truly in control of the people, as Stronach argues, the possibility of a return to the militaristic policies of the past seem much less likely. It also leaves China's criticisms about Japanese remilitarization without a popular basis.

D. THE "CHINA THREAT" AND CHINESE MILITARY MODERNIZATION

The belief in Japan that the reemergence of China constitutes a threat is based on three changes within China: China's rapidly developing economy, the military modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA), and the reorientation of its military strategy. Beyond a cursory look at China's overall economic development, I have studiously remained focused on the security issues related to China's reemergence and have avoided delving too deeply into the economic aspects of Japan's relations. It is important to remember, however, that Japan (as does the United States among many others) considers economic relations to be a critical aspect of its comprehensive security. China also considers economic development to be an important aspect of its overall security and so I will examine how its focus on economic development has played an important role in China's military modernization.

⁵² Stronach, p.164.

1. Economic Development

Economic development has been given the highest priority by China. From as early as the 1975 announcement by Zhou Enlai of the "Four Modernizations," the PRC has "pursued a national strategy with economic construction at the core."⁵³ The Four Modernizations in order of priority were agriculture, industry, science and technology, and defense. The development of modern aspects of these four areas would secure China's long-range security and prevent a repeat of China's recent history of suffering and humiliation at the hands of imperialists.⁵⁴ This focus on economic development progressed only slowly at first, but began to take off under the added emphasis it was given by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980's. Deng's "Open Door" policies, which recognized market forces and the profit motive while retaining certain aspects of a centrally planned economy, brought about the consolidation of China's foreign and economic policies. According to analyst Robert Taylor, Deng and his followers staked their political legitimacy not on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism but on their policies of national economic development and their ability to improve the living standards of the Chinese.⁵⁵

Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow on the National Defense University's Institute for National Strategic Studies has argued before the House Committee on

⁵³ Kayahara Ikuo. "1995: Thorough Analysis of the Chinese Military Power. Expert Analyzes Reality of the Chinese 'Menace.'" *Chuo Koron*. Translated in FBIS-CHI-95-021. 1 February 1995.

⁵⁴ Alfred D. Wilhelm, Jr. *China and Security in the Asian Pacific Region through 2010*. Center from Naval Analysis, CRM 95-226.

⁵⁵ Robert Taylor. *The Sino-Japanese Axis: A New Force in Asia?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985) pp. 50-61, and *Greater China and Japan: Prospects For An Economic Partnership in East Asia*. (New York: Routledge, 1996) pp. 5-6.

National Security that economic development has become one of the driving forces in China. "The Chinese have decided that the key to great power status lies in building a world class economy and a world class military force, or, as it is often expressed, in building a 'rich country and a strong army.'"⁵⁶ This means that for China to be able to afford a strong army, it must first and foremost develop its economy. Effie Petrie, in her thesis on the modernization of the Chinese military, takes this point one step further:

China's modernization program is intended primarily to promote economic development. China can only attain a position of status and respect in the international community by developing comprehensive national strength. In addition to military modernizations, it must evolve economically and politically. Today, a nation's power is largely determined by its economic strength and political connections. China must strive to continue its economic growth and cultivate relations with both its neighbors and the west.⁵⁷

China's economy has undergone tremendous change and is growing at an impressive rate for a country of its size and relative backwardness. The key result of this economic growth (in terms of its impact on military modernization) is that China now has the financial strength to fund a moderate military modernization programs. Exactly how much this actually entails, however, is under serious debate. Table 1 outlines some of the published estimates of China's military expenditures, including its "official figures." Additionally, the table includes a RAND study extrapolation of a moderate nine percent growth rate to give an implied dollar estimate for 2007. According to China analyst

⁵⁶ Ronald N. Montaperto. "The People's Republic of China as an Ascending Power." Prepared Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security. Federal News Service. 20 March 1996. p. 2.

⁵⁷ Effie R. Petrie. "Capabilities and Intention: An Analysis of the Military Modernization of the PLA." (MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. December, 1996). p. 27.

Michael Swaine, China's official military budget has increased well over ten percent per annum since at least 1990 and will continue as such for the foreseeable future, so this nine percent growth rate seems reasonable.⁵⁸

A critical piece missing from the official military budget figures is the amount that should be included from enterprises owed and run by the PLA. The estimated figures by the research organizations have tried to take these into account. Numerous problems exist in determining what should be included, hence the wide range in estimates. While it seems obvious that monies earned in PLA enterprises that are then use expressly to purchase equipment and supplies for the PLA, or to pay, feed or house its soldier should be included, many of these enterprises are now in the production of goods for civilian use.⁵⁹ Petrie argues that of the estimated 20,000 PLA run enterprises, 75% have been converted from military to civilian production, and that the commercial scope for exceeds the military purpose for these enterprises.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ The official Chinese defense budget increased over 15 percent in 1989 and 1990, nearly 15 percent in 1991, over 14 percent in 1992 and 1993, and 23 percent in 1994. These increases are a sharp reverse of the prior decade's average negative growth rates. Michael D Swaine. "China" Reprinted from *Strategic Appraisal 1996*, Zalmai Khalilzad, ed. (Santa Monica: RAND. 1996) p. 204.

⁵⁹ The official budget of the PLA consists primarily of salaries and personnel expenses, some operating and maintenance expense such as fuel for training. Defense procurements and research and development funds, however are located in other budgets. Additional sources of revenue for the PLA include: PLA commercial activities and profits, PLA unit grown crops and livestock which decreases required funding, and profits from arms exports. United States General Accounting Office. "Report to Congressional Committees: National Security, Impact of China's Military Modernization in the Pacific Region." GAO/NSIAD-95-84. June 1995. pp. 16-18.

⁶⁰ Petrie, p. 32.

Source of Estimate	Year of Estimate	RMB Estimate (billions)	Dollar Estimate (billions)	Defense Share (percent)	Implied Dollar Estimate for 2007 (billions)
Official exchange rate	1994	52.0	6.0	1.5	20.0
Official figures, IMF, PPP-based	1994	52.0	33.7	1.5	113.0
Official figures, University of Pennsylvania, World PPP	1994	52.0	75.9	1.5	254.0
International Institute of Strategic Studies	1994	100.0	45.0-55.0	3.3	150.0-184.0
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency	1990	—	55.0	—	184.0
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute '94	1993	258.7	45.0	8.6	150.0
Lowest combination (official/official)	1993-1994	52.0	6.0	1.5	20.0
RAND estimate			38.0		125.0
Highest combination (SIPRI/Penn World)	1993-1994	258.7	377.6	8.6	1,262.0

Source: Michael D. Swaine, "China" *Strategic Appraisal*.⁶¹

Table 1: Range of Estimates for Current Chinese Defense Spending

Whatever the actual amount, the fact remains that China's relative economic prosperity has allowed it to take a vigorous approach to its military modernization programs. This does not mean, however, that China is trying to modernize overnight. According to reporter Jack Weible, a recent Pentagon study mandated by the 1997 U.S. Defense Authorization Act, states that China is looking long-term in its modernizations plans, "with the goal of becoming 'the leading economic and political power in East Asia' within the next 50 years." It goes on to say that:

Chinese military modernization will continue to focus on three components: small, high-tech forces for use in regional contingencies;

⁶¹ Michael D. Swaine. "China." in Khalilzad, Zalmay. ed. *Strategic Appraisal 1996*. (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996) pp. 205-206.

large low- and medium-tech forces for defending its homeland; and "modest" nuclear forces to act as a credible deterrent to other nuclear powers.⁶²

2. Military Modernization

The military modernization of the PLA has been ongoing since the announcement of the "Four Modernizations" in 1975. Fourth in order of importance behind agriculture, industry, and science & technology, the modernization of China's defense forces progressed only moderately in the 1970's and did not receive much attention until the mid 1980's. The initial modernization of the PLA during this early period was simply aimed at upgrading the various weapon systems and did nothing to address doctrinal or structural problems.

Two wars in the recent past have had a great effect on China's military modernizations effort – the Sino-Vietnam border war in 1979 and the 1991 Persian Gulf War between the United States' led coalition forces and Iraq. Both wars caused the PLA leadership to turn a critical eye to the organization, structure and the equipment of its forces as well as to the doctrine, strategy and tactics under which it planned to fight.

The 1979 Sino-Vietnam border war, although only sixteen days long, revealed a number of serious shortcomings in the PLA's capabilities. As the largest military operation China had mounted since the Korean War over twenty-five years before, this war was expected to be a relatively simple exercise for the numerically superior Chinese

⁶² Jack Weible. "Pentagon: China Takes Slow, Steady Approach to Modernization." *Army Times*. 5 May 1997. p. 29.

forces. Combine China's overwhelming size advantage with the fact the Vietnam was forced to fight on two fronts (the Vietnamese were also fighting with Cambodian forces on its southwestern border) and it is understandable that China expected to be able to conduct its punitive attack and depart with an easy victory. The Vietnamese army, however, after decades of fighting the French and then the United States, was the most combat-experienced army in Asia. It also fielded a highly mobile force which was more technologically advanced than the Chinese forces. Although Chinese forces penetrated about fifty kilometers into Vietnam and eventually claimed victory, the Vietnamese forces were able to inflict heavy casualties on the PLA. The PLA's performance was marred by poor mobility, weak logistics, outdated weaponry. Additionally poor communications, an unclear chain-of-command, and the lack of a military rank structure confused the situation and affected the PLA's combat effectiveness.⁶³

As a result of the problems identified during the Sino-Vietnam war, numerous organizational and structural changes were made to the PLA, including the creation of the state Central Military Commission (CMC), civilianization of many PLA units, consolidation of China's military regions from eleven into seven, streamlining and reduction of superfluous PLA forces, formation of group armies and the enactment of a new Military Service Law in 1985. The end result of this streamlining and reduction in

⁶³ Worden, p. 552.

forces was that the overall size of the PLA was brought from nearly 4.5 million soldiers in the early 1980's down to a force of approximately 3.2 million in 1992.⁶⁴

The other action that has been of primary importance in giving impetus to and reenthusing purpose into China's military modernization efforts was the 1991 Persian Gulf War between the coalition forces lead by the United States against Iraq. Two aspects in particular were noted by outside observers and Chinese military official. First, there are many similarities between the Iraqis and the Chinese – from the same type and age of its equipment to the doctrine and tactics these forces fought under. The striking speed with which the war was executed and the immense destruction caused by the advanced weapons also shocked China. “The Gulf War demonstrated that Chinese equipment and military doctrine were obsolete for the conditions of modern warfare.”⁶⁵

The second aspect that many Chinese military experts identified after this war was its limited nature. This was highlighted in the Gulf War, but was also seen in the Soviet fighting in Afghanistan and the Iran-Iraqi conflict. Chinese military officials now believe that limited warfare of a high-tech nature will be the norm for future wars.

According to China analyst David Shambaugh who had discussed this war with Chinese personnel at the Academy of Military Sciences and National Defense University in 1991, the Gulf War greatly shocked China and its concepts of how wars should be fought. He noted the Gulf War:

⁶⁴ Michael D. Swaine. *The Military & Political Succession in China: Leadership, Institutions, Beliefs*. (Santa Monica: Rand. 1992). p. 160.

⁶⁵ GAO report to Congressional Committees, p. 4.

had a jarring effect on the PLA. The military nature of Desert Storm and the swiftness of the allied victory stunned the Chinese high command. Before the war, they had been predicting that U.S. forces would become bogged down in a ground war similar to the Soviets' experience in Afghanistan. Every element of the allied strategy and capabilities left the PLA aghast and hammered home as never before the backwardness of the PLA. The PLA was forced to confront the elements of modern warfare: precision-guided munitions; stealth technology; electronic counter-measures; precision bombing of military targets with minimized collateral damage; airborne command and control systems; in-flight refueling; the minimum loss of attack aircraft and life; the use of satellites in anti-ballistic missile defense; strategic targeting and intelligence gathering; early warning and surveillance; the use of command centers half a world away ... This was the PLA's first exposure to a high-tech war and they were stunned.⁶⁶

While the Sino-Vietnam border war had pushed the process of modernization in the PLA, the Gulf War caused a thorough revision of doctrine, training and most importantly, changed the Chinese thinking on weapons and technology. As a result, China's modernization has been focused in four main areas: education and training, restructuring of the forces, research and development (R&D) and acquisition of new weapon systems.

a. Education and Training

Reforms in education and training emphasized improving the military skills and raising the education levels of officers and troops and conducting combined-arms operations. A critical part of this was the professionalization of the officer corps and the development of a noncommissioned officer corps from those not selected for officer training. This process had begun with the establishment of the National Defense

⁶⁶ David Shambaugh. "China's Military: Real or Paper Tiger? *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 19, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 19.

University in 1985. It also included a complete revision of the PLA's military training system, with increased combined arms training and emphasis on professional military education.

b. Force Restructuring

Restructuring of the PLA as discussed after the Sino-Vietnam border war has resulted in the reorganization of the PLA into seven military districts with group armies as the primary units. Unlike the field armies of the Sino-Vietnam war period, group armies are unified infantry, armor, artillery, air defense and support assets under one commander that fight as a combined-arms force. Combined-arms forces are better able to deal with changing situations, varied intensities of combat as well as support, rearm and maintain themselves due to their streamlined structure and unity of command.⁶⁷ In support of the new strategies discussed in the next section, the PLA also developed "fist" units suited for the limited duration and intensity, high-tech warfare of the type observed in the Persian Gulf War and expected in the future. These small, well-trained combat forces are trained to fight with the advanced technology weapons that were proven effective in the Gulf War. As a trade off for the cost of these new high-tech weapons, further cuts in the PLA are planned that will remove another 500,000 soldiers, leaving an end-strength around 2.5 million.⁶⁸

⁶⁷ Worden, pp. 561-563.

⁶⁸ "China's New Look Army: The PLA Tested Higher Tech in the Straits War Games." *Asiaweek*. 12 April 1996, p. 30.

c. Research and Development Efforts

The third area of focus is in research and development. Critical weaknesses have been noted in China's Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence (C3I) systems, electronic warfare, precision guided munitions and jet engine design. The GAO report on Chinese military modernization has noted that:

China has been successful in using indigenously developed technologies in conjunction with foreign technologies in its space and nuclear program; however, despite technological assistance from both Russia and Israel, China has had trouble developing an indigenous fighter aircraft. Additionally, China's ability to absorb new technology has been questioned and may be a roadblock to the PLA's modernization.⁶⁹

Fiscally constrained, the PLA has chosen to focus on a selected number of key areas rather than concentrating on an all-round buildup. C3I, space-based systems, precision guided missile technology, high speed computers and electronic warfare systems are at the core of China's R&D efforts. Another aspect of the fiscal constraints, the units receiving the newest systems are the elite "fist" units, while the other units are slowly but steadily receiving upgrades to their systems.⁷⁰

d. Advanced Systems Acquisitions

The final area of modernization is that of the acquisition of advanced weapon systems. As noted above, the R&D for these systems has been limited to selected areas, which has meant that for a large part of its acquisitions, China has been forced to purchase these systems on the foreign market. While this is the quickest way to

⁶⁹ GAO report to Congressional Committees, p.26.

⁷⁰ Ji You. "High-Tech Shift for China's Military" *Asian Defense Journal*. September 1995.

upgrade the PLA, it requires funds that are not readily available and diverts funds from other projects. Therefore modernization has occurred not only through foreign purchases, but China has also attempted to reverse engineer selected high-tech systems as well as indigenously develop others.⁷¹ The end result however, is a modernization process that is progressing at a moderate pace.

The acquisition of advanced systems has mainly been focused on the naval and air forces, while the ground forces have remained last in line in terms of both priority and modernization. According to China military analyst Michael Swaine, the purpose of these purchases has been to develop a rapid reaction and limited power projection capability. As Table 2: Recent and Planned Major Naval and Air Acquisitions demonstrates, the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has been the major point of effort. This has allowed the PLAN to add over 20 new principal surface combatants since the mid-80's. These ships are equipped with a significant missile capability, advanced radar and fire-control systems, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and electronic countermeasures. Additionally China has added over 100 mine warfare ships of various classes, six missile frigates, and nine Houxin-class missile craft since the 1980's and is developing new classes of resupply amphibious assault ships. Also persistent reports indicate a plan to construct or purchase one or two medium to large aircraft carriers.

⁷¹ Petrie, p. 53.

Branch	Type	Class	Recent	Planned ^a
Navy	Destroyer	Luhu	1	3
	Destroyer	Luda III	2	14
	Missile frigate	Jiangwei	4	2
	Submarine	Improved Ming	10	?
	Submarine	Modified Romeo	1	?
	Submarine	Song	0	?
	Submarine	Kilo	4	18 ^b
	Mine warfare ships	Various	100	—
	Missile craft	Houxin	9	?
	SSBN	Xia	1	?
	SSN	Han	—	1-5
	Aircraft carrier	40,000-50,000 tons	—	1-2
	LST	Yukan	5	?
	Tank landing ship	Yutin	1	?
Air force	Fighter	J-7	40/year	—
	Fighter	J-8	12/year	—
	Fighter	Su-27	26	348 ^c
	Fighter	F-10	—	? ^b
	Bomber	H-6	4/year	—
	Transport	IL-76	25	?

^a These number indicate quantities of weapon systems under consideration or already determined. Question marks indicate uncertainty about a planned quantity.

^b An unknown quantity to be coproduced.

^c Includes about 300 to be coproduced.

Source: Michael D. Swaine "China" *Strategic Appraisal* 1996, p. 211.

Table 2: Recent and Planned Major Naval and Air Acquisitions

In the field of submarines, China has decommissioned and removed from service over half the number of its conventional submarines, but is upgrading its Ming-class submarines and developing a new diesel-electric one to replace the old Romeo and Ming-class. It has also recently purchased four sophisticated Kilo-class conventional submarines from Russia. In nuclear-powered submarines, China plans to supplement its current Han fleet and build an new Xia-class ballistic missile submarine with an improved missiles.⁷²

⁷² Swaine, "China." *Strategic Appraisal*. pp. 205-211.

According to Swaine these acquisitions have greatly improved the operational range, firepower, and air defense capabilities of China's principal surface combatants, thereby improving its capability to conduct operations farther from shore and for longer periods.⁷³ While these improvements have been successful for the PLAN, the PLAAF's attempts at developing and advanced indigenous fighter and combat aircraft industry have been largely unsuccessful. While the PLAAF maintains the world's largest collection of 1950's technology Soviet aircraft, its modernization efforts have been mainly advanced through purchases of both aircraft and technology from Russia. The purchase and delivery of 26 Su-27/*Flanker* long-range fighters and 25 IL-76 transports have had the greatest impact on improving the PLAAF's ability to support operations further from mainland China and provide some sort of power projection.⁷⁴

As mentioned earlier, the PLA's ground arm has been last in priority of modernization. Modernization efforts have mainly been directed at upgrading its existing equipment, purchasing and reversing engineering T-72 main battle tanks from Russia, and developing, in conjunction with Pakistan, a state of the art main battle tank. Additionally the PLA has introduced two new armored personnel carriers and anti-tank guided missiles.⁷⁵ R&D efforts have focused on further developing anti-tank and anti-aircraft missiles, armor-piercing ammunitions, helicopters, and an assortment of new

⁷³ Ibid. p. 208.

⁷⁴ Gregory K. S. Man. "Modernizing the Chinese Military." in Debra E. Soled, ed. *China: A Nation in Transition*. (Washington D.C.: Congressional Quarterly Inc. 1995.) pp. 278-280.

⁷⁵ Petrie, pp. 54-55.

transportation vehicles. Purchases in the early 1990's of over 300 helicopters from the United States, Russia, France Australia, and Germany has also helped their modernization efforts.⁷⁶

3. Change in Strategic Orientation

The final change in China that has increased the belief in Japan that a China threat exists and becoming a problem in the future, is the transformation of the PLA's strategic orientation. China has followed Mao's concept of "People's War" from the early 1930's until the late 1970's. The objective of this type of warfare is to fight a long, protracted land war emphasizing maneuver and attrition of the enemy forces by not only the PLA, but the entire populace of China. Mao believed that China could defeat a technologically superior enemy by using its great continental territorial size to trade space for time, "luring the enemy in deep" and then defeating him through attrition in a series of decisive battles.⁷⁷ This doctrine has an avowed defensive orientation that was not overtly threatening to other countries, such as Japan. The Sino-Vietnam border war, however, caused China to begin to review this doctrine and revise it to better account for the increasingly technical nature of China's military. Wars were not going to necessarily fought on Chinese territory and the need to rationalize this type of conflict as "counterattacks in self-defense" seemed to mark the need for change.⁷⁸

⁷⁶ Man, pp. 276-277.

⁷⁷ Montaperto. Testimony Before the House Committee on National Security. p. 3.

⁷⁸ Man. p. 266.

Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, the doctrine of "People's War" was restated as "People's War under Modern Conditions" in 1985. This took into account the vagaries of nuclear weapons on the one hand, and more local, limited duration actions on the other. Chinese defense planners began to note that these limited wars had certain characteristics: generally short in duration, geographically localized and not tending to spread, employment of massive firepower, particularly air power and short-range missiles, all weapons (including chemical and tactical nuclear weapons) were viewed as fair game and ground forces, though still important, were no longer seen as the mainstay or key to victory.⁷⁹

However, according to China analyst Gregory Man, "the PLA's evolving Local War doctrine will only supplement, not replace, China's current official military doctrine – People's War Under Modern Conditions – which is based on Mao Zedong Military Thought."⁸⁰ He argues that China has not abandoned the basic premise that the participation of the whole populace and mobilization of all the country's resources for as long as it takes to defeat the enemy. However, success in this new "outwardly-looking military doctrine of local war, requires "the employment of sophisticated weapons and specially tailored, highly mobile forces to make rapid gains by achieving and early tactical advantage."⁸¹ Two tenets of this new doctrine are particularly important to

⁷⁹ This characterization of limited wars is from Shambaugh, "China's Military. " and further supported by Ronald N. Montaperto in his work, "China as a Military Power." Institute for National Strategic Studies, *Strategic Forum*. Number 56, December 1995.

⁸⁰ Man. pp. 262-267.

⁸¹ Man. p. 265.

understanding the belief that it is a more threatening in nature. The first is the principle of "active defense," where the PLA will mount a series of aggressive preemptive operations for the very inception of the conflict which will destroy the enemy's ability to encroach upon Chinese territory. The second element is the idea of a "strategic boundary" which Montaperto believes is a source of potential tension between China and its neighbors. This concept pushes the physical boundary of China outward, requiring China to develop the capabilities to project military power beyond its borders.⁸²

Despite this evolving military doctrine, analysts believe that it will be years before the PLA is able to fully match its doctrine with the modernization levels required. Ronald Montaperto argues that one of the reasons for this is that the PLA "lacks a strategic focus." Without determining the most likely sources of any future conflict, the doctrinal revisions are incomplete and sometimes nebulous.⁸³ It is clear, however, that from the perspective of a neighboring country, China's doctrine has shifted from one that was purely defensive, inwardly-looking in direction to one that has a outwardly-looking, more aggressive nature.

E. CONCLUSION

After looking at many of the key events in the modern relations of Japan and China that have developed into negative images and perceptions of Japan, three trends or characteristics have been identified that continue to influence the relationship between

⁸² Montaperto, "The People's Republic of China as an Ascending Power." p. 4.

⁸³ Montaperto, "China as a Military Power."

Japan and China. Despite these seemingly negative trends, there is an equal if not greater positive trend of economic interaction and social conduct. In fact, the level of interaction between Japan and China, in terms of trade and loans and interpersonal contacts, Japanese visiting China, is the highest among all other countries (excluding Greater China, Hong Kong and Taiwan) with which China has relations.⁸⁴ The level of Japanese investment in China has increased from approximately \$349 million in 1990 to over \$2.5 billion in 1994.⁸⁵ The Japanese trade deficit with China in 1995 was almost \$14 billion, with imports of almost \$36 billion and exports of almost \$22 billion.⁸⁶ It seems to be the case, however, that the negative images of Japan that have developed in China as a result of the history of animosity and destructive actions of Japan, continue to arise and disrupt relations between the two countries. China continues to use these historical animosities and Japan's history of aggression as a whip to beat Japan with, whenever they feel threatened by Japanese actions.

China's rapidly developing economy has been able to provide the fiscal resources to moderately support the military modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). These modernizations are based on the Four Modernizations and reflect militarily the lessons learned from China's poor showing in the Sino-Vietnam border war and the performance of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf War. From these stimuli China has

⁸⁴ Whiting, p. 28.

⁸⁵ Japan External Trade Organization. "Changes in Japan's Direct Overseas Investments" Online. Available HTTP. <http://www.jetro.go.jp/WHITEPAPER/INVEST96/t12.html>. 15 September 1996.

⁸⁶ Japan External Trade Organization. "Japan Trade Balance with China." Online. Available HTTP. http://www.jetro.go.jp/FACTS/t_2.html. 15 September 1996.

evolved its guiding military doctrine and strategy from that of a "People's War" to a modern version oriented on "limited war." As Swaine has argued, "This shift is reflected in a broad-based defense doctrine comprising the central concepts of local war, active peripheral defense, and rapid power projection."⁸⁷ It is for these reasons that the China threat is believed to be growing, and analysts in Japan can believe that perhaps a "new cold war" has begun.⁸⁸ China's concentration on modernizing the PLAN seems particularly threatening to Japan. A move to develop a blue water navy, while arguable aimed at protecting China's territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea, is equally disturbing to the security of these sea lanes, through which the vast majority of its oil and natural resource imports must flow. The problems with these fears will be discussed in the final Chapter on prospects for the future.

⁸⁷ Swaine, "China." *Strategic Appraisal*. p. 202

⁸⁸ Comment by the President of the Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Nakajima Mineo as quoted in Kyono Mamiko, "Is China a Regional Threat, or a Challenge?" *The Daily Yomiuri*. 19 November 1995.

III. MODERNIZATION OF THE JAPANESE SELF DEFENSE FORCES

The defense of Japan and the strategic concepts behind it have gone through great changes as a result of the end of the Cold War. These changes reflect the new environment associated with the decline of the former Soviet Union's influence in East Asian affairs, the new pressures resonating from the expectations resulting from the Persian Gulf War and coalition warfare, and the reemergence of China as a powerful player in the region. These events, and the problems Japan has experienced with them, have caused the Japanese to review and revise their strategic concepts for defense. The National Defense Program Outline, the basic document which provides guidance and structure to the Japan Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces, was revised in 1995. This was the first major change in twenty years. As a result of this revision, Japan reviewed and in some cases restructured the various components of its Defense Agency and the Self Defense Forces, as well as the strategy for its employment and use.¹

The strategic direction of Japan's defense activities is not as broadly or explicitly stated as, for example, the U.S. National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement. The process through which Japan's strategic focus and principles are enunciated is not clear, so it is therefore useful to review briefly how defense policy in Japan is formulated. This section will be followed by an analysis of the two broad policy statements that direct Japanese defense policy; the National Defense Program Outline

¹ Japan Defense Agency, *National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996*. Adopted 28 November 1995. Available HTTP. http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.html.

(NDPO) and the Mid-Term Defense Program.² While the NDPO looks long-term and provides broad, strategic direction, the Mid-Term Defense Program focuses on a five year period (1996-2000). A review of the latter will be helpful in pinpointing the immediate changes being made and the focus of the modernization program. Finally, the structure, training and doctrine, equipment and modernization efforts of the Japan Self Defense Forces will be examined to identify the major changes and direction of its modernization efforts for the 21st century.

A. JAPANESE DEFENSE POLICY AND STRATEGIC THOUGHT

The process of change within any government is difficult for a number of reasons— from bureaucratic inefficiency and infighting, to problems with the personalities of key players involved. There is normally, however, a lead agency, organization, or person, who takes charge and leads the group in the new direction. Reflecting the knowledge that it was the power of the defense establishment, key officers and the military wielding this power that led it to a series of aggressive wars, Japan has organized its defense community with many checks and balances, and as a decidedly second-place organization.

1. Policy Formulation and Key Players

The Prime Minister, as the commander-in-chief of the SDF, and directly responsible to the Cabinet and the Diet for the defense of Japan, is the most important

² *On The Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996- FY2000)*. A tentative unofficial translation is available HTTP. http://www.jda.jp/policy/f_work/chukibou/index_e.html.

official in the defense community. Having said that, however, it is also important to realize that due to the diffusion of responsibility in the defense establishment, in certain circumstances he is relegated to a minor role. The Chief Cabinet Secretary in the Prime Minister's Office coordinates defense policy and is considered the right-hand of the Prime Minister.

The Security Council (SC) of Japan is the organization that approves recommended defense policies and resolves budgetary problems but has little to do with the day-to-day business of the Defense Agency. It does not maintain its own staff and so does not have much impact on (or the capacity to meddle with) policy formulation during its early stages of development. Its members (see Figure 1 for its current members and important observers) greatly reflect their parent organizations and it functions very much like other Japanese governmental decision-making organizations – with behind-the-scenes consensus building occurring first, so that when the Council does meet, an agreed upon course of action is in place, and every major ministry has already made its recommendations and changes to the proposal.³ Even the name of the Security Council is a compromise, chosen over the “National Security Council” when it was changed from the National Defense Council 1986, for its weaker connotation of military security and in deference to the opposition parties in the Diet.⁴ The Prime Minister must report to

³ Michael W. Chinworth. *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy*. (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc. 1992). pp. 22-23.

⁴ Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara. *Japan's National Security: Structures, Norms and Policy Responses in a Changing World*. (New York: Cornell University Press. 1993) p. 41.

President: Prime Minister Members: Vice Prime Minister Minister of Foreign Affairs Minister of Finance Chief Cabinet Secretary Director General of the Defense Agency Director General of the Economic Planning Agency Chairman of the National Public Safety Commission
Regularly Present: Minister of International Trade and Industry Director General of the Science and Technology Agency Director General of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau
Assistant Members: Parliamentary Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Administrative Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Administrative Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs Administrative Vice Minister for Finance Administrative Vice Minister, Defense Agency Administrative Vice Minister for Economic Planning Administrative Vice Minister for International Trade and Industry Administrative Vice Minister for Science and Technology

Source: Adapted from Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan, 1996* and Holland, *Managing Defense*.⁶

Figure 1: Security Council of Japan

and/or consult with the SC in a number of areas before taking certain actions. These include decisions on the Defense Outline, the coordination of industrial production and other matters relating to defense planning, mobilization of the Self-Defense Forces, and other matters related to national defense that the Prime Minister recognizes as necessary to be discussed.⁵

The Japan Defense Agency (JDA) is the organization responsible for the implementation of the defense policies formulated and approved by the Security Council. (See Figure 2 for an outline of the Organization of the JDA.) A number of the JDA

⁵ Ibid. p. 187.

⁶ Harrison M. Holland. *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma*. (Lanham: University Press of America. 1988). p. 80.

members actively participate in the Security Council and the Director General of the Defense Agency is a voting member. As stated earlier, the Director General of JDA is not a major cabinet position but a the head of a secondary state agency. The Director General is a political appointee, though not normally one that is politically powerful, and it is the Administrative Vice Minister (an Assistant member in the Security Council and a career civil service post) that is the most influential. Additionally, "seconded" officials, from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Finance, and International Trade and Industry, hold many of the key positions such as Chiefs of the Internal Bureaus. The Internal Bureaus are where the majority of policy planning and procurement decisions occur. In those Internal Bureaus, the use of seconded officials is one of the main instruments by which civilian control of the military is realized.⁷ Other seconded officials are scattered throughout the Defense Agency, occupying key civilian positions whenever someone must deal with the three services, other ministries and the Diet.

The relative weakness often associated with the position of the Defense Agency Director General is not as big a problem as it once was. The fact that strong Director Generals have gone on to other, more powerful positions, has taken some of the force out of this argument. For example, Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro (1982-1987) had extensive experience in foreign policy and defense issues and was previously the JDA

⁷ Ibid. p. 2.




Figure 2: Organization of Japan Defense Agency

Director General. On the whole, however, those who have held the position are normally seen as weak politicians which leads to the JDA being dominated by other ministries.⁸

One of the key problems with the structure of the Japanese Defense establishment is the lack of focus at the upper echelon. The multiplicity of players that work on defense issues is amazing and creates a problem of focus and priority. When an official is

⁸ Ian Grow. "Civilian Control of the Military in Postwar Japan." in Ron Matthews and Keisuke Matsuyama, eds. *Japan's Military Renaissance?* (New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1993). p. 61.

seconded to the Defense Agency, the person's motivation and allegiance often remain with the parent organization.⁹ The agenda that is brought with the official is that of the parent. For example, an official seconded from the Ministry of International Trade and Industry may be most concerned with Japan's economic well-being as it relates to a particular industry. Based on the desire to build up a critical industrial sector (for instance, the aircraft industry) the official may advance a position that favors and supports this industry rather than one which is best for the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces. An additional factor is that the atmosphere that requires a seconded official to fill key decision-making positions, necessarily discourages the development of civilian career defense specialists, because their ability to move up and fill key positions are dominated and blocked by these seconded officials.

A second problem with the defense establishment in Japan is the second-class status that it holds and therefore its inability to attract the best people. The top college graduates of the prestigious universities tend to migrate to the top ministries: Finance, Foreign Affairs and International Industry and Trade. The problem is compounded by the pervasive nature of the pacifism that has permeated the population and influences the most promising individuals to look to the other ministries for employment. A *Yomiuri Shimbun* survey in July 1988 showed that while half of the surveyed population believed there existed genuine security concerns, only a little over 28 percent declared they would

⁹ Chinworth, pp. 17-20, Holland p. 6.

support the SDF in the defense of Japan.¹⁰ In a 1995 survey conducted by the office of the Prime Minister, though over half the surveyed population believed the purpose of the SDF was to ensure national security, two-thirds believed its most main role to be disaster relief.¹¹ The desire for a pacific, non-military approach to security by the average Japanese, affect the type and quality of person the JDA can attract.

There are two other elements that must be identified to complete the defense establishment. They are the political parties, on one hand, and the defense contractors in the private business sector, on the other hand. Political support for defense is limited for the most part by the politicians' desire to be reelected. The pacifism that encompasses Japanese society also has a detrimental effect on politicians too closely associated with the defense establishment. Chinworth sites an example of a respected politician who lost reelection because he was perceived as ignoring the local constituency as he established his reputation on international and defense issues.¹² Despite this fear, there is still sufficient interest in the Liberal Democratic Party's organized special committees under its Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) that parallels the committees within the Diet on defense issues.¹³ These *zoku*, or caucuses, allow LDP members of these committees to become more familiar with defense issues as well as with the special interest groups.

¹⁰ Cited by Chinworth, p. 8.

¹¹ "Public Opinion Survey on the Future Role of the SDF." Cited in *Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a New Era*. (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd. July, 1996). pp. 197-206.

¹² Chinworth. p. 21.

¹³ Organizational information on the LDP is available HTTP. <http://www.sphere.ad.jp/ldp/english/e-orgchart.html>. 16 Dec 1996.

However, the same problems that affect JDA officials – that of being related to a “second-class” agency with its history and the pervasiveness of pacifism – also affects the type and quality of politician interested in defense. According to Holland, LDP Diet members who tend to gravitate toward defense issues have relatively little influence in policy councils or in the Party, and as they attempt to advance their position as pro-defense, their perceived “hawkish” stance diminishes the effectiveness of their effort.¹⁴

The final actor in the defense establishment is the defense contractors and other businesses related to defense issues. Japan’s unique defense industry, hemmed in by its constitutionally mandated export ban on military materiel,¹⁵ has been nurtured by MITI, JDA and private concerns to ensure its viability should a future need for it arise. Although defense-specific industries account for not more than 0.6 percent of domestic industrial production and so can not be called critical to the national economy they are nonetheless important to the government.¹⁶ In preparation for the review of the National Defense Program Outline, Prime Minister Morihiro Hosokawa created a nine-member

¹⁴ Holland. p. 10.

¹⁵ Japan restricted the export of arms to 1) communist countries, 2) countries under UN-resolution arms embargo and 3) countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976 these restrictions were tightened by a resolution passed by the Diet that banned arms exports to these three categories of countries, restricting the exports of arms in general and the plants that could produce them. This, however, was revised to not include the exchange of military-related technology to the United States in 1983. See Okazaki Hisahiko. *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense*. (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc. 1986.) p. 82.

¹⁶ Chinworth. p. 190, and Michael J. Green, *Arming Japan: Defense Production, Alliance Politics, and the Postwar Search for Autonomy*. (New York: Columbia University Press. 1995). Table 1.4, p. 18.

advisory panel to review Japan's basic defense posture. A statement from this panel reflects the importance of the defense industry to Japan:

From the viewpoint of security, however, we would like to emphasize that it is extremely important to have a domestic defense industry capable of developing and producing technologically advanced and high-quality equipment. . . . Furthermore, as Japan maintains a policy of imposing strict voluntary restraints on arms exports under the three principles of arms exports, weapons-related divisions of component enterprises have no alternative but to formulate production plans based entirely on orders from the Defense Agency. As a result, a wide variety of products tend to be produced on a limited scale, which leads to prices higher than the average price abroad. As for mainline equipment, it is notable that a major part of such equipment is either imported from the United States or manufactured domestically under license from United States defense contractors.¹⁷

Okazaki Hisahiko argues in his pragmatic book on Japanese grand strategy, that the reason for these self-imposed restrictions is almost entirely related to "the manifestation of a 'pacific posture'"¹⁸ that afflicts Japanese society and affects not only the defense industry but the Defense Agency itself. This reliance on domestic production for defense materiel has progressed from a low in the early 1950's of about 30 percent to consistently maintaining a ratio of domestic procurement to total (the *kokusanka* ratio) of over 90 percent since the early 1980's.¹⁹ The advantages for Japan lie not only in maintaining these defense industries, but also in spin-off technologies, acquired through licensed production of U.S. defense systems. Japanese Defense analyst Michael Green

¹⁷ *The Modality of Security and Defense Capabilities of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century*. Advisory Group on Defense Issues. (Tokyo, August 12, 1994).

¹⁸ Okazaki. p. 82

¹⁹ Green, p. 15.

uses the example of the brakes for the bullet train that were based on the design of the brakes for the F-104 Starfighter, built under license by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries in the 1960's.²⁰

2. Japanese Strategic Thought

Japanese defense policies and contemporary strategic thought in Japan are firmly rooted in the three pillars and fundamental philosophies of their Constitution, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and the Charter of the United Nations. (Figure 3 shows a representation of the key documents and policies that form the framework for defense policy in Japan.) With these three primary pillars as their foundation, Japan's Basic and Standard Defense Policies were developed in 1957, establishing the following four principles considered necessary to achieve the objective of national defense:

1. Support of the activities of the United Nations and the promotion of international cooperation.
2. Promotion of public welfare and the enhancement of the people's love for the country.
3. Incremental development of effective defense capabilities necessary for self-defense.
4. Use of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements as the basis for dealing with external aggression.²¹

While the first two principles are statements of philosophy, the last two became the key elements of the Japanese passive security strategy based exclusively on this defensive-only posture.

²⁰ Ibid. p. 14.

²¹ Japan Defense Agency. *Basic Policy for National Defense*. 14 December 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/f_work/kihon_e.html.




Figure 3: Framework of Japanese Defense Policy

Within the confines of this defensive-only military strategy, Japan would only take the minimum actions necessary for self-defense and do this with the minimum defense force necessary. In fact, the policy states that it was not attempting to meet fully the requirements for self-defense (or more specifically, that it is not building a capability directly linked to a military threat to Japan), but to prevent instability in the region by ensuring a power vacuum would not be created.²² Under this policy Japan could build up its defense capability moderately, ensuring civilian control and adhering to its three non-nuclear principles of not possessing, manufacturing nor allowing the importation of nuclear weapons.

Changes to the security environment, in both the international and domestic conditions, have resulted in higher (and quite different) expectations of the types of roles and missions that the Self-Defense Forces might conduct. These changes led to the

²² Holland, p. 21 and Appendix E, *National Defense Program Outline* (1973), pp. 91-96.

²³ Japan Defense Agency. *Framework of Defense Policy*. December 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.jda.go.jp/policy.f_work/f_work_e.html.

review of the NDPO. Changes in the threat due to the end of the Cold War and the end of the bipolar, confrontational atmosphere, brought a lessening in the probability of global war. On the other hand, the Persian Gulf War with its coalition warfare, demonstrated to the Japanese that regional conflicts still were going to occur. With the emphasis on multilateral efforts to combat regional problems and decrease tensions and given the constitutional restrictions and popular support of pacifism, Japan could see that it could not fully participate. Japan's "checkbook diplomacy" was viewed as an insufficient form of participation²⁴ and it was time to make changes and become a more active member of the international community. One role that seemed at least partially palatable to the Japanese and the world was that of United Nations peace-keeping and humanitarian assistance.²⁵

The Japanese constitutional restrictions on the deployment of the Self-Defense Forces had to be amended before these forces could be used in this manner. This was done in 1992, after much debate, with the passage of the Law on Cooperation for United Nations Peace-keeping Operations and Related Activities.²⁶ The use of the Self-Defense

²⁴ This is reference to Japan's use of aid/grants and other forms of payments in lieu of personnel or equipment. It was specifically reflective of Japanese support of Desert Shield/Storm and their contribution of over \$13 billion. See Cronin, p. 21, Brian Cloughley, "Japan Ponders Power Projection." *International Defense Review*, Jane's Information Group Limited, 1 July 1996, p. 27. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "Coping with Japan." *Foreign Policy*, Number 87, Winter 1992-93, p. 108.

²⁵ This is not to say that all agreed to this. See for instance, Sasaki Yoshitaka, "Japan's Undue International Contribution." *Japan Quarterly*, Asahi Shimbun. July-September 1993.p. 243-265.

²⁶ See "Paths to Peace: Japan's Participation in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations and International Humanitarian Operations." Ministry of Foreign Affairs. December 1996. Available HTTP. <http://www.nttl.co.jp/infomofa/pko/index.html>.

Forces in humanitarian relief situations, such as in Rwanda, and at home, as with the Hanshin/Awaji earthquake, helped mollify the population's pacifist fears and has brought about a new level of acceptance of these types of uses of the SDF.

The result of these changes in the security environment has been a shift in direction of Japan's strategic thinking on security issues and new calls to revise the NDPO. Prime Minister Hosokawa, in early 1994, initiated the review of the NDPO with the creation of a special advisory panel chaired by Higuchi Hirotaro, CEO, Asahi Breweries, Ltd. Consisting of eight other business leaders, academics, and defense experts, the panel met over a period of five months to hear briefings and to discuss relevant issues, ranging from regional security and defense issues to personnel, equipment and SDF structural issues. The panel completed its work with the presentation of the report "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century" to Prime Minister Murayama.²⁷ Most of the changes that were identified in this report eventually found their way into the new NDPO. The Higuchi report recommended:

Japan should extricate itself from its security policy of the past that was, if anything, passive, and henceforth play an active role in shaping a new order. Indeed, Japan has the responsibility of playing such a role.²⁸

²⁷ An English translation this report (The Higuchi Report) appears as Appendix A to Patrick M. Cronin and Michael J. Green, *Redefining the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Tokyo's National Defense Program*, McNair Paper 31. (Washington D.C.: Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, November 1994.) pp. 21-60.

²⁸ The Higuchi Report, p. 30.

It goes on to identify that Japan's first mission in this 'new order' is to "build a coherent and comprehensive security policy" consisting of:

First, promotion of multilateral security cooperation on a global and regional scale; second, enhancement of the functions of the Japan-U.S. security relationship; and third, possession of a highly reliable and efficient defense capability based on a strengthened information capability and a prompt crisis-management capability.²⁹

While the approach of using these three objectives is not new, the emphasis that it recommends on multilateral security cooperation and on Japan's own military forces in a more balanced way with the U.S.-Japan security arrangements is a definite shift away from the previous NDPO's predominant focus on the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

B. NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM OUTLINE

As the strategic, mid- to long-term document used to guide the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces, the National Defense Program Outline has a great impact on the roles and missions, equipment, training and modernization of the SDF. The 1995 NDPO calls for a more balanced approach to better provide for the defense of Japan. The NDPO outlines three objectives:

1. A multilateral approach to regional security.
2. Strong, continued support of the U.S.-Japan security relations.
3. A compact, effective, and flexible SDF.

The basic premise of national defense remains unchanged. Japan continues to prevent aggression using a combination of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and its own defense capability. It continues to rely on the United States nuclear umbrella for

²⁹ Ibid. p. 30.

strategic deterrence. The major change in the NDPO is the additional emphasis placed on the two objectives of multilateral, regional security and the SDF. The emphasis on defense capabilities of the SDF requires the restructuring of elements of the SDF, mainly in scale and function. While the NDPO focuses mostly on these two objectives, it also makes a number of recommendations for changes in, as well as continued emphasis on, the U.S.-Japan Security Alliance. These changes will be looked at in more detail in Chapter IV but are encapsulated briefly here.

1. United States – Japan Security Arrangements

The security relationship between the United States and Japan continues to be the cornerstone for Japanese security. The NDPO outlines four specific efforts that will be made to enhance the credibility of these arrangements and to ensure their effective implementation.

The first effort is in the promotion of exchanges of information and consultation between the two countries. This includes close consultations on defense policies and U.S. military posture, particularly in connection with the Department of Defense's Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the New Special Measures Agreement on Host Nation Support (HNS), and the bilateral study of ballistic missile defense (BMD).³⁰

The second effort is the establishment of an effective posture for cooperation in operational areas including joint studies, exercises and training, as well as enhancement

³⁰ Joint Announcement United States-Japan Security Consultative Committee, Tokyo. December 2, 1996. Available HTTP. <http://www.ntls.co.jp/infomofa/ju/security/joint1202.html>.

of mutual support in those areas. The U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Committee recently announced a number of ways this cooperation will occur.³¹ It includes a call for more joint training exercises such as the first JGSDF combined-arms, live-fire exercise that occurred in Yakima, Washington,³² and other such joint training exercises, particularly those focused on peace-keeping, humanitarian and disaster relief operations. It also calls for continued exchanges of officers under the Personnel Exchange Program (PEP) and attendance by officers of both countries in the others' service schools.

The third effort is to enhance the broad, mutual exchange of equipment and technology and is most represented by the efforts made under the F-2 Production Agreement and the development of Theater Missile Defense (TMD) programs. It also calls for continued improvements in the Technology-for-Technology Initiative.³³

The final effort involves the implementation of various measures to facilitate the smooth and effective stationing of United States forces in Japan. These include implementing the New Special Measures Agreement on Host Nation Support and the recommendations of the final report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO). This report calls for the return of approximately 21 percent of the total acreage

³¹ Ibid.

³² Asia-Pacific Defense Forum Staff, *Yakima: A New Japanese Training Ground*. Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Spring 1995. p. 26-30.

³³ A useful discussion of this initiative is found in Green, p.130-142. The Initiative calls for reciprocity in technology transfers between Japan and the United States, directed specifically at giving U.S. firms and its industrial base greater access to and transfer of Japanese nonderived, dual-use technology. "The declining defense spending in both countries legitimized the concept of drawing on a common defense technology base." Green, pp. 139-140. The initiative was initially intricately linked to TMD development, but in October 1993 these were delinked.

currently under U.S. control on Okinawa, various measures that will reduce the impact of U.S. military activities on the inhabitants, and improvements in the reporting and prevention of major accidents involving U.S. forces.³⁴

2. Multilateral Approach to a Stable Security Environment

The NDPO identifies a multilateral approach to security as one of the objectives through which Japan is to approach security for the 21st century. This increased emphasis takes three broad approaches: the use of multilateral regional forums for discussion, the increase in exchanges (such as visits, port calls and personal exchanges between the SDF and foreign militaries), and support for the United Nations initiatives on arms control and disarmament for the prevention of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, as well as chemical and biological weapons.

In the area of multilateral regional forums, Japan has increased its participation in and support of ASEAN, APEC, ARF and other forums as an effort to build regional confidence. The move is to give these forums a larger role in multilateral security, though at this point this is truly only at a fledgling state. Figure 4: Regional Participation (As of the 2nd ARF Meeting, July-August, 1995) outlines the various regional forums and shows current membership. In the Statement of the Chairman from the 2nd ARF meeting, it was agreed that the evolution of this regional security forum would be in three stages –

³⁴ Minister for Foreign Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Mondale. *The SACO Final Report*. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2 December 1996. Available HTTP. <http://www.ntls.co.jp/infomofa/ju/security/96saco1.html>.

promotion of confidence building, development of preventive diplomacy, and elaboration of approaches to conflict – and that ARF was in the first stage.³⁵

To increase the number and types of educational exchanges and to expand the security dialogue, Japan recently has conducted exchanges with Korea, China, Russia, including a port call by the Korean Training Squadron, its first visit to Japan. Reciprocal visits by the Japanese also have been scheduled.³⁶ High-level exchanges with China have included Japan Defense Agency Director Naoki Murata's visit to China 20-23 August 1996 and the reciprocal visit of China's Defense Minister Chi Haotian in December 1996. The NDPO outlines the belief that these kinds of exchanges, port calls, and open security dialogue, will help to increase the transparency of defense issues in the region.³⁷

The revised NDPO calls for Japan to cooperate with efforts of the United Nations and other international organizations in arms control and disarmament with the purpose of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles, and land-mines. Japan's desire to play a larger role in the United Nations has been expressed in a number

³⁵ The second meeting of ARF was held in July/August 1995, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei. Figure 4 is taken from *Japan's New Defense Policy*, an online pamphlet by the Japan Defense Agency. Available HTTP: http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/f_work/jndp/index_e.html.

³⁶ For an extensive list of current exchanges, see Section II, "ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) Trends and Japanese Confidence Building Efforts" in *Japan's New Defense Policy*.

³⁷ Ibid. Section II, p. 1.




Figure 4: Regional Participation (As of the 2nd ARF Meeting, July-August, 1995)

of ways. It expressed the desire to occupy a permanent seat in the Security Council³⁸ and subsequently adopted the Law Regulating Treatment of Dispatch Defense Agency Personnel to International Organizations, which authorized JDA personnel, with restrictions, to be used to support UN activities. This was seen by some as a direct response to the U.S. Senate resolution (January 1994) which called on the U.S. government to support permanent membership only when Japan (and Germany) made it possible for their armed forces to participate in UN military activities.³⁹

³⁸ Foreign Minister Kono Yohei, told the UN General Assembly in September 1994 that "Japan is prepared, with the endorsements of many countries, to discharge its responsibilities as a permanent member of the Security Council." *Asian Security 1995-1996*. (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1995) p. 126.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 126.

Japanese contributions to the United Nations Special Committee (UNSCOM) have included chemical weapons experts and observation teams in support of the survey teams in Iraq in 1993 and 1994. This led to the development of a unit specialized in protection against chemical weapons, and the development within the JGSDF Chemical School of the only facility in Japan recognized by the United Nations to manufacture chemicals for defensive purposes.⁴¹ These specially-trained personnel have been sent to China to survey and collect information that may in the future lead to the disposal of chemical weapons left in China by the Japanese Imperial Army.⁴²

3. Response to Large-Scale Disasters and Various Other Situations

The last area on which the new NDPO places increased emphasis is in the area of disaster relief, counter-terrorism, and protection of lives or assets. Japan has already made contributions in support of humanitarian relief in Zaire and Rwanda, and stands ready to provide similar support for future international disaster relief efforts. The experiences with the earthquakes in the Hanshin-Awaji area of Japan have proven the SDF capable of providing this type of support, but not without improvements to its

⁴⁰ Myanmar (Burma) has since been given observer status and is one of three countries (Myanmar, Cambodia and Laos) which will probably be admitted into ASEAN in the near future.

⁴¹ This facility manufactures "Schedule 1" chemicals, which include: sarin, soman, tabun, VX and mustard gas. Approximately 88 grams of these chemicals are created annually for research purposes and none are used in nor does Japan produce any chemical weapons. "Chemical Protection Research by the JSDF." *Japan's New Defense Policy*. Section III, 2. p. 1.

⁴² "Chemical Weapons and the Self-Defense Forces." *Japan's New Defense Policy*. Section III. p. 1.

emergency action/crisis management procedures.⁴³ The incident of sarin gas being released into the subways of Tokyo also has brought to light the problems associated with SDF response to terrorist-type event and have demonstrated the utility of the Self-Defense Forces in chemical defense and clean up.

One aspect of this area discussed in the new NDPO raised the possibility that Japan might have to deal with a massive migration of refugees to Japan or the emergency evacuation of Japanese citizens living abroad. This obviously comes out of concerns about the problems that could occur with the reunification of Korea, and though it is qualified with the statement that it bears no particular contingency in mind, there is a troubling possibility that Japan would or could take some sort of action in Korea.⁴⁴

C. MID-TERM DEFENSE PROGRAM (1996-2000)

The Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (MTDP), which covers the period FY 1996-2000, takes the general approach approved in the National Defense Program Outline and provides guidelines for planning, lays out the major programs and the budget, and gives directions on the reorganization of the forces.⁴⁵

⁴³ Critics of the SDF's response cite problems with slow initial response time, lack of exemptions from travel restrictions for emergencies and the requirement to wait for local authorities to request assistance before acting. See *Asian Security 1995-1996* (Tokyo: Research Institute for Peace and Security, 1995) p. 137. Also Michael Blaker, "Japan in 1995: A Year of Natural and Other Disasters." *Asian Survey*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996) Vol. XXXVI, No. 1, January 1996, p. 43.

⁴⁴ "Japanese Defense Policy and the New National Defense Program Outline." *Japan's New Defense Policy*. Section I, p. 3.

⁴⁵ *On the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996- FY2000)* was adopted by the Security Council and the Cabinet on 15 December 1995. A tentative unofficial translation is available HTTP: http://www.jda.jp/policy/f_work/chukibou/index_e.html.

1. General Guidelines for Planning

The Mid-Term Defense Program Build-up Plan general guidelines began with the defense capacities and the principles to maintain while restructuring and refocusing the forces. The three new buzz words for the SDF are "compact, effective, and flexible." By "compact," the NDPO and the MTDP are attempting to downsize Japan's forces. This impacted most specifically the GSDF which will have its authorized strength cut by over 20,000 personnel, and with all three branches, in terms of decreases in overall total on-hand equipment. The personnel cuts, however, are mostly reducing the authorized strength of the force to a level closer to the current on-hand strength.⁴⁶ As for the cuts in equipment, the focus is on eliminating outdated equipment and continuing to modernize the fleets with new equipment.

"Effective" refers to the Self-Defense Forces' ability to perform its three main missions in the most efficient and economic manner. The three missions are the defense of Japan, disaster relief, and peace-keeping. The primary mission remains unchanged, this, of course, being the defense of Japan. The two new missions, based on new "expectations" of the SDF, are responding to large-scale disasters and humanitarian relief operations, and making a contribution to a more stable security environment through peace-keeping operations. The MTDP concentrates on making "qualitative improvements" over that of quantity and enhancing necessary functions that support these three primary missions. A central part of improving the effectiveness of the force in the

⁴⁶ The 1992 *Defense of Japan*, shows the authorized/actual strength of the GSDF to be 180,000/151,176.

MTDP is the emphasis on strengthening the early warning and intelligence gathering, command, control and communications systems.

The third aspect, "flexibility," is to be enhanced through an emphasis on the retention of personnel and equipment necessary for education and training and by creating, maintaining and retaining a new type of Self-Defense Reserve force with high-readiness.

The final points discussed in the new MTDP guidelines for planning highlight the continued relevance of and enhancements to the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and its role in the creation of a more stable security environment, while at the same time recognizing the constraints necessary given the economic and fiscal conditions in the country.

2. Major Programs and Budget

The MTDP outlines a number of new and continued equipment acquisition programs that are captured in Table 3 below. The specific programs will be discussed below. The MTDP calls for an estimated budget of ¥25.15 trillion at FY 1995 prices, (\$139 billion⁴⁷) with an additional ¥110 billion (\$608 million) set aside for use, with the approval of the Security Council, in case of large-scale disasters or to respond "to an unpredictable situation in the future."⁴⁸ This represents an increase of ¥2.98 trillion

⁴⁷ Yen to dollar conversions were done using Purchasing Power Parity rates published by OECD at \$1=¥181 in 1995.

⁴⁸ Section 5, Expenses Required. *On the Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996-FY2000)*,

(\$16.5 billion) over the last MTDP (FY1991-FY1995) with an average growth rate of 2.1 percent. However, the equipment procurement amount of ¥4.28 trillion (\$23.6 billion), represents a 3.6 percent cut, which according to some analysts, could deal the defense industry a "fatal blow."⁴⁹

	Kinds of Equipment	Quantity
Ground Self-Defense Force	Tank	96
	Artillery (Except Motor)	45
	Multiple Launch Rocket System	45
	Armored Vehicle	168
	Surface-to-Ship Guided Missile	24 Launchers
	Anti-Tank Helicopter (AH-1S)	4
	Transport Helicopter (CH-47JA)	12
	Equipment and Material for Improvement of Surface-to-Air Guided Missile (HAWK)	2 Groups
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Destroyers	8
	Submarines	5
	Others	18
	Total Self-Defense Ships to be constructed (approximate tonnage)	31 (about 100,000 tons)
	Patrol Helicopter (SH-60J)	37
Air Self-Defense Force	Fighter-Interceptor (F-15DJ)	4
	Fighter-Support (F-2)	47
	Transport Helicopter (CH-47J)	6
	Intermediate Level Jet Trainer (T-4)	59

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan (FY1996-FY2000)*

Table 3: Equipment Acquisition, Mid-Term Defense Program

D. JAPANESE SELF-DEFENSE FORCES

The restructuring of the JSDF under the NDPO and MTDP is discussed below under each service. Table 4 outlines the directed restructuring and major equipment

⁴⁹ "Japanese Defense Industry Braces for Restructuring" *Nikkan Kogyo Shimbun*. 21 December 1995. Translated in FBIS-JST-96-051.

gains, as well as the end-strength changes in personnel. As a matter of emphasis, the items that pertain to the Joint Staff Council and joint operations have been extracted and are discussed first.

In the discussion earlier, it was noted that the major change of direction that the NDPO and MTDP advance is the balanced emphasis on multilateral security efforts, Japan's own defensive capabilities and the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. When reviewing Japan's defensive capabilities, the central role and mission continues to be the defense of Japan. To support this new balanced effort and in response to the new missions of disaster relief and assistance and other contributions to a more stable security environment (i.e., the mission of United Nations peace-keeping), the Self-Defense Force will be restructured as discussed below.

1. The Joint Staff Council and Joint/Integrated Operations

The NDPO directed that additional attention be paid to achieve joint and integrated operations through the enhancement of the Joint Staff Council's functions. The MTDP directed each branch of the SDF to "study enhancements of the Joint Staff Council's functions and take necessary measures" to improve joint operations.⁵⁰ Strengthening the Joint Staff should help alleviate some of the problems the SDF has encountered in the past, areas such as communications. It also will provide a more "unified effort" toward the accomplishment of its missions. Security analyst Patrick M. Cronin, in his critique of Japan's review of its defense policies, has argued that "faced

⁵⁰ *The Mid-Term Defense Build-up Plan*, "Reorganization of the major units and other points," point 4.

with the prospect of lower defense budgets and downsizing ground forces, Japan is likely to put a heightened premium on jointness.”⁵¹ However, the very structure of the SDF, with its placement of the Joint Staff Council – not as an intermediary between the ground, maritime and air services and the Defense Agency, but as a separate advisory entity – reflects the “stove pipe” approach taken to constrain military effectiveness. The adoption of the same kind of sweeping reform that the Goldwater-Nichols Act brought to the Department of Defense and the military in the United States is needed. According to Cronin, however, overcoming the historical animosity and interservice rivalry as well as the fundamental organizational and communications problems within the JDA, make it unlikely that some sort of sweeping reform will occur in the near future.⁵²

One step that could greatly improve “jointness” and interoperability is in the setup of a warning, intelligence, and command, control and communications architecture. The improvements directed in the NDPO and reemphasized in the MTDP will greatly enhance the interservice communications and assist in the interoperability and compatibility with U.S. forces under the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Additionally it will improve the SDF’s overall effectiveness in its primary “defense of Japan” mission, as well as help the SDF prepare to take a larger role in UN peace-keeping operations.

The MTDP specifically directed the continued upgrade of the fixed type three-dimensional radar systems and transportable warning and surveillance radar systems, and

⁵¹ Patrick M. Cronin. “Japan’s Emergent Security Policy.” *Joint Forces Quarterly*. Spring 1995. p.21.

⁵² Ibid. pp. 21-22.

the achievement of operational capability of the AWACS aircraft (mainly a ASDF issue). This will give a better "situational awareness" of the vessels, aircraft and other systems in the surrounding waters and airspace of Japan. To improve intelligence, the MTDP directed the development of a new central intelligence organization, aimed at high-level collection and analysis of strategic and operational intelligence. Additionally, it directed the establishment of a more efficient structure for the intelligence units. Finally, in terms of command, control and communications (C³), the MTDP directed the building of a new Central Command System, the establishment of the Integrated Defense Digital Network (IDDN) and improvements in the use of satellite communications.

The creation of the Defense Intelligence Headquarters (DIH) was modeled after the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency of the United States.⁵³ It is located at the Joint Staff Council and is headed by a GSDF General, while the Defense Councilor will concurrently serve as the DIH deputy head. It will have a staff of 1600, consisting of general affairs, planning, analysis, radio and picture departments.⁵⁴ The development and operation of the DIH has been called "the linchpin of security" for Japan, and will have the dual function of improving Japan's overall ability to collect, process and analyze information in crisis situations, but will also free

⁵³ "Defense Agency To Form New Central Intelligence Body." Kyodo, 28 December 1996. Translated in FBIS-EAS-96-251.

⁵⁴ "New Defense Intelligence HQ Opens in Tokyo." Kyodo, 20 January 1997. Translated in FBIS-EAS-97-013.

Japan from its complete reliance on the United States for strategic information.⁵⁵ Associated with this was the announcement in May 1996 by Prime Minister Hashimoto of Japan's intention to launch a spy satellite. This will upgrade Japan's capability to collect strategic intelligence without depending on the United States. However, according to Shigeru Matsui, a Japanese military commentator, the possibility of becoming totally independent (of the United States) is near zero.⁵⁶

In order to gain a consensus on ballistic missile defense, the MTDP also directed the gathering of information "from a comprehensive point of view" of such a system's overall usefulness and a cost-benefit comparison. The development of this system and its useful employment will require a great deal of joint interoperability and intense coordination and will be a real test to not only the joint operations of the SDF but also to the U.S.-Japan arrangements.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ "The Defense Intelligence Headquarters is a Linchpin of Security." Sankei Shimbun, 21 January 1997. Translated in FBIS-EAS-97-016.

⁵⁶ Tu Po. "Japan will become an Intelligence Power." Yazhou Zhoukan, 25 November - 1 December 1996. Translated in FBIS-EAS-97-014.

⁵⁷ Cronin, p. 22.

		NEW NDPO OF 1995	NDPO OF 1976
Self-Defense Force	Self-Defense Personnel Regular Personnel Reserve Personnel	286,541 238,641 47,900	321,701 273,801 47,900
Ground Self-Defense Force	Major Units Regionally Deployed Units Mobile Operation Units Ground-to-Air Missile Units	8 Divisions 6 Brigades 1 Armored Division 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups	12 Divisions 2 Combined Brigades 1 Armored Division 1 Airborne Brigade 1 Helicopter Brigade 8 Anti-Aircraft Artillery Groups
	Main Equipment Battle Tanks Artillery Personnel Regular Ready Reserve Personnel (New) Reserve Personnel	Approximately 900 Approximately 900 145,000 15,000 31,000	Approximately 1,200 Approximately 1,200 180,000
Maritime Self-Defense Force	Major Units Destroyer Units (For Mobile Operations) Destroyer Units (Regional District Units) Submarine Units Minesweeping Units Land-based Patrol Aircraft Units	4 Flotillas 7 Divisions 6 Divisions 1 Flotilla 13 Squadrons	4 Flotillas 10 Divisions 6 Divisions 2 Flotillas 16 Squadrons
	Main Equipment Destroyers Submarines Combat Aircraft Personnel Regular Reserve Personnel	Approximately 50 16 Approximately 70 46,085 1,100	Approximately 60 16 Approximately 220 46,085
Air Self-Defense Force	Major Units Aircraft Control and Warning Units Interceptor Units Support Fighter Units Air Reconnaissance Units Air Transport Units Ground-to-Air Missile Units	20 Squadrons and 8 Groups 1 Squadron (Airborne Early Warning Squadron) 9 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 3 Squadrons 6 Groups	28 Groups 1 Squadron 10 Squadrons 3 Squadrons 1 Squadron 3 Squadrons 6 Groups
	Main Equipment Combat Aircraft Fighters Personnel Regular Reserve Personnel	Approximately 400 Approximately 300 47,556 800	Approximately 430 Approximately 350 47,556

Source: Adapted from Japan Defense Agency, *Japan's New Defense Policy and Defense of Japan, 1996*.

Table 4: Restructuring/Equipment/Personnel Totals of the SDF

2. Ground Self-Defense Force

The Ground Self-Defense Force is the primary recipient of and major player in the new peace-keeping and disaster relief missions. The GSDF is therefore directed to

restructure in order to be configured in units of more appropriate size for deployment to these contingencies. With the Brigade as the basic size of these units, five of the current divisions will be restructured into brigades, one of which will be configured with improved airborne mobility. Some units in each of these restructured divisions and brigades will consist of the new SDF Reservists with high readiness, and capable of rapid mobilization and deployment. The overall structure and deployment of the GSDF divisions and brigades remain regionally deployed in a balanced manner that conforms to the geography and population characteristics of Japan. The authorized end-strength of the GSDF is to be reduced from 180,000 to 160,000, of which 15,000 will be Ready Reserve Personnel.

The major programs and equipment acquisition for the GSDF are focused on the modernization of its primary equipment as noted in Table 3. This will entail the overall reduction in the total number of tanks and artillery from approximately 1200 each, down to about 900. In response to the new requirements for transportation in support of international disaster assistance and peace-keeping missions, the MTDP directs the continued acquisition of the transport helicopter (CH-47). The MTDP also directs the continued stockpiling of ammunition and other measures to support sustainment and to reduce overall vulnerability. Additionally it directs the reconstruction of old ramshackle buildings and other measures to promote greater harmony with the local communities and the areas surrounding the bases.

3. Maritime Self-Defense Force

Under the MTDP, the Maritime Self-Defense Force is directed to restructure by disbanding two Regional District Destroyer Units and one Squadron of fixed-wing patrol aircraft. The current structure within the mine-sweeping force of two flotillas will be consolidated into one. To enhance training, the submarine force will create an education unit, within its own community. Additionally a similar squadron will be created by converting one squadron each of the fixed-wing patrol aircraft and the land-based patrol helicopter units into an education squadron specially for training pilots.

The increased transportation needs required by Japan's new international disaster assistance and peace-keeping support has the MTDP directing the acquisition of transportation ships. One of these new ships, an 8,900-ton Landing Ship-Tank (LST), has been called by *Jane's Fighting Ships 1992-93* "clearly a candidate for operating Sea Harriers, perhaps as an interim step toward building an aircraft carrier."⁵⁸ Whether these ships are capable of some sort of "power projection" or are simply transports remains a matter of disagreement. Brian Cloughley argues that although the four amphibious ships under construction for the JMSDF will be capable of carrying tanks and the situation in which they would be needed in support of peace-keeping operations is difficult to foresee, other countries must accept that Japan is a major power.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ As quoted by Sasaki, p. 264.

⁵⁹ Brian Cloughley. "Japan Ponders Power Projection." *International Defense Review*. 1 July 1996, p. 27.

4. Air Self-Defense Forces

The Air Self-Defense Forces, in an effort to consolidate its surveillance effort, has been directed by the MTDP to take parts of two of the current four aircraft control and warning unit's warning groups and reorganize them into an Airborne Early Warning Squadron. The MTDP also has directed that one squadron of the fighter-interceptor units be disbanded.

The air defense capability continues to be a major effort in the MTDP with three programs to improve or test programs for modernization. It directs the implementation of a test modification program for the F-15, an improvement program for the Patriot and Hawk programs, and the acquisition of equipment and material for improving the short-range and close-range surface-to-air guided missiles, and anti-air guns. The MTDP also provides for the acquisition of 47 F-2 fighter-support aircraft (previously known as the FSX), which was jointly developed and produced with the United States.

In support of the requirement for transportation for international disaster relief assistance and peace-keeping support, the MTDP directs the study of a follow-on aircraft for the C-1 Transport Aircraft and the study of requirements and operational need for an in-flight refueling function for fighter-support aircraft. This postpones the decision on large-scale long-distance transports with mid-air refueling capabilities. This is something the Ministry of Defense originally wanted, but the Socialist Party was adamantly against,

stating that "increasing the striking distance of fighter planes is contrary to the purpose of purely defensive forces."⁶⁰

E. CONCLUSIONS

The National Defense Program Outline and the Midterm Defense Program are the foundation by which the Japanese structure and direct changes and improvements to the Japanese Defense system. After reviewing the new changes, analyst Brian Cloughley concluded, "The JSDF is well-equipped with modern weapons and as well-trained as can be expected given self-imposed limitations."⁶¹ Others, however, have said that the SDF is incapable of providing its own defense, and that by 1999, it will be even worse.⁶² This review has shown that within the framework currently accepted in Japan, the Self-Defense Forces are capable of conducting operations in the defense of Japan and are in the process of restructuring, making force and equipment level changes, and preparing to conduct training to meet these newly directed missions. This does not mean, however, that there are not problems.

Key to meeting the new requirements of the NDPO and MTDP is strengthening and employing a joint structure. The problem of Japan's "stove pipe" approach to the SDF has not been addressed. The Joint Staff Council continues to be nothing more than

⁶⁰ "New Mid-Term Defense Plan, Including a Notable Postponement." *Nihon Keizai Shimbun*. 15 December 1995. Translated in FBIS-JST-96-051.

⁶¹ Cloughley, p. 30.

⁶² Tsutomu Matsumura, "Politicians Should Question Self-Defense Forces' Operational Abilities Before Debating on the 'Right of Collective Self-Defense'." *Tokyo Sapio*. Translated in FBIS-EAS-96-117.

an advisory body, and one not responsible, nor greatly involved in the separate defense forces. The improvements directed in command, control and communications will go a long way to making the current joint system more interoperable and compatible, but does nothing to improve the diffusion of direction at the upper levels within the defense establishment.

The "balanced approach" advanced by the NDPO and the MTDP also has an inherent conflict in missions. The new emphasis on multilateral security efforts and Japan's role in United Nations peace-keeping missions are greatly restricted by the "Five Principles" governing the use of Japanese forces. The five principles are:

1. An agreement on a cease-fire shall have been reached among the parties to the conflict.
2. These parties shall have given their consent to deployment of the peace-keeping force and Japan's participation in that force.
3. The peace-keeping force shall strictly maintain impartiality, not favoring any party to the conflict.
4. Should any of the above guideline requirements cease to be satisfied, the Government of Japan may withdraw its contingent.
5. The use of weapons shall be limited to the minimum necessary to protect the lives of personnel.⁶³

These limitations, coupled with the continued constitutional question on the use of and deployment of Japanese forces outside the border of Japan greatly impair the possibility that Japan will be able to successfully fulfill their newly stated role in anything more than a cursory manner.

⁶³ "Five Principles Restricting Japan's Participation in PKO." *Defense Guide of Japan*, p. 1. Available HTTP: <http://cssew01.cs.nda.ac.jp/~yas/JDA/DOJ/PKO.html>

Suggestions to remedy this situation range from opposition party leader Ichiro Ozawa's proposal that Japan establish a "stand-by force," organized and trained separately from the SDF,⁶⁴ to the debate over the need for some kind of a "basic security law" to govern the use of the SDF and resolve the constitutionality question.⁶⁵ Until this conflict between the SDF's "new mission" of peace-keeping and the restrictive principles for its participation is resolved, Japan's participation can only be nominal.

The final area of conflict, the budget, has and will continue to be the major arbiter between desire and capability. This can be seen specifically in the competition between the large host nation support requirements for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan as part of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and the costs associated with the modernization of the Self-Defense Forces. When these two are placed within the context of the current economic conditions and the one percent ceiling that the JDA has worked under since 1976, the question of priority becomes real. Resolving this issue is something that must be done incrementally and could continue to be a problem for years to come.⁶⁶ The constraints of the budget and the competition it causes between the SDF's new *raison d'être* peace-keeping, and the U.S.-Japan security relations must be resolved for Japan to finish its modernization for the 21st Century.

⁶⁴ Ozawa Ichiro. "The Third Opening." *The Economist*. March 9, 1996. p. 21.

⁶⁵ "Defense Strategy of Japan." *Defense Guide of Japan*, p. 1. Available HTTP. <http://cssew01.cs.nda.ac.jp/~yas/JDA/DOJ/Policy.html>

⁶⁶ See Holland, p. 49-52, and Katzenstein & Okawara, p.155-159.

What has become clear through this examination of the procedural manner in which Japanese security and defense matters are addressed, and the systematic way the National Defense Program Outline and the Mid-Term Defense Program are reviewed, revised and updated, is that external threat concerns have at best a very weak influence on the process. While this may simply be a reflection of the relatively peaceful nature of the current security environment, it seems clear that at least currently, fears of some sort of "China threat" are not directly influencing the process by which Japan reviews and modernizes its Self-Defense Forces. The greatest influences on the modernization process have come from internal sources: the bureaucratic process and system Japan has developed to manage and control its security forces, domestic political concerns, the pacifism that has been embraced by a majority of the Japanese people.

External factors such as the U.S. security arrangements with Japan also strongly influence the modernization of the Japanese defense forces both directly, through limitations on what it will and will not provide, and indirectly in its pressure on Japan to increase its portion of this defense commitment. Other external factors such as the growing regional and international structures for security of which Japan is both an active participant in and a strong endorser, have had a moderate influence on Japan's modernization process both as a forum in which Japan can discuss and address security issues, as well as a reason for structural and mission changes to its defense forces. As Japan develops these forums, possibly into ones with some sort of enforcement mechanism, they will in the future play an even stronger role.

Therefore it is clear that because Japan has developed its defense forces and security structure devoid of any specific orientation on any one threat, the reemergence of China in regional and international affairs has had almost no direct influence in the modernization process or the orientation of the Japanese defense forces. The reaction to China's reemergence, as it impacts on Japan's security concerns, seem to be at a higher, strategic and political level, rather than influencing the modernization process itself. This will be further examined in the Chapter on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and in the examination of the prospects for the future.

IV. UNITED STATES – JAPAN SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS

Despite the earlier quote by Foreign Minister Ikeda on the importance of the Japan-China relations,¹ there can be no doubt that the principal relationship and the primary foundation for Japanese security is the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. Prime Minister Hashimoto, in his first policy speech to the Diet in January 1996, said that the "...Japan-U.S. relations are the most important bilateral relationship not only for Japan but for the world at large and that they are the cornerstone of peace and stability for the Asia-Pacific region and the world...." He noted that he will "firmly maintain the security arrangements with the United States, which arrangements provide the foundation for our wide-ranging cooperative relationship and are indispensable to the peace and prosperity of the Asia-Pacific region."²

The U.S.-Japan security arrangement was rooted firmly in the Cold War's bipolar, confrontational attitudes that greatly influenced the way in which Japan perceived threats and prepared to defend itself. Since its inception, Japan has been able to use the security arrangements to focus national efforts and resources on its economic redevelopment. This seconding of Japan's security to the United States has not come without costs. Domestically, it has fueled a form of pacifism that now affects any action it may take to modernize or restructure its forces, or to use these forces in anything but the defense of

¹ As cited on Page 1 of this thesis, FBIS-EAS-96-218, 8 Nov 1996.

² Policy Speech by Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro to the 136th Session of the National Diet. 22 January 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.mofa.go.jp/f_m/hashimoto/ry_136.html.

Japan. Furthermore, it has left Japan weak regionally and internationally in terms of their ability to perform any kind of leadership role in the security arena.

The passing of the Cold War has brought about a new security environment for Japan. The importance of China to the security and stability of the region is one area on which the United States and Japan can both agree. Reflecting the new security environment and the importance of this "China factor," Japan has taken the actions outlined in Chapter III to modernize its military's roles and missions, doctrine and equipment. This importance of China also has had a similar effect in renewing and reinvigorating the importance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. This can be seen in the policies enunciated in the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto "Joint Declaration on Security–Alliance for the 21st Century," the December 1996 report of the Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO) and the ongoing revisions to the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangements provide Japan strategic deterrence under the U.S. nuclear umbrella and are the foundation for the framework of its security structure. Japan's new security policies, as outlined in the 1995 NDPO and the 1996 JDA white paper, suggest a noticeable shift away from relying exclusively on this security arrangement. They now reflect a more "balanced approach" to security, with more symmetry between the roles of the bilateral security arrangement, the emerging regional/international security aspects, and the role of Japan's Defense Forces. This shift reflects Japan's and the U.S.' desire to find the a larger role internationally for Japan, befitting of its status in the international community. In order to get a fuller understanding of the

historical basis for this development, I will briefly trace the ways in which the U.S.-Japan security arrangements has played a role in shaping Japan's strategic thought and defense force orientation. From there I will then explore the changes as outlined in the three sources noted above and how these changes reflect a new appreciation for the growing importance of China. The question to be answered is "Is this renewal and reaffirmation of the security relationship between the United States and Japan simply a 'reinvigoration' of the old system, a fundamental change in direction, or a combination of both?"

A. BASIS OF THE SECURITY ARRANGEMENT

The basis for the relationship that exists between the United States and Japan reflects the results of World War II and the need to bolster the East to defend against the growing dangers of the so-called "Evil Empire," the Soviet Union. From its surrender in 1945 until it regained its sovereignty in 1951, Japan was completely torn down and rebuilt in the image and spirit of the United States. Okazaki Hisahiko, a Japanese academician concerned with Japanese strategic thinking, noted that East Asia and specifically Japan had become "the hunting preserve for the exercise of American idealism and moralism."³ Dependent on the United States for its survival, Japan was forced to embrace a new constitution that would ensure it never again was able to pursue a militaristic, expansionist foreign policy.

³ Okazaki Hisahiko. *A Grand Strategy for Japanese Defense*. (Lanham: University Press of America, Inc. 1986) p.76.

1. The New "Peace" Constitution

In order to create a foundation upon which Japan could be rebuilt, General MacArthur, as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), was responsible for instituting a new constitution that would begin this reformation. The new constitution made two fundamental changes to the political structure in Japan: transferring the sovereignty of Japan from the emperor to its people and establishing an unambiguously British-style parliamentary system. Most importantly for future actions under the security arrangements and in response to his fear a rebirth of Japanese militarism, General MacArthur also insisted on the inclusion of the so-called "peace clause" in the new constitution.⁴ This clause, Article IX of the Constitution, renounced the use of war and the pursuit of the instruments of war as legitimate tools of a sovereign nation:

Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes.

In order to accomplish the aims of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.⁵

2. Defining the "Threat" and the Policy of "Containment"

Despite the pacific aims of the constitution it had forced on Japan, the United States soon realized that some sort of Japanese military force would be necessary to assist

⁴ W.G. Beasley, *The Rise of Modern Japan: Political, Economic and Social Change Since 1850*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995) pp. 219-221.

⁵ Article 9 of the Constitution of Japan, promulgated 3 November, 1946 and put into effect 3 May, 1947. A complete copy of the Japanese Constitution, in both English and Japanese, can be found as the first addendum to *Japan: Profile of a Nation*, (Tokyo: Kodansha International, 1995) pp. 437-460.

in the new policies of "containment." With the loss of China to communism in 1949, the Soviets' first detonation of an atomic bomb and the belief that all communism was under the direction and control of the Supreme Soviet, the United States began to follow the policies outlined in National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68). NSC-68 expanded on the ideas and observations of George Kennan, as articulated in his "Long Telegram" and "The X Article," and put forth a strategy that would "contain" communism. Kennan urged his superiors to adopt "a long-term policy of firmness, patience and understanding," designed to confront communism and Soviet encroachment "at every point" they are encountered. Though substantially oriented toward Europe, Japan was the third area of strategic interest where the United States would begin to build the "perimeter" called for by NSC-68 to contain communism.⁶ The policy of containment was seen as universal in nature and as geographically unlimited. Additionally containment was viewed as needing a "total war" approach, in that the United States must be prepared to use its resources totally and unconditionally. The fervency and bitterness that came to characterize the Cold War and the policies of containment were reflected in President Truman's speech to Congress when he declared, "The seeds of totalitarian regimes are nurtured by misery and want. They spread and grow in the evil soil of poverty and strife. They reach their full growth when the hope of

⁶ The other two areas being the Rhine Valley in Germany and Great Britain. Robert Jervis. "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution*. Vol. 24, December 1980. p.573. For a more detailed account of Kennan's thoughts, see George F. Kennan. "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" in Phil Williams, et al. eds. *Classic Readings in International Relations* (Belmont: Wadsworth Publishing Company. 1994) pp. 390-395.

a people for a better life has died.”⁷ This confrontational approach to communism and the countries that espoused it put Japan, as the Asian ally against communism in the East, firmly and irrevocably in the United States’ camp.

The policies of containment brought new focus to U.S. - Japan relations. Three aspects of containment in East Asia were particularly important to Japan. First was the perception that a unified Sino-Soviet (communist) bloc existed. Second was the expanding nature of communism and the fear that once one country in the area fell, a “domino effect” would occur, with other countries nearby following closely behind. Lastly the signs that though not the most important arena (Europe was still assumed to be the place the next major power war would take place), East Asia was the area most likely to first test of the resolve of the United States and the “free world.” These three aspects combined to make the U.S.-Japan security relationship the critical aspect of the Cold War environment.⁸

It is important to note that despite the Korean War and the Korean/Chinese threat, the principal and overarching greatest threat, as perceived by both the United States and Japan, remained the Soviet Union. The monolithic “Communism” was perceived by the U.S.-centered, capitalist world as completely controlled by the Soviet Union. The North Koreans and the Chinese, though huge in numbers, were seen as utterly dependent on the

⁷ President Harry S. Truman to the 80th Congress, March 12, 1947, cited in Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future*, (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1982), p. 132.

⁸ Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. “The Origins of the Cold War” in *Classic Readings in International Relations*, pp. 395-402.

Soviets for much of their equipment, training, and purpose of direction. Authors like Robert R. Simmons⁹ have shown this united communist front to be nothing more than a "false perception" of the capitalist world but that did not change the fact that this perception continued to guide U.S.-Japan relations. Thus the Soviet Union was seen as the principle threat against which the United States would support Japan as "a fortress against Communism in Asia."¹⁰

The contradictions of the "Peace Constitution" and the requirements of the policy of containment quickly came into conflict with the outbreak of war on the Korean peninsula. The deployment of the U.S. Occupation Forces in Japan to Korea prompted General MacArthur to order the formation of the Police Reserve Force of 75,000 men, and later expanded the Maritime Safety Agency by 8,000. This force evolved within two years to the National Safety Agency and in 1954 was transformed into the Defense Agency and the Self-Defense Forces.¹¹

A by-product of the Korean War and an important lesson to the Japanese, the dismissal of General MacArthur taught a powerful lesson to the Japanese about civilian control of the military. As one scholar noted,

The reactions to Truman's dramatic and sudden action were those of bewilderment and astonishment that an unprepossessing civilian in Washington, even though President, could by one stroke of the pen fire a

⁹ Robert R. Simmons, *The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and the Politics of the Korean Civil War*. (New York: The Free Press, 1975) pp. 102-136.

¹⁰ Terashima Jitsuro. "How To Control the U.S.-Japan-China 'Triangle Crisis'". *Chuo Koron*. Translated in FBIS-EAS-96-150. 1 August 1996. pp. 28.

¹¹ Japan Defense Agency White Paper. *Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a New Era*. (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd. July, 1996). pp. 57-61, 370-372.

man who had come to represent to the Japanese people benign Authority and Power. This, it began to dawn on many Japanese, was "civilian control."¹²

This one event clearly displayed the resolve and control of the military by its civilian leadership, something which was clearly lacking in Japan prior to the new constitution. This principle became a central part of the postwar defense policy of Japan and was integrated into every aspect of the newly developing defense forces.

The Korean War also had the effect of speeding the return of sovereignty of Japan to its people. The United States was in the impossible position of maintaining occupation forces in Japan, running the Japanese government, and attempting to put in place democratic ideals and institutions, while at the same time fighting a war against communism in Korea. All of this combined to pressure the United States, its allies and Japan to sign a peace treaty quickly.

3. The Treaties of Peace and Security

The Korean War brought about the need to formally end World War II in the Pacific and to change the view of Japan as the enemy to that of an ally in the defense of the free world.¹³ The San Francisco Peace Treaty Conference in 1951 formally ended the occupied status of Japan and returned to the Japanese people full sovereignty over Japan and its territorial waters. President Truman, in his opening remarks to that

¹² Harrison M. Holland. *Managing Defense: Japan's Dilemma*. (Lanham: University Press of America, 1988). p. 17.

¹³ George Friedman and Meredith Lebard. *The Coming War With Japan*. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1991) pp. 111-112

conference, stressed three points that would guide U.S.-Japan relations to the present. He said first, that peace with Japan will bring further reconciliation and peace. Secondly he stated that the most important aspect of this treaty was to ensure that Japan would never again resort to aggression but rather opt for protection, while at the same time refraining from disturbing the security of other countries. Lastly he said that in the event Japan does establish its own self-defense force, those forces should be integrally linked to the forces of other countries.¹⁴

The Peace Treaty was signed by 49 countries, but not by the Soviet Union, Poland and Czechoslovakia and China. At the same time, the United States and Japan also signed the Security Treaty¹⁵ and later the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement.¹⁶ The Security Treaty established the right of the United States to station troops in Japan and was an implicit agreement to come to the defense of Japan against foreign attack or domestic disturbances. The Defense Assistance Agreement established a legal basis for furnishing military equipment and technology to Japan. When Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru signed the above treaties in 1951, he did so with the intent of directing the recovery of Japan through economic means, leaving the security of Japan mainly to the United States.

¹⁴ As cited in Crabb, *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy*, p. 132.

¹⁵ *Security Treaty Between The United States of America and Japan*, September 8, 1951, 3 United States Treaty (U.S.T.), pp. 3329-3340, Treaties and other International Acts Series (TIAS) No. 2491.

¹⁶ *Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement Between the United States of America and Japan*, March 8, 1954, 5 U.S.T., pp. 661-680, TIAS No. 2957.

4. The Yoshida Doctrine

The doctrine named after Prime Minister Yoshida contained three main tenets. First, the economic revitalization of Japan was the primary national goal. Second, the United States would provide for Japan's security in exchange for the right to base forces in Japan. Third, Japan would only maintain a minimal, limited, defensive capability and avoid international strategic issues.¹⁷ Cooperation with the United States on matters economic and political were critical to its success.

The U.S.-Japan security arrangements was the means by which Japan could recover from its wartime destruction by focusing on the economy without incurring massive expenditures for external defense. Yoshida felt that providing bases in Japan for United States forces in exchange for security guarantees was a "fair price" for U.S. protection.¹⁸ Using Article IX of the constitution as cover, Yoshida was perfectly willing to postpone the time when Japan would have rearm until after economic recovery had been achieved. In Yoshida's words,

The day [we rearm] will come naturally if the livelihood recovers. It may sound selfish, but let the Americans handle [our security] until then. It is indeed our God-given luck that the Constitution bans arms. If the Americans complain, the constitution gives us adequate cover.¹⁹

¹⁷ Kenneth B. Pyle. *The Japan Question – Power and Purpose in a New Era*. (Washington D. C.: The AEI Press. 1992) pp. 21-25.

¹⁸ Tetsuya Kataoka and Ramon H. Myers. *Defending an Economic Superpower: Reassessing The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance*. (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989) p.13.

¹⁹ As cited in Kataoka, p. 16.

Yoshida also favored the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan over proposals for regional collective security like NATO in Europe. He was supported in this by then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, who knew that another NATO-like collective security alliance would never make it past the U.S. Congress.

In order to avoid conflicts in international strategic issues and as a necessary side-effect of the Yoshida doctrine, Japan deferred on major foreign policy approaches to the United States. Japan's recognition of Taiwan rather than Beijing as the legitimate government of China is the clearest example of this. Despite following the U.S. lead in foreign policy, Japan has maintained a policy of economic independence in its trading partners. It reached out for the Chinese market with unofficial economic missions to Beijing and Sino-Japanese commercial relations were reestablished as early as 1952. Between 1952 and 1958, a total of four trade agreements were signed between official Chinese Communist organs and unofficial, private Japanese trade associations.²⁰ These informal agreements, known as "friendship trade," accounted for nearly 30% of Japan's total trade in the region and made the PRC, Japan's number one East Asian trading partner.²¹

²⁰ Milton M. Meyer. *Japan: A Concise History*. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1993) p. 259.

²¹ Allen S. Whiting. *China Eyes Japan*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989) p. 39.

5. 1960 Revisions and the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security

Both the Security Treaty and the Defense Assistance Agreement were revised in 1960, under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,²² which further defined the U.S. commitment to Japan's defense. The 1960 revisions called for an incremental step for Japan to take a larger role in its own defense as it had agreed to in the initial Security Treaty:

... Japan will itself increasingly assume responsibility for its own defense against direct and indirect aggression, always avoiding any armament which could be an offensive threat or serve other than to promote peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.²³

As Japan began to recover economically and to grow more independent and able to stand on its own, the need to revise the Security Treaty had grown with this rising Japanese confidence. As the debate on revising the Treaty occurred, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke provided an unusually blunt series of notes which outlined the basic problems with the U.S.-Japan relationship and the four areas that were the most problematic:

1. Japanese aversion to war as against global policy of U.S., particularly its military policy towards Japan.
2. Resentment against Japan's subordinate position to U.S. under Japan-U.S. security treaty arrangements.
3. Antipathy arising from territorial problems.

²² *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*. January 19, 1960. United States - Japan, 11 U.S.T., pp. 1632-1651, TIAS No. 4509 and the *Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security: Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Armed Forces in Japan*. 19 January 1960. United States - Japan. 11 U.S.T., pp. 1652-1675, TIAS No. 4510.

²³ *Security Treaty*, Preamble, p. 3331.

4. Disappointment over restrictive measures against Japanese goods in U.S. and dissatisfaction over embargo against Communist China.²⁴

Domestic political problems between the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the opposition parties of the Left, compounded the difficulty of coming up with a revision which solved all of the above listed areas of antagonism. In fact the very constitutionality (in accordance with the Japanese Constitution) of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements was under question.²⁵ To force the issue further and to pressure the ruling party, the Left in Japan (with cautious support of a number of more moderate groups and portions of the general populous) conducted street demonstrations, strikes, and distributed hand bills decrying the revisions.

The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security was a step toward a more equal bilateral relationship. Items in the initial Security Treaty that were believed necessary for stability and control during the occupation period but no longer acceptable were removed. For example, the Security Treaty clause which allowed U.S. forces to be used in domestic disturbances within Japan was removed, as was the clause which denied Japan the right to grant military concessions to any third party.²⁶ The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation also had added a clause which put in place a ten-year time limit, after which the treaty would only require a one-year notification to terminate. Most importantly and

²⁴ As cited in Roger Buckley, *U.S.-Japan Alliance Diplomacy 1945-1990*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1992). pp. 80-81.

²⁵ Tokyo District Court Judge Date Akio ruled the security arrangements unconstitutional in 1959, only to have his ruling overturned on appeal by the Japanese Supreme Court. Ibid. p. 91.

²⁶ Article I and II, *Security Treaty*, p.3331.

the heart of the revisions, Articles V and VI gave specific guarantees of security to Japan and redirected and reemphasized the basis for stationing of U.S. forces in and around Japan. Article V stated that an armed attack against either the Japan and the United States "in the territories under the administration of Japan" would cause them to "act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes." Article VI, in order to contribute "to the security of Japan and the maintenance of international peace and security in the Far East," granted the United States "the use by its land, air, and naval forces of facilities and areas in Japan."²⁷ The end result was a document that continues today to be the legal basis for the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and represents, according to its supporters, the very principles Yoshida had advocated in 1951 and outlined in the Yoshida Doctrine.²⁸

B. GRADUAL CHANGES IN THE RELATIONSHIP

Despite various problems most often associated with economic and trade friction, the security relationship between the United States and Japan continued on a relatively even keel through most of the Cold War period. By this I mean that the aims and goals have remained generally the same. The security arrangements have remained on the path set out in the 1960 revisions of the Mutual Cooperation and Security Agreements and the Yoshida Doctrine continued as the basic operating principle behind Japanese security policy through the end of the Cold War. This is not to say that change did not occur. The

²⁷ *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*, Articles V and VI, p. 1634.

²⁸ Buckley, p. 97.

security relationship has required continuous maintenance and has had to be constantly managed. Three areas in particular experienced the greatest change; these are the perception of the threat, the level of U.S. commitment and the capabilities of the JSDF.

1. The Changing Threat Perceptions

The identification of a threat against which the U.S.-Japan security arrangements were to defend, has gone through a number of changes, both in direction and degree. As was noted earlier, the enemy against whom the security arrangement was originally established was the Soviet Union, perceived as the leader and director of the international communist community. Junior members of this community in Asia, China, North Korea and Vietnam, were seen as mere pawns under the Soviets control. This simplistic, bilateral antagonism provided the justification and purpose for the Cold War and was the basis for the security arrangement. From a global perspective, this division was relatively clear. In Asia, and specifically in Japan, however, the impact of or at least concern for other regional players tended to play a larger role than in the global perspective. Additionally the fluidity of the threat and the amount of change in Asia (in all aspects, politically, militarily, culturally, economically, etc.) has been much greater than in Europe, where this static, "enemies staring at each other across a border," mentality was born.

At the beginning of the Cold War, the threat from the Soviet Union was clear, from a strategic perspective, but mainly in a broad, ideological way. The threat from "...mainland China, which the Japanese tend predominantly to view as an *Asian* power,

rather than necessarily a *Communist* power in the Cold War context," always put a strain on the U.S.-Japan security relations and raised questions about the focus of Japan's defenses. However, from a numerical and capabilities perspective, the unprecedented build-up of Soviet forces in the Far East beginning in the late 1960's, with the relative decline in fear of China due to its dual focus (inward-looking and toward the Soviet Union), the primary threat and reason for the Security Treaty became even clearer.²⁹ The Soviet build-up, directly related to the deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations, also highlights the problem Japan had with a threat based on a perception of some sort of unified communism. It became clear to Japan that both China and the Soviet Union must be considered as a separate, individual threat. The degree to which each was a threat to Japan, however, was vastly different. It is also important to keep in mind that being a threat does not necessarily mean the possibility of a direct attack on Japan. Personnel, weapons and equipment, the positioning, stationing and training of these forces, and most importantly, though also most difficult to know, the intentions and plans must be taken into account.

Despite Japanese concerns with China's involvement in the Korean war, China's military forces were seen as mainly internally directed and not a threat to Japan. Simmons argues that the primary reason for China's involvement in this war was fear that the United Nations sponsored attacks into North Korea and toward the Chinese borders

²⁹ Okazaki, pp. 101-103.

could be pushed on into China.³⁰ Once this fear was alleviated, China's focus returned to internal security and the growing Soviet threat. As the depth and intensity of the Sino-Soviet dispute became more known, this internal and Soviet focus decreased Japan's concerns that China was anything but a long-term, distant threat. The Sino-Vietnam War and the poor showing of the Chinese forces there reinforced the belief that China was of little direct threat to Japan. This was reflected in JDA assessment that "the most important major front for the Chinese military is considered to be the Sino-Soviet border, to be followed by the Sino-Vietnamese border."³¹ The Soviets, on the other hand, continued to take actions that demonstrated to Japan that they continued to be the greatest threat in the region.³²

The change from seeing the threat as a single, unified force under the Soviet Union to a more multifaceted threat, emerged with the Sino-Soviet disputes of the late 1960's, changing more with the expansion and outcome of the Vietnam War, the "Nixon Shocks" and the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC, but became truly credible with the announcement of the "four modernizations" by Deng Xiaoping in 1985. Up until this time, any question of threat to Japan would work its way back to the Soviet Union as the only credible one. Even the events listed above, though they might have changed perceptions of commitment or identified areas of concern, they

³⁰ Simmons, pp. 102-106.

³¹ Defense of Japan 1982, p. 40.

³² See Okazaki, p. 103, and *Defense of Japan, 1982*, pp. 7-14 for an examination of the expansion of Soviet influence and forces.

did not fundamentally change the principal threat in the area. The military modernization of the Chinese forces, however, brought the possibility of another threat onto the horizon.

2. Changing Perceptions of the U.S. Commitment to Japan

At the same time that the perceived threat from the Soviet Union was growing, Japan began to see a waning or weakening of the U.S. commitment to Asia in general, and to Japan in particular. Conditions and events such as the unresolved nature of the Korean War, the effects from the shocks caused by the way in which the United States normalized relations with the PRC, the defeat and withdrawal of U.S. forces from Vietnam, and the continued call for Japan to enlarge more quickly its defense spending, as well as the roles and missions of its forces, Japan could not help but question the U.S. resolve to stay in Asia.

The belief that the United States was left with a "sour taste" in its mouth from problems associated with Korea and the lack of progress toward any kind of peaceful resolution, coupled with President Carter's troop cutback plans for South Korea, left Japan with a sense that the U.S. commitment to Asia was weakening by the mid-1970's. Though stopped by the Reagan Administration before they could occur, the idea that the United States would pull out a portion of its force in Korea, in spite of the real threat to security in the region from the North Koreans and in response to perceptions of a South

Korea human rights problem, made Japan question the relative importance of its position.³³

The so-called Nixon shocks, the normalization of relations between the United States and the PRC without prior notification, the removal of the dollar from the gold standard, and the import restrictions on textiles, all gave Japan reasons to be concerned about the sincerity of the U.S. commitment. If Japan, a nation that would be greatly affected by the reopening of China (a prospect Japan had been trying to arrange on its own) and a bilateral treaty partner of the United States, could not be consulted or at least informed in advance, many Japanese felt it did not bode well for the relationship. Tie to that the effects resultant from the ending of the Bretton Woods agreements and the trade dispute on Japanese textile exports, and you have Japan questioning the viability of the U.S.-Japan relationship.³⁴

The U.S. debacle in Vietnam and its subsequent withdrawal signaled another U.S. retreat from Asia. This war, more than any other, caused the United States to question its security policies throughout the world. A result of this "soul-searching" was the retrenchment of U.S. security policy titled after its creator, the "Nixon Doctrine." The Nixon Doctrine, in a nutshell, has been described as "a new emphasis on getting U.S. partners everywhere to bolster the U.S. leadership position by doing more on their own

³³ Edward A. Olsen. *U.S.-Japan Strategic Reciprocity: A Neo-Internationalist View*. (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. 1985) p. 41.

³⁴ Buckley examines, in great detail, many of the aspects and interrelated problems of the Nixon Shocks. pp. 115-137.

behalf.”³⁵ To the Japanese, however, it was seen as a rationalization for a reduced role for the United States in Asia.³⁶ The key concept within the Nixon Doctrine was a retrenchment of America’s overseas obligations, which would allow the United States to fulfill the remaining obligations more effectively and at a lower cost.³⁷

An integral part of the Nixon Doctrine and the final aspect that accelerated Japan’s questioning of the U.S. commitment to Asia and to the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, was the continued U.S. pressure and demands for Japan to increase its support of the arrangements. U.S. requests for Japan to pick up more of its own defense had begun as early as 1947 and probably always will be a part of the tensions related to this uneven security arrangements. However, during this period events such as the reversion of the Ryukyu islands (including Okinawa), for example, were viewed by the Japanese as a crowbar with which the United States was prying out further increases in Japan’s security effort and thereby relieve the United States of the requirement.

3. The Changing Capabilities of the Japanese Defense Forces

As the U.S.-Japan security relationship has gradually changed over time, based on changes in the perception of the threat and the commitment of the United States, so have the capabilities of the Japanese defense forces. *The History of the JSDF and Self-Defense Annals, Deployment and Outline of the Organization of the JDA*, as cited by defense

³⁵ Olsen, p. 7.

³⁶ Ibid., p. 41.

³⁷ Crabb, pp. 278-324.

researcher, Satoshi Morimoto, breaks up the development and changes of the Defense Forces capabilities into three phases.³⁸ The first phase encompasses the creation of the National Police Force Reserve, its reorganization under the Defense Agency as Self-Defense Forces through the First Defense Buildup Plan in 1957. The second, or formative phase, began with the adoption of the Basic Policies for National Defense in that same year and continues through the end of the Fourth Defense Buildup Plan in 1976. The final phase, which begins with a new perspective on force modernization and defense procedures under the National Defense Program Outline, continued until the end of the Cold War. I would now add a fourth phase, one which goes from the new NDPO announced in 1995 and continues into the future. This phase encompasses the changes made reflecting the new security environment and is more a change in emphasis than direction.

During the initial phase, Japan's newly created defense forces were issued weapons by the United States under the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement³⁹ and trained by U.S. Forces in Japan. Primarily used for domestic control and to reinforce local police, these forces could not yet be considered true defense forces. During the formative phase, Japan began to make use of Three- and Five-Year Defense Buildup

³⁸ Satoshi Morimoto. "The Japanese Self-Defense Force: Its Role and Missions in the Post-Cold War Period." in *Asia in the 21st Century: Evolving Strategic Priorities*. Institute For National Strategic Studies (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press. 1994). pp. 171-188.

³⁹ *Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement, with Annexes, between the United States of America and Japan*. 8 March 1954. 5 U.S.T., pp. 661-680.

Plans to direct the development of the defense forces toward a specific level, thereby improving fighting capabilities of the SDF while preparing for any military eventuality. In the late 1950's this force was of sufficient strength and training to take over from the United States the primary mission of defense of Japan. The third phase began with the 1973 National Defense Plan, which fundamentally changed the buildup of the defense forces from one focused on attaining a force with level of preparedness equal to a specific threat to one that was focused on building within clear limits on defense capabilities and spending.⁴⁰ The concept of "defense power in peacetime" was used to explain the tie between the limits on defense spending and capabilities, the reliance on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, and the ongoing détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.

The 1973 NDPO gave credence to an SDF that was only able to deal with limited or small-scale aggression, relying on the U.S. security guarantees for anything greater. It emphasized the modernization of the SDF's equipment, weapons and logistical support without increases in size or changes in missions. Five-Year Mid-Term Planning Estimates (renamed Mid-Term Defense Program Plans after 1985) were then used to direct defense spending within the one percent of GNP constraint placed on the JDA.⁴¹ While there is a real limitation to a defense budget based on one percent of a given GNP,

⁴⁰ Holland, p. 21.

⁴¹ The 1% ceiling on defense expenditures was put in place under Prime Minister Miki Takeo in 1976. It was removed as a formal policy in 1987 under Prime Minister Nakasone. Holland, pp. 49-52. Also see Table 5.

Japan has experienced phenomenal growth in its GNP and therefore the amount actually spent on defense has also increased.⁴² Even with the one percent restriction, the total amount spent on defense expenditures has increased from ¥1.3 trillion (\$7.2 billion) in 1975 to ¥4.8 trillion (\$26.5 billion) in 1996, which was fourth highest worldwide.⁴³ However, Thomas Wilborn, an Asian specialist for the Strategic Studies Institute, argues persuasively that in the case of Japan, it is unrealistic to use defense spending as a standard for comparing military capability. This, he argues, is due to volatile exchange rates, high personnel costs and high equipment costs.⁴⁴

Table 5 provides an overview of Japanese defense spending from 1955 until the present. The table shows is that despite the large total, the growth and changes from year to year have been small. It also shows that even during years of high or low tension and periods when China and others have criticized the Japanese for remilitarizing, or when the United States has criticized them for not doing enough, there has not been a corresponding increase, decrease or great change in their defense spending. The Japanese have stuck to the plan laid out in the NDPO and the MTDP. That other countries have

⁴² Under Prime Minister Nakasone's lead, an attempt was made to change or remove this limit, and for three years (1987-89) the spending limit was exceeded. Since then, however, though not a formal policy required by law, it has been followed and maintained. *Defense of Japan, 1996*. Reference 24. Changes in Defense Expenditures, p. 298.

⁴³ Ibid. p. 298 and United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers: 1995*. (Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. 1994). p. 42. The total amounts of these two references are different due to definition differences. However, the trend in defense spending and the overall rankings are the same.

⁴⁴ Thomas L. Wilborn. *Japan's Self-Defense Forces: What Dangers to Northeast Asia*. (Carlisle Barracks: Strategic Studies Institute. United States Army War College. 1994) p. 14.

concern to complain is telling proof of the changes Japan's defense forces have gone through.

When the amount Japan spends on defense is compared with other countries, (Table 6) a similar result is found. In constant dollars, the amount Japan expends on its defense (and support of the U.S. forces stationed in and around Japan) seems on par with other countries of its size. Keeping in mind Wilborn's earlier comments about volatile

FY	Item GNP (Initial Forecast) (A)	General Account (B)	Growth from Previous Year	Defense Budget (C)	Growth from Previous Year	Ratio Defense Budget to GNP (C/A)	Ratio of Defense Budget to General Account (C/B)
1955	75,590	9,915	-0.8	1,349	-3.3	1.78	13.61
1965	281,600	36,581	12.4	3,014	9.6	1.07	8.24
1975	1,585,000	212,888	24.5	13,273	21.4	0.84	6.23
1985	3,146,000	524,996	3.7	31,371	6.9	0.997	5.98
1986	3,367,000	540,886	3.0	33,435	6.58	0.993	6.18
1987	3,504,000	541,010	0.0	35,174	5.2	1.004	6.50
1988	3,652,000	566,997	4.8	37,003	5.2	1.013	6.53
1989	3,897,000	604,142	6.6	39,198	5.9	1.006	6.49
1990	4,172,000	662,368	9.6	41,593	6.1	0.997	6.28
1991	4,596,000	703,474	6.2	43,860	5.45	0.954	6.23
1992	4,837,000	722,180	2.7	45,518	3.8	0.941	6.30
1993	4,953,000	723,548	0.0	46,406	1.95	0.937	6.41
1994	4,885,000	730,817	1.0	46,835	0.9	0.959	6.41
1995	4,928,000	709,871	-2.9	47,236	0.86	0.959	6.65
1996	4,960,000	751,049	5.8	48,455	2.58	0.977	6.45

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, 1996. Reference 24, p. 298.

Table 5: Changes in Japan's Defense Expenditures (Unit: ¥100 Million, %)

exchange rates, high personnel costs and high equipment costs, the amount is actually even less.

Through the use of the NDPO and the MTDP, Japan has modernized the SDF within the confines of its defense-only strategy. As noted earlier, this strategy is not directed against or in response to any specific threat. It is completely backwards from the way the United States, for example, does its defense planning in which the first step is to

Country	Defense Expenditure						% of GDP		
	U.S. \$ (million)			U.S. \$ per capita			1985	1994	1995
	1985	1994	1995	1985	1994	1995			
Canada	10688	9695	9004	421	345	320	2.2	1.7	1.6
China	27107	28945	31731	26	24	26	7.9	5.6	5.7
DPRK	5675	5660	5232	278	245	219	23.0	26.6	25.2
France	44604	45184	48002	808	781	826	4.0	3.3	3.1
Germany	48149	36965	41815	634	454	509	3.2	2.0	2.0
Indonesia	3197	2486	2751	20	13	14	2.8	1.6	1.6
Iran	19423	2340	2460	435	38	38	36.0	3.8	3.9
Japan	29350	46639	50219	243	372	401	1.0	1.0	1.1
ROK	5892	12764	14359	209	285	320	5.1	3.3	3.4
Russia	329449*	96693	82000	1189*	649	551	16.1*	8.5	7.4
Taiwan	8793	11457	13136	453	543	620	7.0	4.7	5.0
United States	352551	293214	277834	1473	1130	1056	6.5	4.2	3.8
Vietnam	3277	992	910	53	14	12	19.4	5.1	4.3

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance: 1996/1997*. pp. 306-308.

* - Indicate total as the Soviet Union

Table 6: Comparison of Defense Expenditures (1995 Constant Prices)

identify the threat (or a series of threats). Then scenarios in which this threat might occur are imagined. Only then is the military force examined, to ensure sufficient forces are on hand or available to compete in these scenarios. Japan has chosen to build a force that it considers able to defend Japan, within the constraints of its one percent spending ceiling, the U.S.-Japan security arrangements and the continued peace and stability in the region, but without focusing on any specific threat.

Some have argued that SDF readiness has been the victim of the lack of public support, on the one hand, and ulterior motives of the JDA on the other. Defense analyst Michael Chinworth notes that "JDA strategy over the past twenty years has been directed at establishing the policy precedents that accompany the production, development, and deployment of state-of-the-art systems" in an attempt to better itself in the eyes of its own people, and the Japanese bureaucracy. This pursuit of high-tech items has been at the cost of the overall development of the SDF. Critical areas such as logistical support and ammunition supplies, which do not carry that sexy "high-tech" label, generally are not

supported.⁴⁵ Others question the true purpose of the SDF. "Many observers agree with Michael Chinworth in wondering if the purpose of the SDF is really to assuage U.S. pressure rather than to provide for defense, or any other military purpose."⁴⁶

A simple but meaningful way to look at the capability of the SDF is to compare it to the forces of other nations. Table 7 shows 15 other nations' ground, sea and air forces. Table 8 then shows a comparison of weapons systems within the region. What is clear after examining these two tables is that Japan on the whole seems to possess a military that is slightly smaller than that of other nations its size. Further, within the region, it

Ground Forces		Naval Forces			Air Forces	
Name of Country or region	(10,000 persons)	Name of Country or region	(10,000 tons)	(Number of Vessels)	Name of Country or region	(Number of combat aircraft)
China	220.0	USA	506.9	1050	China	*6010
North Korea	100.0	Russia	424.0	1700	USA	*4200
India	98.0	China	104.5	940	Russia	*3440
Russia	67.0	UK	82.6	300	Ukraine	*1100
ROK	55.0	France	46.0	330	India	*930
Pakistan	52.0	India	26.4	160	France	*790
USA	50.1	Peru	23.4	40	UK	*600
Vietnam	50.0	Turkey	22.7	240	North Korea	590
Turkey	40.0	Taiwan	22.3	390	Syria	580
Iraq	35.0	Germany	19.9	210	Egypt	580
Iran	34.5	Italy	19.7	170	Germany	*560
Syria	31.5	Spain	19.1	150	ROK	*490
Egypt	31.0	Brazil	18.6	190	Israel	490
Myanmar	26.5	Indonesia	16.7	140	Taiwan	*470
France	24.1	Canada	16.3	70	Turkey, Poland	450
Japan	15.3	Japan	34.6	160	Japan	520

Source: Japan Defense Agency, *Defense of Japan*, 1996. Reference 8, p. 251

* - Includes air force, naval and marine combat aircraft.

Table 7: Outline of Major Countries' and Regional Military Power

⁴⁵ Michael W. Chinworth. *Inside Japan's Defense: Technology, Economics & Strategy*. (Washington D.C.: Brassey's Inc. 1992). pp. 8-9.

⁴⁶ Wilborn, p. 18.

Weapons System	China	DPRK	ROK	Taiwan	Russia (Far East)	Japan
Main Battle Tank	8000-8500	3400	2110	630	5600	1130
Armored Personnel Carrier	6100	2740	2520	875	7000	940
Artillery Pieces	14500	8000	4500	1375	5800	780
Multiple Rocket Launchers	*	2200	156	*	*	90
Attack Helicopters	81	0	75	45	190	84
Reconnaissance Aircraft	290	0	28	37	100	120
Fighter, Ground Attack	440	**	255	**	334	50
Fighters	4411	529	130	327	450	259
Bombers	566	82	0	0	180	0
Submarines	63	25	4	4	43	17
Destroyers	18	0	7	18	13	9
Frigates	36	3	33	18	34	51
Mine Countermeasures	120	25	14	16	47	35
ASW Helicopter	40	0	47	19	75	110
Amphibious Ship	55	0	15	21	17	6
Amphibious Craft	370	260	36	400	203	40

Source: Adapted from International Institute for Strategic Studies, *Military Balance: 1996/1997*.

* - Included in artillery pieces total.

** - Included in Fighters total.

Table 8: Regional Comparison of Major Countries' Weapons Systems

shows the comparative lack of weapons systems within the SDF, the exception being surface combatants and ASW assets. While both tables only show quantity and do not accurately reflect capabilities (such as range, lethality, age, training, etc.), the data do cause one to question the basis of charges of Japanese remilitarization and fears of Japanese military might from an equipment/size standpoint.

When evaluating the capabilities of the SDF, it is important to keep in mind the defensive orientation of Japan. While any weapon can be used for offensive as well as defensive purpose, the type and quantity of weapons acquired by Japan do seem to be defensively oriented. Its lack of long-range transports (both naval and air), bombers, and in-flight refueling capabilities, coupled with the relatively large quantity of ASW assets, fighters and tanks (without the capability to move them off the island they are on), seems to give credibility to its claim of a defense-only strategy. Wilborn goes so far as to say

that "... the SDF must be as close to that [exclusively defensive] standard as the military of any major nation."⁴⁷

The equipment Japan has acquired to defend itself is only part of the equation. The ability of Japan to develop a credible force which can deter aggression and defend the country is tied directly to the level of training it has attained. There have been arguments in both directions, saying that the SDF is poorly trained or well-trained. Those who believe it poorly trained point to the lack of live-fire training, limited training areas, unrealistic training, and the lack of combat experience within its ranks.⁴⁸ On the other side, analysts point to the growing number of training exercises, particularly combined exercises (including two or all of the branches of the SDF), and to the greatly increased number of joint training exercises with the United States.⁴⁹ This trend began in the 1980's and continues today. Japanese forces have conducted training exercises in conjunction with the United States in and around Japan, Hawaii, Washington, New Mexico and Alaska.⁵⁰ The Maritime and Air SDF have the longest history and closest ties to their related elements in the U.S. forces, but the GSDF has been increased its

⁴⁷ Ibid. p. 19.

⁴⁸ Norman D. Levin, Mark Lorell and Arthur Alexander. *The Wary Warriors: Future Directions in Japanese Security Policies*. (Santa Monica: Rand. 1993) p. 49, 51-52, 68-69, Tsutomu Matsumura, "Analyst Questions SDF Defense Capability" in FBIS-EAS-96-117, 12 Jun 1996, and Brian Cloughley, "Japan Ponders Power Projection" *International Defense Review*. Vol. 29. No. 7. 1 July 1996. pp. 27-35.

⁴⁹ For one of the best overviews of the capabilities of the SDF in terms of equipment, personnel and training, see Levin, Lorell and Alexander, Chapter 3, pp. 37-69. See also Kataoka and Myers. *Defending an Economic Superpower*. pp. 76-79.

⁵⁰ Defense of Japan, various years. For 1996, Reference 31. pp. 310-312.

participation levels.⁵¹ For example, for the last nine years Japan has participated in RIMPAC, a bilateral (United States and Japan) and multilateral (United States, Australia, Canada, South Korea, and Chile) joint naval exercise.⁵²

The enormous changes Japan's SDF has gone through have allowed it to advance from its beginnings as a domestic police force to the point such that it is now capable of defending Japan. It must do so, however, within the constraints of its constitution, spending limits, and with the assistance of the United States.

4. The Demise of the Soviet Union and a New Environment

The implosion of the Soviet Union and the separation of its various republics into autonomous nations has dramatically changed the strategic environment of the world. The bipolar structure of military confrontation between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Soviet Union and the communist world, on the other, has ended. With its end three major changes have occurred to the security environment: the possibility of global war has decreased immensely, the importance and use of a multilateral approach to security has increased, and nuclear weapons and the nuclear threat has diminished.

The changes in the security environment no longer permit the single-minded focus on the threat posed by the Soviet Union that was a characteristic of the Cold War.

⁵¹ Levin, Lorell and Alexander, p. 43, note 8. Asia-Pacific Defense Forum Staff, *Yakima: A New Japanese Training Ground*. Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Spring 1995. p. 26-30.

⁵² A great deal of information on this exercise is available HTTP. <http://www.cpf.navy.mil/r96oview.htm>.

Inherent to the prevention of global war, the United States had focused most heavily on the Soviet Union. For Japan, this Soviet threat was apparent in the Far East Military District's overwhelming numerical superiority. In light of this force to the north, Japan was able to focus its defenses in that direction as it was truly the only military threat to Japan in the area. As this force deteriorated under the poor economic support and political confusion of Russia, other possible threats have become more critical and could destabilize the security in the region. The role of China has become particularly important, affecting all the possible problem areas, including the Korean peninsula, Taiwan, the South China Sea, and various smaller territorial disputes. Additionally many of the nations in the region are expanding or modernizing their military capabilities mainly in light of their economic development. Regional conflict, based on ethnic, religious or territorial disputes are becoming more likely.

As the bilateral system of confrontation dissolved, the use of multinational responses to security problems has grown. The coalition warfare of the Persian Gulf War and the multilateral use of sanctions and military alliances to enforce peace in Somalia and Bosnia is seen as the wave of the future. The emergence of U.N. structures which allow a effective international response to dangers provide for a greater reliance on multilateral actions. For Japan, the growing importance of ASEAN and its Regional Forum, the G-7, APEC, and the United Nations serve as the basis for the development of a regional security architecture.

The final change to the security environment is the decrease of the importance of nuclear weapons and the associated decrease in the nuclear threat. This is the most

relative of all the changes, in that one nuclear bomb can still cause sufficient havoc and devastation that a thousand seem redundant. However, reduction in nuclear stockpiles has begun in the former Soviet Union and the United States under the START I and II talks. However, they do not apply to other nuclear powers such as the United Kingdom, China and France, and countries such as North Korea and Pakistan have continued to pursue these weapons. In addition, the development and spread of weapons of mass destruction based on chemical or biological agents continue to present a danger. The nuclear umbrella guaranteed under the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security remains the primary deterrent to these developments.

With these changes in the security environment, it became necessary to reexamine the purpose and intent of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. As discussed in Chapter III, Japan's review of its policies began with the report, "The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan." This then became the heart of the revision and release of the new National Defense Program Outline. The NDPO, as the long-term vision for Japanese security policy, provided the basis for the Mid-Term Defense Program. The MTDP laid out the specific budgetary constraints, equipment and personnel levels, structural and doctrinal changes to be made and programs and studies to be conducted over the next five years. For the United States, the same kind of review process is institutionalized in the Department of Defense's annual Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) and the production of its National Military Strategy which is reflective of the President's National Security Strategy. In addition, the post-Cold War environment had some calling for a reallocation of priorities in order to receive the

“peace dividend” possible from the unneeded expenditures on defense. Therefore the United States conducted a “bottom-up review” of its defense organizations, strategies and policies. From this process and as part of the review of regional security policy, the East Asia Strategy Report (EASR) was produced in 1995. This report provided a regional focus and perspective on the U.S. post-Cold War policies in East Asia. It positioned the U.S.-Japan security relationship as the core of U.S. security policy in the Asia-Pacific region and described the security alliance as fundamental to the peace and security of not only the two countries but also to the whole Asia-Pacific region.⁵³

C. REVISIONS AND IMPROVEMENTS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

China’s actions have helped to spur Japan toward a revitalization of its security arrangements with the United States. China’s conduct in a recent series of aggressive political and military moves gave credence to those who believed China was becoming a threat. The duplicitous way in which China’s Premier Li Peng could say to Japanese politicians that “China has not posed, and will not pose a threat to any other country. China’s development will only benefit peace and stability in Asia and the world at large.”⁵⁴ while at the same time their forces were occupying Mischief Reef, taking it from the Philippines. The Chinese have taken other aggressive actions in the East and South China Seas, such as the Taiwan Strait missile firing and training exercise, and

⁵³ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs. *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. February 1995. p. 10.

⁵⁴ “China No Threat to Japan: Li Peng” Agence France Presse, May 6, 1996.

nuclear weapons testing. Additionally the strategic accord with Russia which has facilitated the purchase of advanced weaponry fuel the concern for China's real intentions.⁵⁵

In conjunction with the Japanese and U.S. reviews of their respective strategies for security and in accordance with the requirements set out in Article IV of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security,⁵⁶ concentrated consultations and dialogues took place on the significance of the post-Cold War environment on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. The forum for these discussions ranged from numerous working groups, the bilateral Security Subcommittee, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC is also know as the 2 plus 2)⁵⁷ up to the Summit Meetings of the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Japan.⁵⁸

During this period of consultation, two agreements that will have a great impact on the operation of the security relations were updated. They were the Agreement on

⁵⁵ Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro. *The Coming Conflict With China*. ((New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1997) pp. 166-185.

⁵⁶ "The Parties will consult together from time to time regarding the implementation of this Treaty, and, at the request of either Party, whenever the security of Japan or international peace and security in the Far East is threatened." Additional notes established the Security Consultative Committee, consisting of the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Director General of the Defense Agency, the U.S. Ambassador to Japan and the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific. *Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security*, Articles IV, p. 1634; notes pp. 1650-1651.

⁵⁷ This U.S. participation to this group was changed in December of 1990 from those noted in footnote 56 to now include the U.S. Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. This combination of the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Director General of the JDA and the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense are known as the "2-plus-2."

⁵⁸ The major forums for United States-Japan consultations on security are listed in Reference 29, *Defense of Japan*, 1996, pp. 303-304.

Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services⁵⁹ and the New Special Measures Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Forces in Japan.⁶⁰ In addition, a Special Action Committee on Okinawa was created to find ways within the security arrangements to better address and reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa.

The two-year review of the security relationship culminated at the April 1996 Summit Meeting where two documents were issued: "Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century, a Message from Prime Minister Hashimoto and President Clinton to the Peoples of Japan and the United States"⁶¹ and "United States-Japan Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century."⁶² These documents are a renewal and revitalization of the security alliance and represent a decision as to the future of the security relationship. Perhaps the most important work, however, is still ongoing. The review of the security guidelines under which the United States and Japan cooperate on defense issues and plan for contingencies is critical. These guidelines will clearly establish the various actions

⁵⁹ Excerpts of the "Agreement Between the Government of Japan and the Government of the United States of America Concerning Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services Between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Armed Forces of the United States of America," June 28, 1996, are in *Defense of Japan, 1996*, Reference 32, pp. 313-315.

⁶⁰ Excerpts of the "Agreement Between Japan and the United States of America Concerning New Special Measures Relating to Article XXIV of the Agreement Under Article VI of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between Japan and the United States of America, Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of United States Forces in Japan," December 11 1995, are in *Defense of Japan, 1996*, Reference 39, pp. 324-325.

⁶¹ The full text of the message "Meeting the Challenges of the 21st Century," is available HTTP. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/21stcent.html>.

⁶² The full text of the message "U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century," is available HTTP. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/jointsec.html>.

and roles of the United States and Japan and allow for the discussion of situations that could cause serious damage the security arrangements.

1. Improved Support and the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA)


One of the most important aspects of U.S.-Japan security arrangements is the development of interoperability between the two forces. The success the United States and its allies enjoyed during the War in the Persian Gulf was directly related to the agreements put in place prior to the conflict. Logistical agreements that allow the use by an ally of fuels, ammunitions, foods and water, increase the efficiency and ease of operations. The Agreement on Reciprocal Provision of Logistic Support, Supplies and Services (also know as the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement, or ACSA) allows the United States and Japan to support each other in bilateral exercises, United Nations peace-keeping operations and international humanitarian relief missions with such provisions as food, water, billeting, transportation, petroleum, oils, lubricants, clothing, communications, medical services, storage, training, spare parts and components, repair and maintenance, and air and sea port services. The agreement is not subject to the provisions of Japan's Three Principles of Arms Exports,⁶³ but the use of the supplies or

⁶³ Japan restricted the export of arms to 1) communist countries, 2) countries under UN-resolution arms embargo and 3) countries involved or likely to be involved in international conflicts. In 1976 Prime Minister Miki further tightened these restrictions, and in 1981 a resolution passed by the Diet banned arms exports to these three categories of countries, restricting the exports of arms in general and the plants that could produce them. This, however, was revised to not include the exchange of military-related technology to the United States in 1983. See *Defense of Japan, 1996*, Reference 35 and 36, pp. 318-320.

services must be consistent with the U.N. Charter and may not be transferred to a third party without consent of the provider.

The impact of this agreement is particularly important to Japan in terms of the last two instances, U.N. peace-keeping and international humanitarian assistance. As noted earlier, Japan's defense forces, organized and equipped under the guidelines of a "defense-only" strategy, do not have either the heavy-lift capability nor the experience in establishing the logistical support requirements associated with these missions. This agreement provides the legal basis for exchange of these goods and services between the United States and Japan. For the United States, access and use of assets under the control of the JDA, particularly air and seaport services, will help it effectively operate in Japan.

United States forces are deployed throughout Japan, though the majority are on the island of Okinawa. (See Figure 5 and Figure 6.) Japan's assistance for these forces, which total about \$5 billion dollars a year, cover over 75% of the costs associated with stationing forces in Japan. These include the wages and allowances of Japanese personnel that support the United States forces, utilities costs, base repair and development, and facilities improvement costs. The update to the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) as outlined in the New Special Measures Regarding Facilities and Areas and the Status of U.S. Forces in Japan takes into account the costs associated with the realignment, reduction and consolidation of the facilities and bases of the U.S. forces. This agreement also changes the way in which the amount provided by Japan incrementally increases, allowing for annual adjustments of the amount. This reflects




Source: Adapted from Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 *Strategic Assessment and Defense of Japan*, 1996.

Figure 5: Deployment of U.S. Forces, Japan (Excluding Okinawa)

more accurately the costs and not simply a fixed increase which will provide Japan with less of a financial burden.

2. The Special Action Committee on Okinawa (SACO)

The concern over the heavy burden of basing U.S. forces in Okinawa was increased with the rape of a young girl by U.S. soldiers in September 1995 and the Governor of the prefecture refusing to sign lease renewal agreements. About 75 percent of the U.S. facilities and training areas for its forces in Japan are in Okinawa. This



Source: Adapted from Institute for National Strategic Studies, 1997 *Strategic Assessment and Defense of Japan*, 1996.

Figure 6: Okinawa - U.S. Forces, Facilities and Areas

represents about 10 percent of the total land in the Okinawa prefecture and 18 percent of the main island.⁶⁴ (See Figure 6)

The Special Action Committee on Facilities and Areas in Okinawa was established in order to find ways within the security arrangement to better address and reduce the burden on the people of Okinawa. It was to provide recommendations to the

⁶⁴ *Defense of Japan*, 1996, p. 211.

SCC on ways to consolidate, realign and reduce U.S. facilities and areas, and adjust operational procedures in Okinawa. In April 1996, it released an interim report that recommended a 20 percent reduction in the "footprint" of U.S. forces on Okinawa by closing and returning a number of training sites, consolidating housing and transferring aircraft to other sites. Additionally it recommended various noise reduction and abatement policies, adjustments to training and operational procedures for live-fire exercises, road marches and parachute drops, and improvements to SOFA reporting and information systems.

The final report released in November 1996 reemphasized the reductions outlined in the interim report. It discussed the commitment of both governments to deal with the various issues related to the presence and status of U.S. forces and steps to enhance mutual understanding between these forces and the local Japanese communities. The final report, as it was presented by the Security Consultative Committee, contained a concrete implementation schedule of the SACO's recommendations and demonstrated the importance placed by both governments on improving the speed and effectiveness of their joint consultative system.⁶⁵

3. Joint Declaration on Security – Alliance for the 21st Century

The culmination of the security consultative process occurred with the release of the Joint Declaration on Security and the accompanying message to the peoples of both

⁶⁵ The full text of the Final SACO Report, released 2 December 1996 by Minister of Foreign Affairs Ikeda, Minister of State for Defense Kyuma, Secretary of Defense Perry and Ambassador Mondale is available HTTP. <http://www.ntls.co.jp/infomofa/ju/security/96saco1.html>.

countries. The message expounded on the contributions and benefits the security treaty has brought to both countries, the region and the world. It emphasized the importance of the treaty in enhancing the "peace, stability and prosperity in the Asia-Pacific region" and the shared values and beliefs on democracy and freedom the two countries share. It highlighted the work of the United States-Japan Common Agenda for Cooperation on a Global Perspective and the success of the various global cooperative efforts that have been put forward by this initiative.⁶⁶

The declaration, while not a formal change or even an update to the Security Treaty, does represent a clear and pointed statement of direction for the United States and more particularly Japan. It emphasized the central nature of the security arrangements and the desire, not only to continue it but to expand its scope and nature. It reaffirmed the current level of U.S. forces in Asia and specifically in Japan, declaring "the prevailing security environment requires the maintenance of its current force structure of about 100,000 forward deployed military personnel in the region, including about the current level in Japan." It also declared Japan's continued support of those forces through the provision of facilities, areas, and other host nation support.

From a bilateral perspective, the declaration signaled the desire to enhance interoperability between the two countries' forces through the new Support agreements and cooperative research and development such as the support fighter (FSX).

⁶⁶ The Common Agenda addresses a series of environmental, population, health assistance and technology and human resource issues. A fact sheet is available HTTP. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/common.html>.

Importantly, it also expanded the relationship with its desire to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the delivery means through research into ballistic missile defense (TMD). The declaration also stressed the importance of regional stability and called for China to play a positive and constructive role.

The declaration put special emphasis on the development of a multilateral regional security dialogue and cooperation mechanisms and that will eventually lead to the creation of a Northeast Asia security dialogue. It pointed out the importance of the role being played by the ASEAN Regional Forum and called for the strengthening of support for the United Nations and similar international organizations. This emphasis is related directly to Japan's increased involvement in peace-keeping operations and humanitarian assistance.

To many, the security declaration represents a shift in emphasis from the narrow focus on the defense of Japan of the past to a broader, regional focus on security. It is very much in line with the new NDPO's balanced approach and also underscores the centrality of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. It does not, as has been pointed out by security analyst Ralph Cossa, require the remilitarization of Japan's defense forces, or a formal revision of its constitution, nor is it an attempt to set the stage for a U.S. withdrawal from Asia. It is also not an attempt to shift the emphasis to the containment of China.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Ralph A. Cossa. "A Revitalised U.S.-Japan Alliance Should Cause No Alarm in Asia." Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) Trends. No 78. *The Business Times*. 22-23 February 1997. p. 1.

China's reaction to the declaration was immediate and negative. Authors Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro argue that China sees the Declaration as a change in Japan's position and an attempt to counter China's growing power. They also see this as a change in China's position relative to the Security Treaty, which in the past has been tolerant of it, believing it was a counterbalance against the Soviet Union.⁶⁸ Bernstein and Munro also note that China was confident that the arrangements prevented Japan from building a military sufficient to defend itself and that "the United States was helping to keep Japan down." Now they believe China sees the security arrangements as an "offensive pact" against them, expanding the Security Treaty to cover all of the Asia-Pacific, and encouraging Japan to play a larger role, politically, militarily as well as internationally.⁶⁹

4. Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation

As the Joint Declaration stated, both countries recognize the need for closer cooperation and coordination in "dealing with situations that may emerge in the areas surrounding Japan and which will have an important influence on the peace and security of Japan." Therefore they agreed to review the 1978 Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation. The current guidelines, developed after the first NDPO, address the posture of cooperation necessary for the two countries to deter aggression, actions to

⁶⁸ "Qian tolerant of Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, Daily Says." Kyodo News Service, Japan Economic Newswire. November 18, 1995.

⁶⁹ Bernstein and Munro, p. 168-171.

be taken in response to an armed attack against Japan and cooperation in the case of situations in the Far East outside Japan.⁷⁰ While the first two sections are fairly comprehensive, they do not reflect the expanded role of the SDF in peace-keeping operations and international humanitarian relief. They also do not reflect the new Support agreements, host nation support and the Special Measures agreement.

The third section, however, is not very comprehensive and has not supported the type of contingency planning the United States and most of its allies normally conduct. The need to thoroughly review and update this section is particularly important because the process will clearly identify problem areas that could affect our mutual security interests in advance so that efforts can be made to solve the problems. The review of the guidelines will identify what each party wants and is willing to support. As Cossa argues, "Defining 'adequately support' to the satisfaction of both nations, and in a manner not threatening to Japan's peace-loving neighbours, is the goal of the revitalisation effort."⁷¹

D. CONCLUSION

The U.S.-Japan security relationship has taken quite a trip from its beginnings in the wake of World War II. It has progressed from a one-sided relationship characterized by total dependence, to one that, though not reciprocal, at least has the two countries dealing with each other as equal partners in providing for the stability and security of

⁷⁰ The Report by the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation and the 1978 Guidelines are included in *Defense of Japan, 1996*, Reference 30, pp. 305-309.

⁷¹ Cossa, p.1.

Japan. It has dealt with changing priorities within each government, economic tensions and disputes, yet has remained the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

The influence of China on this relationship has changed over time as well. The early stages of the Cold War saw China as a junior partner to the Soviet Union and any concern from a security perspective was minimal at best. The focus and fear was directed toward the Soviet Union and Japan's defense forces were developed to defend against this threat. As the Cold War progressed, China's influence grew in the economic and political realms but it remained a poor second to the Soviet Union in the security arena. It was not until the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union that China began to have influence into the U.S.-Japan security relations and then only weakly. Despite its decline and the economic and political troubles, Russia was still seen as the greatest threat. With the focus of the security arrangement turned toward stability in the region, China's growing military modernization and aggressive actions clearly have become a one of the primary concerns of the security arrangements and will affect the direction of the relationship.

The results of the year-long review of the U.S.-Japan security relationship has brought about a renewed and revitalized desire for cooperation and stability to the region. The emphasis of the alliance has shifted from one focused on just the defense of Japan to one concerned with the broader regional security issues as well. The review process and the Joint Declaration which came from it has resulted in a stronger security relationship between the United States and Japan than at any time during the Cold War. The premier importance of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements was perhaps summed up best by

Prime Minister Hashimoto, in a joint press conference following his latest meeting with President Clinton, "There is no other bilateral relationship in the world that has any semblance to the Japan-U.S. relationship in the present and fundamental importance. I would like to reiterate my determination to further enhance the Japan-U.S. relationship for the benefit of not only the two peoples, but also for the Asia Pacific region and the world as a whole."⁷²

While the U.S.-Japan security arrangements are not directed at China and do not attempt to "contain" it as the arrangement was initially created to do of the Soviet Union, the impact and importance of China to this relationship is immense. This is perhaps best seen in the year during which Japan was in the process of reviewing the importance of this relationship and asking itself if the security arrangement was the appropriate vehicle in which to go on to the 21st Century. While there were many advocates for continuing the alliance, a growing number of domestic critics were calling for changes or the dismantling of it. Then to make matters worse, the rape of a young girl in Okinawa by U.S. servicemen seemed have provided the ammunition for the firing squad which would end or at least change the security relationship. However, China's conduct at this same time raised the importance of the relationship to a new high. Through its duplicitous actions in seizing Mischief reef off the coast of the Philippines and then its naval exercises and missile firings off the coast of and over Taiwan, China appeared to prove that while it may not be a direct threat to Japan, its aggressive actions proved it to be an

⁷² Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro. Joint Press Conference at the White House. 25 April 1997. Available HTTP. http://library.whitehouse.gov/ThisWeek.cgi?type_p&date=2&briefing=9.


intimidating presence introducing instability in the region. As noted by Thomas L. Friedman in an opinion/editorial piece in *The New York Times*, "Japan alone cannot handle China, Japan alone cannot handle a unified Korea, and Japan alone cannot protect its own sea lanes – so for all these we need the U.S. alliance."⁷³ Japan's vigorous endorsement of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements reflect China's negative influence.

⁷³ Thomas L. Friedman. "J-a-p-a-n and C-h-i-n-a." *The New York Times*. 12 February 1996.

V. PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Japan is approaching the 21st Century in a security environment that is characterized by threat uncertainty. In the areas surrounding Japan, numerous potential "hot spots" exist. Figure 7 displays the numerous border and territorial disputes in the region. In this Chapter, I group these locations into three areas of potential problems; the Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes. China plays a role in each of these areas and its importance will only grow with time. The role that China plays in each of these areas is different, and I argue the path it will choose in dealing with each has a significant impact on Japan, the security environment and prospects of future stability in the area. Any one of these potential areas of tensions could hurt or destroy the new security environment and the system Japan is developing.

Japan, with its "balanced approach" to security in Asia, is carefully and incrementally reinvigorating its security structure in preparation for the 21st Century. By addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international approaches, Japan is trying to develop a balanced security structure that can deal with these potential problem areas within the confines of its constitution, the United Nations Charter and the firm foundation of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. In the end, however, it will be the combination of the relationships between Japan, China and the United States on which the stability and security in East Asia rest.



Source: Adapted from Department of Defense *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*.

Figure 7: Boundary and Territorial Disputes in East Asia

Japan and the United States have worked closely to develop an environment that strives to integrate China. It requires, however, China's continued desire to be an involved actor within this established structure. This point was made clear in the Joint Declaration on Security by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto on 17 April 1996, "...it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China

play a positive and constructive role, and in this context [the peaceful resolution of problems in the region], stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China.”¹

The United States and Japan have the important task of ensuring China’s integration into this structure, but it will be China’s actions upon which any further changes in the direction of the U.S.-Japan security alliance will be based. This is argued by defense analyst Ralph Cossa: “China’s behavior, and not ulterior U.S. or Japanese motives, will be the determinant of the future direction of the alliance.”² It is with this problem of “containment” of China versus “engagement” as advocated by the United States and Japan that I will close this chapter.

A. TENSIONS AND TROUBLES FOR THE FUTURE

Japan’s geopolitical security environment include three areas in which China’s role and actions will greatly affect the prospects for future peace and stability. I will examine these potential areas of tension in three groups; the Korean peninsula, Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan, and various territorial disputes. China plays a role in each of these areas and its importance will only grow more over time. The way that China flexes its muscle in each of these areas is different, but each is interrelated in that the path China chooses will have a considerable impact on Japan, the security environment and prospects

¹ The full text of the message “U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security: Alliance for the 21st Century,” is available HTTP. <http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/japan/jointsec.html>.

² Ralph A. Cossa. “In Defense of Japan’s New Regional Role.” *Asia Times: The Voice of Asia*. Thursday, January 16, 1997.

of future stability in the area. Any one of these potential areas of tension could weaken or destroy the new security environment and the system Japan is developing. The way in which China acts in resolving these situations will have a great impact on Japan, Sino-Japanese relations and stability in East Asia.

1. The Korean Peninsula

Perhaps the single most volatile area of tension for the future of peace and stability in East Asia and specifically for Japan's security concerns is the Korean peninsula. Over 1,500,000 soldiers confront each other across the DMZ, from the United States, North and South Korea.³ The deterioration of economic conditions in the North, including chronic food shortages and decreased trade with the former Soviet Union and China, as well as the slow transition of power following the demise of long-time leader Kim Il Sung, all combine to make the situation ripe for trouble.

The fear that famine is about to overwhelm North Korea has brought it to negotiate some of the things it has in the past been unwilling to discuss. These include the "four-country talks" proposed by President Clinton and Prime Minister Kim of South Korea in April 1996 that would establish a framework for a peace agreement on the peninsula,⁴ final agreements on the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization's (KEDO) building of two new nuclear reactors, and the United States'

³ About 1,128,000 are from North Korea, 663,000 from ROK and 36,000 from the U.S. according to *Defense of Japan, 1996*, Reference 7, p. 249.

⁴ *Defense of Japan, 1996*, p. 33.

three bilateral desires: the recovery of U.S. remains from the Korean War, a promise to renounce terrorism and talks to curb North Korean missile exports.⁵

A sign that the deterioration of conditions in the North continues was sharply brought to the world's attention with the highest-ever defection of a North Korean party official, in February 1997. Hwang Jang Yop, in charge of international relations and one of the top North Koreans, requested asylum at the South Korean embassy in Beijing. After a diplomatic fervor that involved North and South Korea and China, and had North Korean agents stationed around the South Korean Embassy in Beijing, North Korea eventually claimed Hwang was useless and "dismissed him." On his arrival in Seoul, he stated that not only are North Koreans starving, but that there is a great chance of war on the peninsula as the hard-liners in the North have taken charge. He also stated that the possibility of collapse of the North Korean government seemed to him as unlikely due to the reign of terror used to maintain control.⁶ His defection and comments call into question the probability that North Korea's government will dissolve and that because of the famine and its inability to train, it is incapable of fighting a war. Further, Hwang stated that North Korea is seriously considering launching a desperation attack against South Korea "and is capable of scorching South Korea with nuclear weapons, chemical

⁵ Nigel Holloway. "Appointment in Beijing: The two Koreas are reported to be holding secret talks in the Chinese capital. The meetings could improve the prospects for peace on the peninsula." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 13 June 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/june_13/relations_j13.html.

⁶ Shim Jae Hoon. "Man in the Middle: The shock defection in Beijing of a top North Korean ideologue confirms there are cracks in the Pyongyang regime's armour but could undermine the prospects for peace on the peninsula." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 27 February 1997. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/feb_27/foreign1_f27.html.

weapons and rockets,” according to the South Korean intelligence agency. “North Korea believes it can win a war against South Korea, and that if the United States intervenes, it plans to scorch Japan, too,” Hwang reportedly said.⁷

China has moved to distance itself both economically and politically from North Korea, stopping the “friendship prices” on goods and most of the other aid that it used to provide it.⁸ South Korea and China established relations in 1992 and the growing trade and economic cooperation between the two has contributed to the weakening of China’s connection to North Korea. Politically, however, a great opportunity is presented to China in its role as moderator in the reunification of the Korean peninsula. The idea that the two Koreas could reunify with the assistance and under the direction of China would show internationally the reemergence of China as a major player. Journalist Nigel Holloway argues that this was one of the main motives behind the secret talks China hosted between North and South Korea in June 1996 which seemed however, to produce no great results. Holloway argues that China’s actions were to show the United States that it must be more fully involved in working out a solution to the problems on the Korean peninsula. It also partially explains why China has only tepidly accepted the U.S.-South Korean proposal of “four-country talks,” in that China feels it was both not consulted in advance and not sufficiently involved from the beginning of the process.⁹

⁷ Quoted by George C. Wilson. “Defector: N. Korea Capable of ‘Scorching’ Attack. *Army Times*. No. 41. May 8, 1997. p. 28. Also G. E. Willis. “Analysts: N. Korean Attack Could Have ‘Pearl Harbor Character.’” *Army Times*. No. 41. May 8, 1997. p. 28.

⁸ *Economist*. “Kim Jong Il’s Inheritance.” 16 July 1994. pp. 19-21.

⁹ Holloway. *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 13 June 1996.

Japan's role in the peninsula is complicated by the distrust and hate that many Koreans still feel from the decades of Imperial control under the Japanese. The ongoing argument over the ownership of Takeshima (Tokdo in Korean) and the surprisingly visceral character of this dispute, shows the depth of the grievances that still exist.¹⁰ Despite this, Japan plays a critical role in Korea, economically as well as politically. No matter how reunification occurs, either through implosion or explosion, the fall-out will affect directly the security environment and Japan's security arrangements.

Three aspects of the unification process will most directly challenge Japan. The first is the support the U.S. could request from Japan should the situation on the peninsula cause a United States military response. This would quickly test the resolve of the new security alliance. If the needed support, be it facilities, equipment or funds, fail to be provided, it would very likely strain and probably break the major underpinnings of the security relationship. Secondly, even without military actions, simply the widespread famine could generate a flow of refugees that would quickly overwhelm the provisions of the new Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA). According to reporter Shim Jae Hoon, South Korean officials are predicting up to 5 million North Korean refugees would attempt to flee their country, a prospect China, as the primary recipient of this flow, is taking seriously. United Nations officials are reporting China is building a giant refugee camp near Yanji on their northeast border with North Korea. Additionally

¹⁰ Institute of National Strategic Studies, National Defense University. *1997 Strategic Assessment: Flashpoints and Force Structure*. Chapter 5 "Japan." Available HTTP. <http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/sa97/sa97ch5.html>.

South Korea's Ministry of Unification has sought 4.6 billion won (\$5.6 million) in the fiscal 1997 budget to build a refugee camp south of Seoul.¹¹

Third, the costs associated with unification will probably quickly overwhelm South Korea and require international assistance, of which Japan could be expected to provide a large portion. In comparison to similar efforts in Germany, financiers have estimated the total cost of reunification of the two Germany's at 1 to 2 trillion deutschemarks (about \$600 billion to 1.3 trillion),¹² while Korean analysts are predicting that Korean unification could be a much more expensive process due to the decay of North Korea's infrastructure and economy, the relatively lower (in comparison to the West Germans) per capita income of South Koreans and the higher ratio of North to South Koreans than there were of East to West Germans.¹³

Many of these concerns can be addressed in advance, which is one of the primary purposes of the ongoing review of the U.S.-Japan Defense Guidelines.¹⁴ Japan's principal role in pursuing stability in the region and on the peninsula, however, can best

¹¹ Shim Jae Hoon. "Darkness at Noon: Its economy in a shambles, Pyongyang is hard-pressed to feed its people. In time, hunger could trigger an exodus of refugees from North Korea and bring the country to its knees." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 10 October 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/oct_10/cover_o10a.html.

¹² As noted by Nicholas Eberstadt. *Korea Approaches Reunification*. (New York: M. E. Sharpe. 1995) p. 154.

¹³ Jongryn Mo "German Lessons for Managing the Economic Cost of Korean Reunification." in Thomas H. Henriksen and Kyongsoo Lho, eds. *One Korea? Challenges and Prospects for Reunification* (Stanford: Hoover Institute Press. 1994). pp. 48-67. Also Eberstadt. pp. 154-158. According to Eberstadt there were four West Germans for each East German over which to spread the economic costs of the reunification, where as there are only 2 South Koreans for each North Korean.

¹⁴ See Guidelines for United States-Japan Defense Cooperation, p. 132 of this thesis.

be served in presenting a unified front in conjunction with the ROK and the United States in dealing with North Korea.¹⁵ This aspect is being helped through its improving relations with the South, as demonstrated by the newly expanded defense consultations and exchanges.¹⁶ Japan's support of the "four-country talks," famine and other assistance to North Korea, and its encouragement of all parties to actively participate in the peace process is probably all that currently can be done in support of the peaceful reunification goal.

2. Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan

Despite the fact that the PRC considers the incorporation of Hong Kong, Macao and (some day) Taiwan to be an internal, domestic issue, Japan and the rest of the world are carefully monitoring China's actions. The generally accepted belief is that the repercussions of failed policies here could be an economic, political and military disaster for China, the region and the world. 1 July 1997 will be one of the most important dates for China's reemergence as an active, powerful player in East Asia in that the world will be watching the way in which China reincorporates Hong Kong. The ramifications of how well this is done will be felt in every other potential area of tension in which China is involved. As one author put it, the way China handles Hong Kong will "shape the evolution of China's political identity and its integration into the international

¹⁵ This is argued by Ralph A. Cossa in *The Major Powers in Northeast Asian Security*, p. 30.

¹⁶ "ROK, Japan Agree to Expand Military Ties." *Korea Times*. 23 September 1995, p.1.

community.”¹⁷ Aspects of this action are most obviously transferable to the 1999 absorption of Macao, but much more important will be whether it can be used as a blueprint for the eventual absorption of Taiwan. If the policies and procedures used to implement the “one country, two systems” concept work, they will very likely become the guidelines for the reintegration of Taiwan.

China’s intentions and the ultimate status of Hong Kong are laid out in two documents: the 1984 Sino-British Joint Declaration and the 1990 Basic Law promulgated by the PRC. The first provides for the transition of sovereignty from the United Kingdom to China and establishes the concept of “one country, two systems,” with Hong Kong retaining a high degree of autonomy in all matters except foreign affairs and defense. Additionally this Declaration is registered as a formal treaty with the United Nations. The second document lays the fundamental governing framework for implementation of the “one country, two systems” principle and specifically says that the PRC socialist system and policies will not be extended into Hong Kong.¹⁸

As the date to transfer Hong Kong approaches, differences over political freedom, rule of law and freedom of the press have surfaced that bring into question the ability of China to peacefully handle the transfer. The use of the 10,000-strong People’s

¹⁷ Michael Yahuda. *Hong Kong: China’s Challenge*. (London: Routledge. 1996). As quoted in Frank Ching. “Reading the Tea Leaves.” *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 12 December 1997. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/dec_12/inreview_d12a.html.

¹⁸ The outline of these two documents was laid out in Jeffrey A. Bader, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs’ testimony before the House International Relations Committee, Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific. 13 February 1997. Available HTTP. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/970213_bader_hong_kong.html.

Liberation Army garrison that will be stationed in Hong Kong to quell dissent after the reincorporation could seriously damage relations within Hong Kong and internationally.¹⁹ This force is the strongest indicator that China intends to maintain a tight grip on Hong Kong in the future, despite assurances local autonomy. Additionally, China's announcement that it would not recognize the validity or results of the electoral reforms that lead to the 1995 Legislative Council (or LEGCO) elections in the belief they were in violation of the Joint Declaration assurance that the "laws currently in force" would remain unchanged portend negatively on the democratic process in Hong Kong. The appointment of a 60-seat, provisional legislature to replace LEGCO upon the transfer of Hong Kong, further threatens the believability of the principles behind the "one country, two systems" policy.²⁰

The economic importance of Hong Kong to China can not be overstated. Jeffrey Bader, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, made this clear in his comments before Congress:

Hong Kong is China's largest trading partner, and much of China's two-way trade uses Hong Kong as a transshipment point. Sixty-five percent of foreign direct investment in China now comes from or through Hong Kong. Over 50,000 enterprises in Guangdong Province alone use Hong Kong investment and employ over 4 million PRC workers.²¹

¹⁹ Bruce Gilley. "Hard to Resist: How much will China meddle after 1997?" *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 12 December 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/dec_12/hk_d12.html.

²⁰ Bader. pp. 2-3.

²¹ Ibid. p. 6.

Beyond the economic impact of Hong Kong's integration into China, the other single biggest impact of this will be on its role as a blueprint for China's eventual absorption of Taiwan. In his book, Michael Yahuda focuses on the problems China is likely to encounter in the transfer of Hong Kong and argues that should this transfer fail to continue in a peaceful and economically profitable way, then China would no longer be able to offer a viable basis for peaceful reunification with Taiwan.²² Despite the fact that Taiwan has become integrated economically with Hong Kong and other major parts of China's Pacific coast,²³ peaceful reunification is very much contingent on what occurs in Hong Kong in the next few years. Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui does not consider that talks about improving China-Taiwan relations are even possible until China's leadership fully regroupes from the death of Deng Xiaoping in February 1997. According to Lee, "the Chinese leadership is facing internal struggles. We would not even know who to talk to."²⁴ The American Assembly Delegation to Asia takes this further when it argues that Taiwan is not only concerned with China's attempt to intimidate and chastise it with military exercises and missile firings. Taiwan is also concerned that though China

²² Yahuda. *Hong Kong: China's Challenge*. (London: Routledge. 1996).

²³ Masashi Nishihara. "Northeast Asia and Japanese Security." in Danny Unger and Paul Blackburn, eds. *Japan's Emerging Global Role*. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 1993). p. 85. Jin-Young Chung totals the cross-investment between China, Hong Kong and Taiwan at almost \$40 billion and the most important aspect of the relationship between the three. "The Eagle, The Goose, and The Dragon: Cagemates in the Asia-Pacific Trade Order?" in Jonathan D. Pollack and Hyun-Dong Kim, eds. *East Asia's Potential for Instability and Crisis: Implications for the United States and Korea*. (Santa Monica: RAND. 1995). p. 135.

²⁴ Quoted in an interview with Japanese reporters in Taipei. "Breakthrough on Taiwan-China ties unlikely this year: Lee." *NEKKEI NET*. Available HTTP. <http://www.nikkei.co.jp/enews/SPECIAL/page/hong6.html>.

may initially soften its position toward it as a result of the takeover of Hong Kong. Once it has solidified its control and the conditions there are returning to normal, however, it will again harden its approach toward Taiwan.²⁵

Despite the increased economic integration of Taiwan, three events would almost certainly result in some sort of military action by China against Taiwan. In the same way that simply a perceived movement in that direction caused the Chinese naval demonstrations and missile firings in February 1996, a move to some sort of declaration of independence by Taiwan would have similar results in the future. Secondly, recognition of Taiwan by any international organization in which membership is based on statehood would almost certainly incite China's wrath. Finally, any Taiwanese pursuit of nuclear weapons, either in development or purchase, would cause China to take immediate action.²⁶

The reversion of Hong Kong and Macao are critical to China's desire to be a leading player in international affairs. As U.S. Ambassador to China, James R. Sasser, said in an address to the Asia Society:

Revision of Hong Kong will be a *defining moment* for China this year. China's leaders are smart enough to know that the world will be watching and that China's self-interest is well served by preserving intact Hong Kong's economic system, civil service and legal and judicial institutions.... I personally believe that China's leaders recognize that a

²⁵ Findings in Phase I of the American Assembly Delegation to Asia (9-21 June 1996) as published in "China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century: Fostering Cooperation, Preventing Conflict." 17 November 1996. Available HTTP. <http://www.columbia.edu/cu/amassembly/new/pahse1.html>.

²⁶ These three possible courses of actions for China were laid out by Effie R. Petrie in her thesis: "Capabilities and Intention: An Analysis of the Military Modernization of the PLA." (MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. December, 1996). p. 95. While definitely not exclusive, they are illustrative of the conditions under which China might feel required to act.

successful transition – a stable and prosperous Hong Kong – will have a positive impact on their image internationally. [Italics are mine]²⁷

China's ability to deal with Taiwan in a peaceful manner is inexorably linked to Hong Kong's incorporation. A forced or difficult merger of Hong Kong could very well lead Taiwan to pursue its own course independently, causing a reoccurrence of the conditions which brought about China's naval exercise and missile firing off Taiwan's coast and the subsequent U.S. naval response. The Taiwanese main opposition party has stated, in fact, that should it achieve a majority position, it will hold a plebiscite and, if independence is approved by the people and the party is sure they are willing to pay the price of war, it will then declare Taiwan independent of China. Further, it stated that they will do this even if it is destabilizing to the region.²⁸

Japan's concern about Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan are primarily economically based. Japan's investment in these areas are extensive. According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, cumulative Japanese investments amounts to approximately \$13 billion in China, \$6 billion in Taiwan and \$14 billion in Hong Kong, so it is not in China's interest to damage ties with Japan.²⁹ In the long term, however, Japan's

²⁷ James R. Sasser. U.S. Ambassador to China, Address to the Asia Society. 4 March 1997. Available HTTP. http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eap/970204_sasser_china.html.

²⁸ Statements made by the Secretary-General of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan's major opposition party to the American Assembly Delegation to Asia, and reported in its report of the 9-21 June 1996 titled "China-U.S. Relations in the 21st Century: Phase I." See footnote 25.

²⁹ Bruce Gilley, Sebastian Moffett, Julian Baum and Matt Forney. "Rocks of Contention: The dispute between China and Japan over the Diaoyu islands stirs up nationalist on both sides and threatens relations between North Asia's biggest powers." *Far Eastern Economic Review*. 19 September 1996. Available HTTP. http://www.feer.com/sept_19/relation_s19.html.

concerns in the political-military arena are directed at the worse-case scenarios of unification. Should the conditions under which the merger of Hong Kong and Macao with China take place go bad, the political and economic fall-out could cause irreparable harm to Japan's security environment. This could easily degenerate into a situation that the United States might feel it needs to act, using the forces stationed in Japan, possibly straining the U.S.-Japan security arrangements. No matter how the unification occurs, China's control of Hong Kong and Taiwan would give it an area from which to base its efforts in the South China Sea as well as greater control over the sea lanes through which almost all of Japan's oil must flow. This would increase greatly the perceived threat to Japan, as well as increase or at least reemphasize Japan's reliance on the United States and its forces to protect this critical element of its economic strength.³⁰

3. Territorial Disputes

As depicted in Figure 7, there are a large number on ongoing territorial and border disputes throughout East Asia that have the potential to disrupt Sino-Japanese relations and cause damage to Japan's immature security structure. These disputes, because they primarily occur in isolated areas and do not involve indigenous populations, have the dual possibility of being situations in which the use of force is more likely as well as disputes which could most easily be settled through regional and international dispute settlement

³⁰ This prospect was brought up by Kent E. Calder in his assessment of the future security environment of Japan for the Center of Naval Analyses. *Japan 2010: Prospective Profiles*. (Alexandria: Center for Naval Analyses. March 1996). p.23. Petrie outlines the idea of China using Hong Kong as a forward base for power projection and control of the South China Sea, "Capability and Intentions" pp. 96-97.

methods. Two of these disputes which most directly affect Japan and China are located in the Senkaku Islands/East China Sea and the South China Sea.

a. Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands

A potential flash point exists between China and Japan in the territorial dispute over the Senkaku islands (known as the Diaoyu islands to the Chinese), a group of eight islets and reefs approximately 102 nautical miles northeast of Taiwan and 240 nautical miles south of Okinawa.³¹ The islands are actually a series of reefs and rock shoals that, with the exception of the three largest, remain at least partially submerged most of the time. The largest island, (about 2 miles in length, and less than one mile in width) has in the past supported a Japanese fishery, a unimproved helicopter landing site, and recently a lighthouse. It was the construction of this lighthouse, initially in 1978 and most recently rebuilt in 1996, by a Japanese fringe group known as the *Seinensha* or Japanese Youth Federation, that reignited the current dispute.³²

The historical basis for China's claims date back to the 16th century when it exercised sovereignty over the area, though it is difficult to find anything that clearly states China's sovereignty over these particular rocks. China and Taiwan began to claim the islands again in the early 1970s after the publishing of a report on sea bed mineral

³¹ One of the most complete compilation of background information, grounds for claims for all three parties as well as the U.S. legal position and obligations is covered in an article prepared by the Congressional Research Service and reprinted by the Pacific Forum CSIS. Larry A. Niksch. "Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands Dispute: The U.S. Legal Relationship and Obligations." PacNet Newsletter Number 45, 8 November 1996. Reprinted in Pacific Forum, Center for Strategic and International Studies. Available HTTP. <http://www.csis.org/html/pac45.html>.

³² Nicholas D. Kristoff. "Behind Japan's Furor Over Tiny Isles, Gangland Fingerprints." *The New York Times*, 10 October 1996, p. 5.

research by the United Nations Economic Commission on Asia and the Far East which identified promising oil deposits around the Senkaku islands. When China created its Territorial Sea Law in 1992, it again claimed the islands.³³

Japan bases its claim on its integration of the Senkaku and the Ryukyu islands (which includes Okinawa) in 1879. It argues that the Senkaku islands are part of the Ryukyu chain and were not annexed with Taiwan and the Pescadores which were returned to China at the end of World War II. Additionally China expressed no objections to the status of the islands at the San Francisco Peace Treaty conference which clearly indicated the islands were not part of Taiwan. Japan also points out that it had leased the islands to the United States (which used them as a bombing range) which then returned them to Japan, with the rest of the Ryukyus and Okinawa by 1972.³⁴

There are three major reasons for the importance of this dispute: nationalism, fishing rights, and oil/mineral resources. From China's perspective, an important reason for this dispute is the growing importance it places on nationalism. According to Hungdah Chiu, director of East Asian Legal Studies at the University of Maryland, China "fanned all this nationalistic sentiment with its military exercises in Taiwan in March. Now it's out of control."³⁵ As nationalism becomes the glue that

³³ *Defense of Japan*, 1996, p. 44.

³⁴ Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "The Basic View on the Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands." Available HTTP. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/ja/senkaku.html>. Additionally see the Japanese Communist Party position in: "Questions Related to the Senkaku Islands and Perspectives for their Resolution." Available HTTP. <http://www.infoweb.or.jp/jcp/English/e-senkaku.html>.

³⁵ As quoted in James Cox. "Japan touches off furor by claiming Diaoyu Islands." Gannett News Service. 29 September 1996.

holds China together, it becomes increasingly important that sovereignty be protected. Sovereignty is something China can not allow to be questioned, though it may be secondary to economic concerns associated with the islands, as argued strongly by Michael Studeman in his detailed research into China's actions in the South China Sea.³⁶

The second reason for this dispute is fishing resources. The most important factor from Taiwan's perspective, the fishing rights associated with the Senkaku islands account for 40,000 tons of fish worth \$65 million a year pulled from the waters surrounding them, according to its national fishing association. Japan has worked bilaterally with Taiwan to resolve this issue and has reached agreement on the joint use of the waters, though it has not had success in dealing with China on this issue.³⁷

The final reason and probably the issue of primary concern is oil. It is believed that the islands might contain "one of the largest oil and gas reservoirs in the world" and control of the islands would confer title to about 22,000 square kilometers of continental shelf and parts of at least three major oil-bearing structures.³⁸ As noted by John Frankenstein, a China expert at the University of Hong Kong, "this is all about oil and gas. The reason you claim the Diaoyus isn't so much the Diaoyus, it's that it gives you extensive claims on the continental shelf."³⁹ Kent E. Calder, analyst for the Center

³⁶ Michael William Studeman. "Dragon in the Shadows: Calculating China's Advances in the South China Sea." (MA Thesis. Naval Postgraduate School. March, 1998). pp. 12-16, 63-83, and 125-130.

³⁷ Cox. 29 September 1996.

³⁸ As cited in Gilley, et al.

³⁹ As quoted in Cox.

for Strategic and International Studies, argues that China's search for energy and growing energy dependence on oil make the Senkaku islands/East China Sea a potentially more explosive issue than the South China Sea, because the two parties involved are the most powerful in the region. Calder equates the geological structure and potential for oil with the North Sea fields and speculates that the 10-100 billion barrels of oil that may be there are larger than the amount available in the South China Sea.⁴⁰

Despite the above reasons for the dispute, China has been willing to shelve its concerns for immediate economic and political reasons. In order to defuse the crisis, China has kept a lid on anti-Japanese activists in Beijing, ordered universities to clamp down on student activities in protest, and in Hong Kong, refused to certify protest ships to carry passengers.⁴¹ Deng Xiaoping suggested in 1978 that the sovereignty issue be put aside and that the islands be developed cooperatively and this same approach is being again offered in hopes that this dispute will not grow into something that might hinder growing Japanese investments in China.

b. South China Sea

Though Japan is not a claimant to any of the disputed areas within the South China Sea, it is greatly concerned with freedom of navigation, sea lane safety and access to resources that may potentially be in this area. Six countries (China, Taiwan,

⁴⁰ Kent E. Calder. "Energy Futures." *The Washington Quarterly*. Vol. 19. No. 4. Autumn 1996. p. 91. He also expands his argument on the importance of energy and the voraciously growing energy demand in East Asia in his book *Pacific Defense: Arms, Energy, and America's Role in Asia*. (William Morrow, 1996).

⁴¹ Ibid.

Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia) are contesting with each other for control of parts of the hundreds of islands, reefs and shoals that make up the various groupings within the South China Sea. As the major claimant, China has advanced its actions under the direction of its 1992 Territorial Sea Law which advocated its maritime rights at the cost of all other claimants. Under this law, China claimed exclusive sovereignty over the Senkakus, Paracels and Spratlys, and most of the remaining islands and reefs of the South China Sea, specified China's right to evict foreign vessels from its water, and authorized the pursuit of violators on the high seas. It also required all foreign warships give China prior notification and receive permission to pass through China's territorial seas.⁴² Most important to Japan, this law threatens freedom of navigation, and increases the possibility that armed conflict could disrupt the flow of goods through the region.

These territorial disputes provide a great opportunity to test Japan's commitment to using regional and multilateral forums for security concerns. Because these territorial disputes occur in isolated areas and do not involve indigenous populations, they have the dual possibility of being situations in which the use of force is more likely as well as the disputes most easily settled through regional and international dispute settlement methods. Michael Studeman argued that the South China Sea disputes with Vietnam and the Philippines demonstrate China's willingness to resort to the use of force when there is a "window of opportunity" both politically and militarily, when the

⁴² Bilson Kurus. "Understanding ASEAN: Benefits and Raison d' Etre." *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXIII. No. 8. August 1993. p. 836.

chance of international uproar at its actions is perceived as minimal and when the benefits outweigh the costs.⁴³ The ability of regional forums such as ARF to deal with aggressive actions, particularly with a country as formidable as China, will be a major test. China has made a number of statements that it could be interpreted to mean it is willing to resolve these situations through regional forums. For example, the July 1995 statement by China's Foreign Ministry spokesman insisting that China has no interest in disrupting freedom of navigation in the Spratlys, and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen's statement at the ASEAN-PMC that China would try and resolve the Spratlys dispute using the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. Despite these pronouncements, many continue to be skeptical of China's intentions and true willingness to allow these types of forums to work.⁴⁴

B. ENGAGEMENT VERSUS CONTAINMENT AND THE FUTURE

The success or failure of Japan's security arrangements could very well be played out in the potential areas for tension examined above. As discussed in Chapter II, Japan's ability to deal with China, as it expands its horizons and reenters the East Asian security community and the world as a powerful player, is hampered by a historically-based animosity and the perceived rise of and fear that a "new" Japanese nationalism, most often viewed as inseparable from remilitarization, is emerging. The modernization of

⁴³ Studeman, pp. 58-62.

⁴⁴ David B. H. Denoon and Wendy Frieman. "China's Security Strategy: The View from Beijing, ASEAN, and Washington." *Asian Survey*. Vol. XXXVI, No. 4. April 1996. pp. 425-426.

China's military has only added to problems with dealing with China's reemergence. In spite of, and in order to overcome these problems, Japan has developed its security arrangements based on the U.S.-Japan security arrangements, a defensive-only military, and an intent to develop regional and international security structures that will further peace and stability in the environment around it. The reinvigoration of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements has adjusted this security relationship from one clearly focused on the containment and defense against the expansion and aggression of the former Soviet Union and world communism, to one that provides for security in an environment that is characterized by threat uncertainty. This readjustment expands the basis of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements through incremental increases in Japan's own Self-Defense Forces' roles and missions, as well as through the support and development of regional security structures and multilateral approaches to conflict prevention.

The areas of tension highlighted above are the three areas that will test these arrangements. They emphasize the importance that China plays in the future of East Asia and demonstrate the reasons Japan might perceive China as a threat to it as well as to the stability and peace of East Asia. The unanswered question, however, is whether or not China will be a participant within this structure or if it (or others) believes this structure is an attempt to hold down or contain it. Given the difficulty in prognosticating future actions of countries, particularly a country that is in the midst of great change with perhaps even greater change forthcoming, I want to focus on the second part of this question, both from the perspective of China, as well as that of the United States and Japan.

1. The Problems of Engagement and Containment

One of the criticisms associated with the approach to security Japan and the United States have taken is that they have simply replaced the Soviet Union with China and the old Cold War policies of containment continue in East Asia. Japan, as during the Cold War, has again allowed the United States to take the lead in defining the policies and methods for implementation of those policies, though as discussed earlier, the Japanese are incrementally increasing their role and participating in greater levels. Nonetheless, a great deal of the current debate over engagement versus containment of China has occurred mainly in the United States. This does not denigrate the debate in Japan, but the level of involvement is definitely greater in the United States. While the security interests of the United States and Japan are different, current policy statements have shown the closeness that these two countries' policies reflect in the engagement of China.

The debate whether the current Japanese and U.S. approaches to China invokes engagement or containment depends on the perspective of the argument. From China's perspective, it seems clear that the leading advocate of the belief that the U.S.-Japan policies are designed to contain China is advanced by the PLA. According to Ronald N. Montaperto, Senior Fellow of the Institute for National Strategic Studies and the National Defense University, "the idea that the United States viewed China as a future, hostile peer competitor resided mainly within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Now, the PLA appears to have carried the day. Where the United States sees Comprehensive

Engagement, the Chinese see Containment.”⁴⁵ Professor Kenneth Lieberthal argues further that in fact the current leadership in China is unable to refuse the hard-line policies advocated by the PLA and is not able to insure a more cooperative course is taken. In response to the perception that U.S. policies were directed at containment and supporting of the current division of Taiwan from China, the PLA-advocated policies have been adopted by Jiang Zemin. The results of this have been harsh rhetoric, withdrawal of Chinese Ambassadors and the military exercises and missile firings of the coast of Taiwan following the visa fiasco with Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui.⁴⁶ The end result so far is that despite the efforts of the United States and Japan to articulate their policies under the title of engagement, China has continued to view them as simply efforts to contain China.

On the other hand, the desire of the United States and Japan to engage China can not be denied. It has been outlined in the Clinton administration’s East Asia Strategy Report (EASR), titled “United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region,”⁴⁷ and further defended by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and primary author of the report, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., in an article in

⁴⁵ Ronald N. Montaperto. “Managing U.S. Relations with China: Toward a New Strategic Bargain.” Institute for National Strategic Studies. National Defense University, *Strategic Forum*, Number 42. August 1995. p. 1.

⁴⁶ Kenneth Lieberthal. “A New China Strategy.” *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 74. No. 6. November/December 1995. pp. 39-40.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs. *United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region*. February 1995.

Foreign Affairs.⁴⁸ He argues that the strategy of engagement and enlargement has three parts: the reinforcement of the bilateral alliances as the heart of the strategy, maintenance of forward-based troops in East Asia and the development of regional institutions that are "confidence-building measures for the region."⁴⁹ Japan has made a similar effort with its National Defense Program Outline⁵⁰ and in its annual white paper *Defense of Japan 1996*.⁵¹ Both highlight the changes in the international system that reduce the overall chance of global war, but make the prospects for stability and peace in the region more difficult. They emphasize, as did the EASR, the primacy of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements in the defense of Japan and overall security and stability in the region. The prevention of destabilizing factors from escalating into serious international problems is given priority, with the development and improvement of regional, multilateral security structure and confidence-building measures (CBM) to improve the transparency of defense and security issues.

Consultant Paul S. Giarra focuses on the growth in importance of the bilateral relationship between the United States and Japan. He notes that this relationship has grown from a single factor in the global picture to become the most important aspect in

⁴⁸ Joseph S. Nye, Jr. "The Case for Deep Engagement." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 74, No. 4. July/August 1995. pp. 90-102.

⁴⁹ Ibid. pp. 94-95.

⁵⁰ Japan Defense Agency, *National Defense Program Outline in and after FY 1996*. Adopted 28 November 1995. Available HTTP. http://www.jda.go.jp/policy/f_work/taikou/index_e.html. Also in *Defense of Japan, 1996*, Reference 18. pp. 276-283.

⁵¹ Japan Defense Agency White Paper. *Defense of Japan 1996: Response to a New Era*. (Tokyo: The Japan Times, Ltd. July, 1996).

the security and doctrine of both countries and the driving force behind the policies toward China:

The bilateral relationship, once a single component of a much larger global confrontation with the Soviet Union, is now so important to the security of each country that its health has become a determinant of fundamental security principles and doctrines for both Washington and Tokyo.⁵²

For Japan, the alliance provides a successful way to avoid direct military confrontation with China, and for the United States, it provides the means through which it can stay effectively engaged in East Asia. It is from the basis of this bilateral relationship that engagement of China can occur.

The main idea behind the concept of engaging China is that we acknowledge China's increasing importance to the region and world, its growing strengths – both military and economic – and seek to nurture and draw it into the international community through communication and cooperation in all aspects of the relationship. The major condition, of course, is that China obeys the currently recognized norms of conduct. This is done through the conscious trade-off between the ideals of a modern democratic nation (in which direction engagement is to draw, push and cajole China toward) and the realities of maintaining communications and congenial relationships with a country undergoing the immense stress of the changes it is experiencing in its ideology, leadership and basic philosophy of operations in the international community.

Of course there are others who feel the ideas expressed under the term “engagement” are morally bankrupt and that the argument about engagement versus

⁵² Paul S. Giarra. “Point of Choice, Point of Departure.” *Japan Quarterly*. January-March 1997. p. 17

containment is nothing but semantics. This was posed by political columnist George Will in an opinion-editorial article, where he argued that engagement is nothing but a “frankly de-moralized policy of commercial and culture dealings that supposedly will, in time, produce the sedation and then the liberalization of China” necessary for it to be fully incorporated into the interdependent, global structure. Containment, on the other hand, means “skepticism about any early reform of China’s domestic tyranny, and diplomatic and military planning against China’s expansionist aspirations as they can be ascertained from China’s diplomacy and military procurement.” The bottom line, he goes on to say, is that the whole argument is unnecessary – there can be not doubt that the policy of the United States is to subvert and ultimately destroy the last remaining communist power:

What the schematic clarity of the dichotomy between engagement and containment obscures is this fact: Whatever the tactics, the strategic aim of U.S. policy is, and must be seen to be, the subversion of the Chinese regime. It is China’s turn.⁵³

Authors Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro argue along a similar line, that the dichotomy between engagement and containment leaves one to believe that these are the only two choices. Both are really “so vague as to be nearly meaningless” and are being defined either by “the Clinton administration’s confused rhetoric,” or by “China’s own propaganda machine” in such a way that engagement has come to suggest something worse:

⁵³ George F. Will. “China’s Turn.” *The Washington Post*. Thursday, 17 April 1997, p. A23.

the idea that making concessions to China and shrinking from imposing sanctions on it no matter how bad its behavior will encourage it to act with greater restraint and responsibility in the international community⁵⁴

Others, such as Chalmers Johnson, have argued that the policies of engagement are drifting towards containment of China, not as the result of a directed policy but actually from the lack of a serious long-term vision toward China, the lack of Asia specialists on the National Security Council and the loss of control of the current policies to the Pentagon. He argues that "the United States and Japan must recognize that their bilateral arrangements for the Cold war are no longer appropriate" and that the problem for both U.S. and Japanese foreign policy is not to inhibit the rise of Chinese power but to influence and adjust to it. The best thing the U.S. could do is to withdraw its ground forces from Japan and Korea as soon as practical, (forces he feels are inherently destabilizing) while strengthening the 7th Fleet and its naval assets in the area. Only these naval forces, he believes, are needed to influence China and moreover, they are welcomed by the other countries in the region for their defense of the sea lanes.⁵⁵

Despite the general theme that we should fear China, reflected in the title and cover of their book, the policy goals advocated by Bernstein and Munro are very close to those advanced by the proponents of engagement:

There are three goals: one, to ensure peace in Asia by maintaining a stable balance of power there; two, to encourage the largest and potentially most

⁵⁴ Bernstein, Richard. and Munro, Ross H. *The Coming Conflict With China*. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1997). pp. 203-204.

⁵⁵ Chalmers Johnson. "Containing China: U.S. and Japan Drift Toward Disaster." *Japan Quarterly*. October-December 1996. pp. 10-18. Also see his "The Chinese Way: In The Next Century, The World's Most Populous Nation Will Set The Pace in East Asia." *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*. No. 1. Vol. 53. 11 January 1997. p. 20.

powerful country in the region, namely China, to be a responsible state committed to nonproliferation, the peaceful resolution of disputes, and honest free trade; and three, to induce China to become more democratic and to respect the human rights of its own people, partly on the grounds that democracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes go hand in hand.⁵⁶

It is toward these three goals that all sides in the debate of engagement versus containment want to go. The question is whether you do that through the framework of a Cold War-like, adversary-based arrangement or through a more modern system that tries to limit conflict instead of embracing it. It is clear that the governments of the United States and Japan have chosen to advance behind the policies of engagement, though the execution of these policies has not been without problems. It also seems even those in opposition to these policies, agree with the ultimate goals associated with engagement.

The problems with the current policies of engagement include its lack of direction and problems with its articulation. Kenneth Lieberthal points to the Clinton administration's lack of an ability to prioritize as one of the biggest problems, because it has allowed every governmental agency to pursue its own China policy.

While the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative threatens sanctions over market access and intellectual property rights, the Department of Commerce goes all out to increase U.S. investment in China; while the Department of State thrashes China for human rights violations and nuclear proliferation, the Department of Defense works hard to develop military-to-military ties.⁵⁷

While in some ways a small dose of ambiguity created by this disparate set of actors might be appropriate or even helpful, the conflicting and contradictory statements and

⁵⁶ Ibid. p. 205.

⁵⁷ Lieberthal, p. 43.

actions of the U.S. has resulted in China not getting a clear picture or understanding the ultimate goals and desires of the participants.

Lieberthal also notes problems with President Clinton's direction of China policy and his public vacillation and about-faces on it, often in response to popular or congressional pressure. His examples of the delinking of China's most-favored nation status from human rights violations and the handling of Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui's visa to visit his alma mater aptly demonstrate the problems vacillations and reversal of policies can have on the President's credibility and Chinese perceptions.⁵⁸

In the case for either engagement or containment, the key to success for both is the relationship between the United States and Japan. The main difference between these two approaches can be seen in the roles, strengths and purpose for the relationship with Japan. The current position of Japan under the policies of engagement call for it to continue to incrementally adjust its military through its mid- to long-range plan laid out in the NDPO. It stresses the desire to develop and nurture regional, multilateral security structures that can develop into forums capable of diffusing tensions, settle disputes and generally begin to institutionalize the use of these forums for peace and stability in the region. It also calls for Japan to incrementally increase its role in international peace-keeping situations as well as disaster relief situations that meet the criteria established within its peace-keeping laws and constitution.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Ibid. pp. 44-45.

⁵⁹ "Five Principles Restricting Japan's Participation in PKO." *Defense Guide of Japan*, p. 1. Available HTTP. <http://cssew01.cs.nda.ac.jp/~yas/JDA/DOJ/PKO.html>. Also

Those who challenge the policies of engagement tend to call for a larger role for Japan. This is particularly the case with Bernstein and Munro. They foresee the need for a stronger, more "normal" Japan:

Preserving the balance of power in Asia essentially means one thing: strengthening Japan. The growth of Chinese power has made much of the recent American attitude toward Japan obsolete. We can no longer operate on the assumption that a weak Japan is a good Japan. Japan can be encouraged to reject China's guilt and intimidation campaign, not by repudiating its war guilt, but by building a credible military force even in the face of it... A strong Japan, in genuine partnership with the United States, is vital to a new balance of power in Asia. A weak Japan benefits only China, which wants not a stabilizing balance of power in Asia but Chinese hegemony, under which Japan would be little more than China's most useful tributary state.⁶⁰

The difficulty with this idea is that outside of those that advocate it, there does not seem to be a strong basis for support. Pushing Japan to enlarge its military as this proposes, would surely incite an arms race in the region. Beyond this, the general destabilizing effect it would have on the relations between the United States and Japan, let alone the relations with China, South Korea and much of Southeast Asia, could not possibly be in either Japan or the United States' best interest. While there is some in Japan who have called for Japan to progress toward becoming a more "normal nation,"⁶¹ this usually begins within the guise of the current security arrangements, and then incrementally increases the degree to which Japan would provide for its own defense. In

⁶⁰ Bernstein and Munro. pp. 219-220

⁶¹ See Edward W. Desmond. "Ichiro Ozawa: Reformer at Bay." *Foreign Affairs*. Vol. 74. No. 5. September/October 1995. pp. 117-131, "The Third Opening." *The Economist*. 9 March 1996, pp. 21-24. Morihiro Hosokawa. "Rebuilding the US-Japan Security Structure." Keynote Address, Seattle Washington, 12 March 1996. Available HTTP. <http://www.us-japan.org/jassw/what/archive96/031296Hosokawa.html>.

either case, the most difficult part for Japan would be the constitutional changes that would be required to advance in this direction.

2. Japan's role in the future

Despite the criticisms identified above which call for other approaches, the United States and Japan have decided that the engagement approach is the appropriate way to deal with China. For engagement to work, the United States and Japan must work to better articulate and convey to China's leaders the conduct expected of major powers at this time, so that neither country will be seen by China as the sole enforcer of these norms. A good example of the progress made in this area, was in Prime Minister Hashimoto's remarks before the National Press Club in Washington, D.C. In his comments on China he reemphasized Japan's desire to:

support China's reform and openness policy so that it consolidates its status as a constructive partner in the international community. At the same time, there is an increasing need for China to adjust a variety of its domestic systems so that they will become consistent with international rules and standards.

Additionally he called for China to continue its efforts to increase transparency of its defense forces, as well as the need to deal with the issues of the environment, energy supplies and population growth in regional forums. On human rights, Prime Minister Hashimoto emphasized that "greater awareness will develop with regards to human rights

and other social issues,” based on an incremental increases in contacts between China and the international community and with the economic development of China.⁶²

The important aspect of this speech is that Japan and the United States can be seen to be speaking as one, in terms that clearly show the desire to bring China more fully into the international community as an actor with whom all are able to work. Without the acrimony and moral indignation that often accompanies U.S. comments on human rights, Prime Minister Hashimoto was able to stress the importance of this area to the world, while at the same time acknowledge China’s progress toward better relations. Additionally, while the United States has been the standard bearer of the policies of engagement, another champion now clearly articulates its standards of conduct. Best yet, this is from an Asian perspective, something with which China may relate. For the policies of engagement to work, more of this positive communications needs to occur.

Within Japan, there is a growing concern that the level of public awareness about the importance of the security arrangements, the level of involvement appropriate for the Self-Defense Forces and the importance of China to this overall process is very low and has not made it into the public consciousness. Open and public debate is needed within Japan on what its role in the security of the region should be, in order to defeat the problems of neutrality associated with lack of knowledge and concern.

⁶² Remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro before the National Press Club, Washington D.C., 25 April 1997. “Japan’s Path and the Japan-U.S. Relationship.” Available HTTP. <http://www.mofa.go.jp/424-051/w425.html>.

While it is clear that the government of Japan is clearly behind incremental increases in its roles and missions, both of its SDF and its diplomatic roles, the people of Japan are woefully uninformed and uninvolved in the process. The politicization of Okinawa has increased the attention on the unfair proportion of support it provides, which has had the positive affect of involving the average citizen of Okinawa in discussions of the security arrangements and the methods in which they are carried out.⁶³ This same involvement must be brought to the main islands of Japan, and in a more positive light. This is necessary if any of the forces are to be relocated from Okinawa to the main islands, and it will have the secondary benefit of beginning the process by which the issues about Japan's role in the international community and level of support for future actions can be obtained.⁶⁴

⁶³ Giarra, p. 25.

⁶⁴ Activities to promote public understanding of the SDF are part of the JDA actions to better inform and involve the public into these forces role in Japan. They are outlined in *Defense of Japan*, pp. 196-197. Additionally, the most recent public opinion survey conducted by the Prime Minister's office in 1995, did show an increase in public interest in the activities and missions of the SDF. p. 197.

VI. CONCLUSION

In this thesis I have looked at Japan's reaction to the reemergence of China as a powerful player in East Asia security affairs, particularly as manifest in the modernization of the People's Liberation Army. In so doing, I have attempted to answer the question, "To what degree has Japan's reevaluation of its security position has been influenced by the reemergence of China and how will this 'China factor' continue to affect Japan as it inches toward its newly described role?"

I began by looking at the Sino-Japanese relationship from a historical perspective. I found that many of the key events in the modern relations of Japan and China have contributed to the development of sources of negative tensions that continue to influence this relationship today. Despite the historical animosity, belief in a kind of Japanese uniqueness and fear of a remilitarized Japan, there is an equal if not greater positive trend toward economic interaction and social conduct. In fact, the level of interaction between Japan and China, in terms of trade, loans and interpersonal contacts, is the highest among any other country (excluding Greater China) with which China has relations. The level of Japanese investment into China has increased from approximately \$349 million in 1990 to over \$2.5 billion in 1994. The Japanese trade deficit with China in 1995 was almost \$14 billion, with imports of almost \$36 billion and exports of almost \$22 billion. It seems to be the case, however, that the deep-seated negative tensions that are a result of the history of animosity and destructive actions of Japan continue to arise and disrupt relations between the two countries. China continues to use these historical

animosities and Japan's history of aggression as a whip to beat Japan with whenever they feel threatened by Japanese actions.

I also found that China's rapidly developing economy has been able to provide the fiscal resources necessary for moderate military modernization of the People's Liberation Army (PLA). Based on the Four Modernizations, they reflect militarily the lessons learned from China's poor showing in the Sino-Vietnam border war and the performance of the allied forces in the Persian Gulf War. From these stimuli China has evolved its guiding military doctrine and strategy from that of a "People's War" to a modern version oriented on "limited war." This shift is reflected in a broad-based defense doctrine comprising the central concepts of local war, active peripheral defense, and rapid power projection. It is for these reasons that the China threat is believed to be growing, and analysts in Japan lay claim that a "new cold war" has begun. China's concentration on modernizing the PLAN is particularly threatening to Japan. A move to develop a blue water navy, while arguably aimed at protecting China's territorial sovereignty in the South China Sea, is equally disturbing to the security of these sea lanes, through which the vast majority of its oil and natural resource imports must flow.

Japan's effort to modernize its security affairs began with the revision of the National Defense Program Outline and the five-year Mid-term Defense Program. These constitute the foundation on which the Japanese organize, change and improvement their defense system. After reviewing the new changes, this thesis argues that the JSDF is well-equipped with modern weapons and as well-trained as can be expected given self-imposed limitations. It is capable of conducting operations in the defense of Japan and is

in the process of restructuring, making force and equipment level changes, and preparing to conduct training to meet its new missions.

Key to meeting the new requirements of the NDPO and MTDP is strengthening and employing a joint structure. The problem of Japan's "stove pipe" approach to the SDF has not been addressed adequately by systemic reforms. The Joint Staff Council continues to be nothing more than an advisory body, and one not responsible, nor greatly involved in the separate defense forces. The improvements in command, control and communications will go a long way to making the current joint system more interoperable and compatible, but does nothing to improve the diffusion of direction at the upper levels within the defense establishment.

The "balanced approach" advanced by the NDPO and the MTDP also has an inherent conflict in missions. The new emphasis on multilateral security efforts and Japan's role in United Nations peace-keeping missions are restricted greatly by the "Five Principles" governing the use of Japanese forces. These limitations, coupled with the continued constitutional question on the use of and deployment of Japanese forces outside the border of Japan, greatly impair the possibility that Japan will be able to fulfill successfully their newly stated role in anything more than a cursory manner. Until the conflict between the SDF's "new mission" of peace-keeping and the restrictive principles for its participation is resolved, Japan's participation can only be nominal.

The budget has and will continue to be the major arbiter between desire and capability. Competition exists between the large host nation support requirements for the U.S. forces stationed in Japan and the funds needed to continue the modernization of

the Self-Defense Forces. When these two are placed within the context of Japan's current economic conditions and the one percent ceiling under which the JDA has worked under since 1976, the question of priority becomes real. Resolving this issue is something that must be done incrementally and could continue to be a problem for years to come. The constraints of the budget and the competition it causes between the SDF's new *raison d'être* peace-keeping, and the U.S.-Japan security relations must be resolved for Japan to finish its modernization for the 21st Century.

The procedural way in which Japanese security and defense matters are addressed and the systematic way the National Defense Program Outline and the Mid-Term Defense Program are reviewed, revised and updated make clear that external threat concerns have at best a weak influence on the process. While this may simply be a reflection of the relatively peaceful nature of the current security environment, it seems clear that at least currently, fears of some sort of "China threat" is not directly influencing the process by which Japan reviews and modernizes its Self-Defense Forces. The greatest influences on the modernization process have come from internal sources. The bureaucratic process and system Japan has developed to manage and control its security forces, domestic political concerns, the pacifism that has been embraced by a majority of the Japanese people have greatly influenced how and what Japan modernizes.

External factors such as the U.S. security arrangements also have a strong influence on the modernization of the Japanese defense forces both directly, through limitations on what it will and will not provide, and indirectly in the pressure it puts on Japan to increase its portion of this defense commitment. Other external factors such as

the growing regional and international structures for security which Japan is both an active participant in and a strong endorser of, have had a moderate influence on the modernization process both as a forum in which Japan can discuss and address security issues, as well as a reason for structural and mission changes to its defense forces. As Japan develops these forums, possibly into ones with some sort of enforcement mechanism, they will play an even stronger role in the future.

In that Japan has developed its defense forces and security structure devoid of any specific orientation or threat, the reemergence of China in regional and international affairs has had almost no direct influence in the modernization process or the orientation of the Japanese defense forces. The reaction to China's reemergence, as it impacts on Japan's security concerns, is much greater at a higher, strategic and political level and is reflected in the U.S.-Japan security relationship.

The U.S.-Japan security relationship has progressed from a one-sided relationship characterized by total dependence to one that though not reciprocal, at least has the two countries dealing with each other as more equal partners in providing for the stability and security of Japan. It has dealt with changing priorities within each government, economic tensions and disputes, yet has remained the most important bilateral relationship in the world.

The influence of China on this relationship has changed over time as well. The early stages of the Cold War saw China as a junior partner to the Soviet Union and any concern of it from a security perspective was secondary to the Soviet Union and Japan's defense forces were developed to defend against this threat. As the Cold War progressed,

China's influence grew in the economic and political realms but it remained a lessor threat to the Soviet Union in the security arena. With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union that China began to have influence into the U.S.-Japan security relations, but only weakly. Despite its decline and the economic and political troubles, Russia was still seen as the greatest threat. With the focus of the security arrangement turned toward stability in the region, China's growing military modernization and aggressive actions clearly have become one of the primary concerns of the security arrangements and will affect the direction of the relationship.

The year-long review of the U.S.-Japan security relationship brought about a renewed and revitalized desire for cooperation and stability to the region. The emphasis of the alliance has shifted from one focused on just the defense of Japan to one concerned with the broader regional security issues as well. The review process and the Joint Declaration which came from it has resulted in a stronger security relationship between the United States and Japan than at any time during the Cold War. Prime Minister Hashimoto's statement clearly highlights its importance. "There is no other bilateral relationship in the world that has any semblance to the Japan-U.S. relationship in the present and fundamental importance. I would like to reiterate my determination to further enhance the Japan-U.S. relationship for the benefit of not only the two peoples, but also for the Asia Pacific region and the world as a whole."

China's conduct in its seizing of Mischief reef off the coast of the Philippines and its naval exercises and missile firings off the coast of and over Taiwan, demonstrate that while it may not be a direct threat to Japan, its aggressive actions prove it to be an

intimidating presence that introduces instability in the region. Japan's vigorous endorsement of the U.S.-Japan security arrangements reflect China's negative influence.

Japan and the United States have worked closely to develop an environment that strives to integrate China. It requires, however, China's continued desire to be an involved actor within this established structure. This point was made clear in the Joint Declaration on Security by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto on 17 April 1996, "...it is extremely important for the stability and prosperity of the region that China play a positive and constructive role, and in this context [the peaceful resolution of problems in the region], stressed the interest of both countries in furthering cooperation with China." The environment and structure of the security relationship between the United States and Japan stresses the importance of China and attempts to engage China in stabilizing and peaceful ways. It is not an attempt to contain China, though miscommunications and misperceptions on either side could cause it to go that way. China, more than any other player in the region, controls the way in which relationships in the region will develop. Their involvement in various regional and international forums and their actions in the region will be the factors that decide the future directions of the U.S.-Japan security relations as well as Sino-Japanese and Sino-American relations.

The Japanese, with their "balanced approach" to security in Asia, have carefully and incrementally prepared for the 21st Century. By addressing security from bilateral, regional/multilateral, and international approaches, Japan has put its relationships on a more even keel. It is no longer relying exclusively on the United States-Japan security

arrangements nor waiting for the United States to lead the way in its foreign policy. The 'China factor,' in its small way, has compelled Japan to better prepare itself to deal with the United States, its neighbors, as well as the rest of the world, as it prepares for the 21st Century.

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